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ABSTRACT
This thesis initially reviews the current state of economic theory on the 
intra-household allocation of resources. It examines the 'game theory1 
framework within which the models are constructed, suggesting that such a 
framework, as yet, has been unable to deal with the complex combination of 
power, altruism, and trust that lead to the conflictual/cooperative nature 
of spousal relationships. It examines the problems of constructing indices 
of power, and suggests a way in which, in this particular case, some of the 
problems may be overcome.
Using qualitative and quantitative evidence from Uganda, the thesis 
describes how bridewealth, division of household assets on death or 
divorce, attitudes to women earning an income and accumulating assets, and 
marital violence effect the financial relationship and the balance of power 
between spouses. Issues such as household budgeting systems, secrecy, 
female participation rates, and division of responsibility for household 
expenditure are seen as important elements of this relationship. Data 
collected on child nutrition is used to examine the impact that these 
factors have on child welfare.
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"The men are not grateful. You come a long way from a grass 
thatched hut, you build a house with iron sheets roof, you 
have bought a bicycle. But it does not shame him to tell 
you to get out. He can't remember that you worked together. 
He chases you with nothing. Sometimes he may even take away 
your clothes too. They know how to make you go naked." 
(Zitwe Women's FGD)
"There are some who say that if my husband does not beat me, 
I do not feel that he loves me." (Zitwe Women's FGD)
"In fact even if she earns money, if you are not very 
careful it may result in separation between you. Because 
whenever a wife gets money, she asks herself the reason for 
which she is being 'ruled'. [Prolonged laughter laced with 
comments like "Then the home dies", "The home falls apart", 
"In fact you have killed the marriage."] (Ggunda Men's FGD)
"If you have your cash like that in your basket, he can get 
it and use it. He can also beat you. Money, that belongs to 
you, can make you be beaten." (Zitwe Women's FGD)
"If you are taking [the children when you leave your 
husband], are they yours? We just give birth." (Kirangira 
Women's FGD)
"When a woman does not produce, the man will chase you away, 
and he will say he cannot remain with you. 'You are eating 
my food for nothing. You are just filling the toilet.1 " 
(Zitwe Women's FGD)
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1INTRODUCTION
The emergence, in the last decade, of literature on intra-household resource 
allocation is important because it tackles the issue of gender inequality 
within the household. Recognising the extent, and the forms of, gender 
inequality is important in itself, but it is also crucial for understanding 
the determinants of both household and individual outcomes, such as 
household and individual production decisions, female labour supply, 
consumption patterns, savings behaviour, and welfare outcomes.
For example there is considerable literature attempting to understand the 
processes of economic growth. If such analyses are only conducted by using 
comparisons between households, or at the firm level, there will be little 
understanding of the obstacles within the household that women face in their 
attempts to accumulate wealth.
In the literature common determinants of female labour supply are the 
potential wage that women may receive, women's education, age, the number of 
young children, and husbands' income. Yet a wife may not necessarily have 
access to her husband's income. The husband's contribution to household 
expenses, rather than his level of income, may lead to a wife participating 
in the economy.
Similarly, there is an increasing econometric literature attempting to 
identify the determinants of child nutrition (Alderman 1990, Behrman 1987, 
Behrman 1988, Thomas 1990). This literature often includes parental 
education, and, when the data are available, maternal and paternal income. 
Yet, while acknowledging the importance of women's role in improving 
nutrition, it does not include issues such as the contribution of both 
spouses to household expenditure as opposed to income, control over income 
and decision-making. As Bennett puts it:
''One of the key steps to understanding women's role in the
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determination of child health and nutrition may be careful 
investigation of the process of resource allocation within the 
household. It is essential to understand gender-specific priorities 
for expenditure and the degree to which men and women control or 
influence various areas of decision-making." (Bennett 1990:100)
Another justification for intra-household studies is that without knowledge 
and understanding of internal household dynamics, development projects may 
not achieve their aims, and, in some instances, have negative effects on 
welfare. Projects that assume that household income and assets are pooled 
may cause considerable inequity. For example, a project in Sudan and the 
Sahel which aimed to restore cattle after herds were lost in a severe 
drought, granted cattle to male 'heads-of-households1, not realising that 
cattle were owned individually, not by households, and that women had also 
lost cattle (Cloud 1978, cited in Rogers 1990). Blumberg (1988) cites 
several development projects where payment for cash crops was given to men 
on the assumption that income is pooled. Instead much of the work was done 
by women who received little reward for their labour (Cameroon - Jones 1983, 
Kenya - Apthorpe 1971, Kenya - Broche-Due 1983, the Gambia - Carney and 
Watts 1990). Projects may assist some members of the household, but place 
heavy burdens on others. For example, children can be important contributors 
to household labour, and projects that encourage their education can have 
unanticipated effects. If the child's work is seen as 'women's work', women 
may have to increase their working hours to make up for the loss of labour. 
In Muslim communities, where women's movements outside the home are 
restricted, children may be women's means of selling agricultural produce. 
Loss of children's labour may severely reduce women's income. In the Gambia, 
a well-documented irrigated rice project obtained low yields because women 
eventually refused to contribute their labour since they did not own the 
land and were unsure of the returns they would obtain from their labour (Dey 
1981). Messer (1990) describes the depth of information necessary to 
understand internal household dynamics, in order to prevent such mistakes.
"(In order) to anticipate potential project impacts, it is necessary 
to examine marriage rules, residence rules, social and biological 
processes leading to cycles of shared residence, work and consumption 
of individuals and the domestic unit.... This includes understanding 
how labour is recruited, the sex and age division of labour, the rules 
for transmission of property within and across generations, concepts 
of ownership of material possessions, skills, information and time, as 
well as rules for sharing such resources," (Messer 1990:52)
By ignoring intra-household issues, it would appear that standard household 
surveys have underestimated the extent of inequality and may have failed to 
identify the poorest. For example, household surveys assume that all
members have an equal share of household income, when in fact a member of a 
wealthy, unequal household may have access to fewer resources than a member 
of a poorer household. Studies that have examined this issue suggest 
standard household surveys do significantly underestimate the level of 
inequality and therefore provide a misleading picture of the patterns of 
poverty. Haddad and Kanbur (1990), using data from the Philippines, suggest 
that a household survey underestimated the level of inequality by somewhere 
between 35% to 60% depending on the index used. 1 Using data from the U.S. 
and Italy, Findlay and Wright (1996) come to a similar conclusion. Lacking 
access to individual data, they simulated unequal sharing of household 
resources and calculated rates of male and female poverty.
There have been a great many studies on nutrition, and a growing number 
attempting to understand issues of control and decision-making within the 
household, and how these affect women’s position. But there are few that 
combine both a qualitative and quantitative approach to understanding social 
relations and structures that determine women's control over resources and 
their impact on child welfare. This study aims to fill that gap.
The initial question that provided the motivation for this thesis was to 
what extent is the nutritional status of children is determined by women's 
control over resources, rather than the 'household' as a whole. 2 The policy 
implication being that raising household income, or increasing employment 
opportunities for women may not have to desired effect on nutrition if it is 
women's actual control over cash income that matters. The international 
evidence on the link between nutritional status and household income is 
mixed (Basu 1996, Casterline et al 1989). Mencher's study (1988) shows in 
South India that if household income is held constant, mainourishment is 
lower if the woman is working. Kumar (1977) suggests that rising income has 
a better income on nutritional status if the wife is working. Yet earning 
is not synonymous with control of the income. Kennedy (1995) in a study on 
the impact of commercialisation of agriculture on health argues that it is 
female-controlled income that makes a substantial difference. One aim of 
this thesis was to collect household level data in Uganda to assess the 
relative importance of household income, women's income, and women's control 
over income for nutrition. The broader aim of this thesis was to: a) use 
the allocation decisions concerning child nutrition as an example in order 
to examine the broader processes of negotiation within the household; b) to 
assess the validity of the current theoretical framework used to analyse 
intra-household decisions; and b) to study the socio-economic factors that 
are important in that decision-making process within a particular community.
1
Haddad and Kanbur also suggest that if the sample is stratified, the estimate of inequality in each strata does not 
alter much, according to whether the household or individual measure is used, suggesting the location of inequality did not 
vary with the method of measurement (Haddad and Kanbur 1990).
2
The debates surrounding the problem of defining a 'household' are discussed in chapter 3.
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The bargaining model literature attempts to develop a theoretical framework 
within which to examine issues of intra-household allocation. 3 This 
literature is reviewed here, particularly with a view to assessing its 
practical relevance as a guide to conceptualising the dynamics within the 
household. Does it clarify the process by which the levels of contributions 
to household needs are decided? Does the framework suggest relevant 
questions that have to be asked of the data in order to reveal the processes 
at work? It is argued that the implicit social relations, that inevitably 
form the basis on which allocation decisions are made, are not dealt with 
adequately. 4 Without a knowledge of the social (or gender) relations it is 
not possible to understand the motivation and rationale behind individuals' 
decisions.
The subsequent chapters go on to show the importance of the social context 
in which intra-household allocation decisions take place for understanding 
household and individual outcomes. The role of marriage customs and 
bridewealth in shaping the conjugal contract are examined. Attitudes to the 
association between money and authority are discussed, and how they lead to 
the unacceptability of women controlling income and assets. The intra­
household decisions that influence female labour supply are explored. The
interrelationship between women's decision to work, household budget 
management, women's control over income and assets, and, women's shares of 
household expenses are also examined. It is concluded that models that do 
not acknowledge the importance of individuals' gender in limiting their 
activities through social relations fail to explain the causes of gender 
inequality, how inequality is maintained, and the intra-household allocation 
driven by that inequality.
The main body of the thesis is based on qualitative and quantitative
evidence collected during a year's fieldwork in Uganda. By using both types 
of methodology it is hoped that the strength of qualitative, sociological / 
anthropological approaches are combined with the quantitative methods of 
economics.
Why Uganda?
An analysis of intra-household resource allocation is, in a sense, a valid 
exercise for any society, rich or poor, in order to increase our
understanding of the dynamics of gender relations and its effect on
3
Doss (1996) gives a recent summary
4
For example, female labour supply may be more dependent on husbands' propensity to forbid their wives from working, 
than any material needs or practical possibilities of working.
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household outcomes. However it is particularly relevant in poorer 
communities where the use of resources is all the more important because 
they are scarce, and because that scarcity in itself can place additional 
pressures on gender relations, increasing any conflict. Uganda is one of the 
poorest countries with GDP per capita at US$ 547 (World Bank 1996). A World 
Bank report (1992) classified 56% of the population in the central region as 
living below the poverty line, and 20% as living in deep poverty. 5 The use 
of household income in such circumstances is crucial for nutrition levels 
and child survival, let alone education.
Uganda is also interesting because there has been rapid economic growth, 
with an average annual GDP growth rate of 6.5% in the period 1987-1997. 
This has resulted in increasing levels of female participation in income 
generating activities. 6 A switch from a situation where one spouse is 
earning the household income to joint contribution may shift the balance of 
control over income, or lead to pressure for a change and conflict over 
control. Where the data allow there will be a discussion of the impact of 
these changes on household outcomes below.
Structure of the thesis
Chapter 2 reviews the theoretical literature on intra-household allocation 
of resources. Chapter 3 deals with methodological issues: the choice of the 
field site; the problem of defining the 'household' and the possible 
alternatives; the qualitative and quantitative methodologies used; how 
representative the sample is of the broader population and the construction 
of variables used in subsequent chapters. Chapter 4 examines the gender gap 
in Uganda between men and women's education levels, involvement in market 
activity, income levels, assets and health. It also compares the situation 
of married women with that of single women.
Chapter 5 discusses three aspects of the Bugandan marriage contract: the
implications of bridewealth for spousal relations; division of household 
assets on divorce, or on death of husband; and, attitudes towards marital 
violence and any changes in its likely prevalence. Chapter 6 examines 
attitudes towards women who earn a monetary income on their own account, and 
towards those who are economically independent. It examines data on the 
determinants of men's decision to prevent women from working, female
Living poverty was defined as having an income of below 5000 Ush per capita per month which is required in order to
have a sufficient intake of calories plus some reasonable non-food expenditure {eg clothing & fuel); living in deepest 
poverty was defined as having an income of below 2500 Ush per capita per month which is required in order to have the bare 
minimum for adequate food intake (world Bank 1992)
6
See chapter 4.
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participation rates, and the extent of labour market segmentation.
Chapter 7 discusses different household budgeting systems and the 
implications each has for the degree of shared control over household 
resources. It also looks at attitudes towards the allocation of 
responsibility for meeting household expenditures, and the importance of 
secrecy. A significant proportion of this chapter will examine data on 
household contributions, and how they differ according to likely control 
over joint household assets, education, wealth of household, and the 
rural/urban divide. Chapter 8 will examine the impact of these
circumstances on the nutritional status of children, in an attempt to judge 
the impact of spousal 'inequality on children. Each chapter discusses the 
qualitative evidence - and then looks at the statistical evidence to 
determine the degree to which the data support the claims made in the first 
part. The remaining sections of this introductory chapter will examine, 
firstly, the areas of academic debate that form an important context to this 
thesis, and secondly the broad categories of intra-household allocation 
decisions that form a central part of this thesis.
This thesis draws on research from a variety of fields - anthropology, 
family research, feminism, history as well as economics. There are a number 
of thorny theoretical issues that should be discussed in order to clarify 
the approach that forms the background to the thesis: firstly, the
importance of analysing how gender is constructed; secondly, the usefulness 
of the term 'patriarchy'; thirdly, the relationship between class and 
gender; and fourthly, the relevance of a materialist approach as a means of 
dealing with these problems.
Deconstruction of gender versus 'sex roles'
In any discussion of the relationship between men and women it is relatively 
easy to make assumptions about the static nature of male and female 
identities. Attempts to contrast men and women's situation, in order to 
reveal the extent of gender inequality, can lead to a failure to examine how 
men and women's relative positions are changing, along with changing 
perceptions of what it is to be male or female.
In a review of the impact of feminism on family research, Ferree (1990) 
discusses the advantages of a 'gender perspective' over a 'sex roles' 
approach, suggesting that while the latter 'assumes a certain packaging of 
structures, behaviours and attitudes. The gender model analyses the 
construction of such packages.' (Ferree 1990:868). Ferree asks the 
rhetorical question of how the 'construction of gender' maintains such an 
unequal balance, and in doing so explains the importance of a critical
1 2
analysis of gender.
"How is the illusion of gender dichotomy constructed and maintained in 
the face of between-sex similarity and within-sex difference? (It is) 
through a constant process of engendering behaviour as separate and 
unequal. By 'doing gender' individuals claim a gender identity for
themselves, and convey it to others Social structures provide the
concrete resources and constraints that shape the ongoing 
interactions, and all sorts of objects and relationship, not just 
individual people, have gender meanings." (Ferree 1990:868).
Gender identities, and how they change, are crucial to understanding the 
relationship between men and women. Gender identities delimit what men and 
women can and cannot do, and can restrict women's activities considerably. 
For example, in Uganda a husband can refuse to allow his wife to visit her 
relatives, can forbid her to work, and can claim her assets. Such norms that 
define acceptable behaviour can be used as a means of control over women's 
activities, and maintain women's subordinate position. Yet in order to 
understand how gender inequality is perpetuated it is important to examine 
how gender identities change with changing circumstances, such as, for 
example, women's increasing employment. This thesis attempts to not only to 
explore the relationship between men and women, but also to see how gender 
identities are changing, particularly in a situation of economic growth that 
is occurring in Uganda, as women increasingly become involved in the market 
economy.
The problem with patriarchy
Notions of patriarchy are still common in discussions of gender inequality 
(for example, Walby 1 990), and it is important to point out the extent of 
the validity of the concept. Pollert (1996) explains the limitations of 
patriarchy as an analytical term. she argues that viewing patriarchy as an 
explanation for women's position requires a description of the material 
basis on which the 'patriarchal system' rests. Yet such descriptions slip 
into ahistoricism. As an example, Pollert cites Hartmann: ' The material
base upon which patriarchy rests lies most fundamentally in men's control 
over women's labour power. Men maintain this control by excluding women from 
access to essential productive resources... and by restricting women's 
sexuality' (Hartmann 1979:11, cited in Pollert 1996:642). Men's control over 
women is explained through acts of exclusion and control, which in turn can 
only be explained by themselves. Patriarchy can only be used as an 
exploratory tool and not an explanatory one (Fine 1992).
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Class and gender
Another debate that has plagued feminist analyses is the relationship 
between class and gender (Acker 1988). Does a woman fall into her husband's 
class by virtue of the benefits that she gains through him, or does she fall 
into another category because of the inequality that women face at home and 
in the wider arena? In essence the problem here is in the attempt to 
classify individuals into a particular category/class, and in not allowing 
several 'systems' to run concurrently where an individual occupies a place 
in each. In fact 'gender and class are mutually determining1 (Moore 
1988:80), because men and women hold both gender and class positions 
simultaneously. For example, a husband’s decision to allow his wife to earn 
an income is influenced by the household's need for an extra income (i.e. 
class position) . And, in turn, that decision may well influence the wealth 
and the class position of the household, and the nature of gender relations 
between the couple.
This inter-dependency between class and gender plays a critical role in the 
process of change. For example, a period of hardship may force a husband to 
allow his wife to work; her new income may increase her bargaining power; 
and her husband may either accept a sharing of authority, or retract his 
initial decision because the challenge to gender identities is too great to 
be absorbed. His decision may depend on the wealth (or class) position of 
the household. It is an analysis of this type of interaction, which occurs 
in the face of change, which enables an understanding of how the relative 
positions of men and women ebb and flow.
A materialist approach
Pollert proposes that historical materialist analysis is the most suitable 
means of carrying out such an exercise - an analysis 1 that is not confined 
to the economy or employment relationship....but one that presupposes that 
there is a material existence and experience 'out there' to be explored' 
(Pollert 1996:647); that economic relations are embedded in broader social 
relations, and in particular, in gender relations. Structures and social 
relations impinge on individuals, not only in their work, but at home, in 
links with kin, and in their emotional and sexual lives. This thesis adopts 
such an approach in order to describe the nature of the relationship between 
husband and wife, and how this relationship impacts on economic decisions 
and welfare outcomes.
1 4
Defining 'intra-household allocation of resources'
The phrase 'the intra-household allocation of resources' has to be 
dismantled, and the areas of interest specified, before the term can be 
analysed in any practical sense. It is insufficient to determine who 
consumes what, as this will only cover consumption decisions over such items 
as food, clothes etc. The decision to earn cash, or to contribute labour to 
household production are decisions of allocation, as are expenditure 
decisions. Allocation decisions fall into several broad categories:
allocation between market and non-market production7, private and public 
household consumption8, current and future consumption, and parent versus 
child allocation.
In this study the particular allocation decisions examined are:
* whether a married woman works for an income, as well as contributing 
to non-market production;
* her allocation of that income between household recurrent 
expenditure, personal consumption, and accumulation of assets;
* whether a married woman chooses to keep those assets at her marital 
home for current use, or elsewhere as future security;
* the male spouse's decision to contribute to public household 
expenditure.
The social structures that are studied are those that impinge on these
decisions. These include
* the marriage contract;
* the likely divorce settlement, including custody over children;
* the opportunities in the market economy.
The aspects of the social relations that are examined are:
* prevailing attitudes towards authority within a marriage and their 
link to control over resources;
* the acceptability of women earning an income, and accumulating
assets;
* the responsibility for meeting household expenditure.
The measure of outcome chosen is the nutritional status of children. It is
Market production is defined here as earning an income on an individual's own account. It does not include 
production of marketed goods where the income is retained by the other spouse. Non-market production includes that for home 
consumption, and unpaid labour for another's market production.
This distinction is used throughout the thesis. Private consumption refers to personal items such as: clothes,
transport, hair & cosmetics, alcohol etc. Public household consumption refers to shared items such as: food, water, tables, 
chairs, pots and pans etc.
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argued that nutritional status is the cumulative outcome of allocative 
decisions in the four areas mentioned:
* the maternal decision to earn an income;
* the parental decision to choose household consumption over private
consumption;
* the parental choice of current consumption over future security;
* meeting their children's needs over their own.
Despite the need for specificity, the main motivating forces behind the 
social relations within the community studied can be generalised and are 
outlined in the following few paragraphs. They are frequent and central 
themes in subsequent chapters.
The decision to earn an income on her own account is not automatic for a 
married woman. It is influenced by the social norms concerning the 
acceptability of woman's control over income, contributions to the household 
made by the other spouse, by the level of poverty of the household, as well 
as the potential wage rate and the number of young children.
The decision how to divide personal income between private consumption and 
household expenditure is affected by social norms concerning responsibility 
for household expenditure, and the likely control over assets once they are 
within the public household domain. A low level of control over these assets 
may act as a disincentive to contribute to the acquisition of public 
household goods.
A distinction has to be made between current consumption that occurs during 
the marriage, and savings for future consumption should the marriage end. 
Such an allocation decision will be influenced by the likely division of 
assets at divorce, (or on the death of the other spouse) and the likelihood 
of divorce itself. If divorce is a possible outcome, and one spouse is 
unlikely to be able to retain an equitable share of the assets, an incentive 
to save outside the marital home exists. Thus, educated women who are 
relatively more able to support themselves, and their children, may be more 
willing to initiate a divorce. Uneducated women who have no means of being 
economically independent, may go to considerable lengths to maintain the 
marriage. This latter category includes women from poor households who have 
to earn a significant portion of the household income, but who are unable to 
accumulate sufficient assets to 'make a go of it' alone.
Also at issue is the extent to which parents meet the needs of their 
children at the cost of sacrificing their own. This may be affected by 
differing parental rights over children, and probable custody, since these 
factors may determine who is likely to benefit from the children's future
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income streams. If one parent has few rights over the children, is unlikely 
to gain custody, and even less likely to benefit from future income streams, 
this may create a disincentive to contribute to her children's welfare, if, 
for example, the alternative is to ensure her own future economic security.
All of these decisions take place within a social structure that to some 
extent is encapsulated within prevailing marriage contracts. For example, 
the marriage contract and the bridewealth may determine the extent of the 
husband's control over his wife's labour and income. It may also determine 
any divorce settlement or the custody of the children.
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2THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE HOUSEHOLD: 
BARGAINING POWER, ALTRUISM AND TRUST
Theoretical conceptions of the household have been the subject of 
considerable debate over the last twenty years. The inability of the 
unitary model to explain certain household outcomes has led economics to 
reconsider its aggregative assumptions about the household, and to examine 
internal processes within family units - for example female labour supply, 
fertility, and certain production decisions. The main purpose of this 
chapter is to consider how the theoretical perspectives have changed, and to 
examine the new alternatives. It will be argued that the new alternatives 
not only face considerable problems, but that they reveal problems in the 
standard approaches within economics.
2.1 Unitary Models
A basic precept of neo-classical consumer theory is that preferences, 
expressed by the utility function, are exogenously given, and that each 
individual has a hierarchy of preferences which is internally consistent. 
Within unitary models of the household it is assumed that individual 
preferences can be expressed in aggregate, household form. Analysis of 
consumer behaviour is based on a set of responses to changing prices and 
wages, and preferences are deduced from behaviour,
Uh = U (Xh, Lh)
where:
Uh = utility function of the household 
Xh = consumption of household 
Lh = leisure of household
The relevant demand function is:
Xh = X(P, lh)
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where:
lh = household income 
P = market prices
In 1956 Samuelson acknowledged that households consist of individuals whose 
preferences differ, so that individual demands may lead to conflict over how 
household income is spent. His solution was to specify individual utility 
functions, but to combine them in a household function.
Uh = U [Uf (Xf, Lf), Urn (Xm, Lm)]
This function is maximised subject to total household income in order to 
derive the demand function:
Xh = X (P, lh)
In practical terms the model remains unchanged, and Samuelson gives the 
following explanation for this:
"since blood is thicker than water, the preferences of the different 
members are interrelated by what might be called a 'consensus' or
’social welfare function1, which takes into account the deservingness 
or ethical worth of the consumption levels of each of its members. The 
family acts as if it were maximising their joint welfare function." 
(1986:10)
It would seem that altruism abounds within the family. As Folbre (1988) has 
pointed out, this is in stark contrast to the neo-classical view of the 
wider economy where self-interest predominates.
In his theory of marriage, Becker (1965,1973,1974) portrays a more
differentiated household, where the head of the household is altruistic. He
devises a theory of a rotten kid/benevolent father where efficiency and
consensus is achieved through paternalistic manipulation possible because of 
his superior economic position. As Hirschleifer (1977) has pointed out, 
this rests on the assumption that the altruist always gets the last word. 
Bernheim and Stark (1988) argue that in repeated games freeloading may 
force the altruist to act 1unaltruistically1, and inefficient outcomes will 
result.
2.2 Validity of the unitary model
There is an extensive literature arguing that the unitary model makes 
unacceptable assumptions. Firstly, that household income is pooled - or that
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contribution and distribution of resources are independent of one another. 
There is considerable empirical evidence to suggest that this assumption is 
rarely valid (Tripp 1981, Guyer 1988, Bruce and Dwyer 1988, Guyer and Peters 
1987, Whitehead 1984, Fapohunda 1988, and evidence given in chapter 7). 
Under conditions of poverty, where disputes about expenditure are likely to 
be more frequent, separate budgets and secrecy are likely to be common 
(Engle 1990).
An econometric rejection of the unitary model is provided by Browning et al. 
(1994) where consumption goods are divided into two categories; public 
household goods (such as tables, chairs etc) and private individual goods 
(clothes etc) . Their French data reveal, firstly, that the expenditure on 
private individual consumption goods is dependent on members' relative 
incomes not total household income. Secondly, the differences in the age 
structure and the total expenditure of the household affects the degree of 
inequality in the distribution of private goods. 1
Due to the requirements of efficiency in the unitary model, a wage increase 
will shift one spouse's labour toward the more profitable activity, and it 
is assumed that the other spouse will make up some of the short-fall in 
domestic labour. Often the sexual division of labour can be fairly 
inflexible. For example, a woman may begin working outside the home, yet her 
husband may not increase the amount of housework that he does. 'There is no 
simple trade-off of wage and family work hours between husbands and wives, 
nor do partners allocate family work based on time availability.' (Thompson 
and Walker 1989:856). 'Some husbands may sabotage their wives' attempts to 
go out to work, other will increase their contribution to household labour 
to help her out1 (Ferree 1990:876). It would appear that it cannot be 
assumed that the labour of one spouse is substitutable by the other.
Thirdly, the notion that households operate under a joint welfare function 
is invalid. A joint welfare function requires consensus, yet negotiation is 
a common process, and can often result in conflict or a failure to 
cooperate. The nature of these processes and the bargaining strength of 
different members will influence the outcome. In response to these 
shortcomings, a series of models have been developed that attempt to 
encompass more accurately the internal process of household allocation.
1 Thomas (1993), Thomas and Chen (1993), Doss (1996), Lundberg, Pollack and Wales (1995), Horney and McElroy (1988) 
and Schultz (1990) also provide econometric evidence that invalidates the unitary model.
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2.3 Bargaining Models
Some writers have turned to the Nash co-operative bargaining framework used
in game theory (Manser and Brown 1980, McElroy and Horney 1981, McElroy
1990, Ulph 1988). Individuals' preferences are delineated separately, and 
each has a fall-back or threat position which will be the outcome if co­
operation fails. Failure results in an individual preferring to be single 
rather than married. The threat points represent the relative bargaining 
power of each person on the principle that the better an individual's non- 
cooperative solution is, the less she/he has to lose, and therefore the 
greater her/his bargaining power. Despite an unequal outcome both parties 
have an incentive to co-operate if the final solution is an improvement on 
their fall-back positions.
McElroy (1990) has represented this process in the following way:
Urn = U (Xm, Lm) Uf = U(Xf, Lf)
where:
Uf, Um = two utility functions
Xf, Xm = consumption goods consumed by husband and wife
Lf,Lm = leisure time
Vm = V(P, Wm, Im; Am) Vf = V(P, Wf, If; Af)
where:
V are the two threat points (indirect utility functions)
P - prices
Wf, Wm = wage of husband and wife 
If, Im = non-wage income
Af, Am = 'extra-household environmental parameters'
The extra-household environmental parameters refer to exogenous variables 
that may alter an individual's attainable utility outside marriage (for 
example, the sex ratios in the marriage market, the ability of women to 
return to their natal homes and prohibitions on women working outside the 
home).
The Nash solution is:
N = (Um - Vm) (Uf - Vf)
The demand functions are:
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Xi = Xi (P, Wm, Wf, Im, If; Am, Af)
where i=f,m.
With its acknowledgement of individual characteristics that may affect 
outcomes, this approach is an improvement on that of Becker and Samuelson, 
but it has its own problems. Sen (1990) has criticised the basic Nash model 
for the assumption that the member with the lower fall-back position will 
always achieve a worse position than the other member. Bargaining power is 
more complex than the availability of alternatives outside marriage. An 
individual's option outside marriage is unlikely to have a significant 
impact on the day-to day negotiations (Ulph 1988). The threat of divorce is 
not credible if it is used repeatedly. (This is not the case with violence. 
The threat of, or actual violence, can be used time after time.)
Ulph argues it is necessary to specify the utility levels that would prevail 
if the household members stayed together, but failed to reach an agreement - 
a non-cooperative framework. He suggests members may agree on a certain 
number of consumption items, but disagree on others. In such a situation 
members may take strategic action, and make certain purchases over which 
there is disagreement, prior to negotiation in order to precommit the 
household before income is pooled. This process is represented in the 
following way:
Utility functions:
Uf = U (X1 , D (X2;X1 ) ) Um = U (X1 , D(X2;X1))
Demand functions:
X1 = D( P, If, Im)
X2 = D ( P, If, Im)
where
Uf, Um are utility functions
X1 = strategically purchased private goods
X2 = agreed household goods
D(X2;X1) = demand for agreed household goods depends on previously purchased 
private goods
Lundberg and Pollack (1992) provide a different interpretation of the threat 
points, developing what they call the Separate Spheres model. They argue a 
non-cooperative stand-off may well occur where 'traditional' gender roles 
and gender role expectations decrease the need for negotiation.
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"Specialisation reduces the need for complex patterns of co-ordination, and 
traditional gender roles serve as a focal point for tacit division of 
responsibilities" (1992:35). Members can still benefit from the economies of 
scale that result from joint consumption. Household (public) goods are 
still produced, but in smaller quantities than if a co-operative agreement 
had been reached.
According to Lundberg and Pollack failure to reach a cooperative agreement 
arises from ....
"the inability of players to make binding, costless agreements. The 
negotiation, monitoring and enforcement of such agreements give rise
to transaction costs. The non-cooperative default allocation point
avoids these costs. Contributions are determined by social
enforcement of the obligations corresponding to generally recognised 
gender roles. [As a result] couples with high transaction costs or 
low expected gains from cooperation will remain at the stereotypical 
non-cooperative solution" (Lundberg and Pollack 1992:160).
(It would be difficult to distinguish empirically between the Ulph and the 
Lundberg and Pollack models. It would be necessary to have detailed 
knowledge of the tacit division of responsibilities and individual
intentions, so that a purchase that is a precommitment due to disagreement, 
and a purchase that is the result of a division of responsibilities can be 
differentiated.)
Woolley (1988) uses a slightly more sophisticated model with two additional 
features. Each individual's action is based on a guess of what the other 
spouse's response will be. (This is modelled using a reaction function in 
which the derivative of one spouse's demand function is substituted into the 
other's demand function.) This enables a decision about future action to be 
made on the basis of past behaviour of the other spouse. This is a 
considerable improvement on the previous models where each individual
maximises his/her utility irrespective of how it will affect his/her 
partner. The second feature is a 'sympathy' co-efficient. Each individual 
has a welfare function that contains the utility functions of both husband 
and wife. The 'sympathy' co-efficients are the weights given to the two 
utility functions, within each welfare function. They represent the degree 
to which one spouse benefits from enabling the preferences of the other 
spouse to be met.
Wf = s (Uf) + (1 -s) Um
where:
W = welfare function
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s = sympathy co-efficient 
Uf = female utility function 
Um = male utility function
Kapteyn and Kooreman (1991) attempt to estimate husband and wife labour 
supply equations that are derived from the above welfare function. Yet 
there is an identification problem concerning the co-efficient 's'. They 
argue in order to estimate the degree of sympathy it is necessary to compare 
actual working hours with preferred working hours. The gap indicates the 
degree to which an individual's preferences have been frustrated, and it is 
assumed that the spouse with the larger gap between actual and preferred 
working hours has more sympathy for the other spouse.
Carter and Katz (1992) approach the problem of interdependent utilities 
rather differently. The husband and wife have separate utility functions and 
budget constraints. The interdependence takes the form of a conjugal 
contract. This contract has two components: a) the labour that both
contribute to the production of household goods; b) transfers of money from 
one spouse to the other. If, for example, the husband receives a wage
increase and decides he wishes to spend more time earning money and less in 
the production of household goods, he will have to compensate his wife
through a transfer of money for the reduction in his household labour. (This 
allows consumption and labour decisions to be interdependent, which they
are not in earlier models.) The Carter/Katz model specifies the following
representation:
Uf = U (Xf, Z; T) Um = U (Xm, Z; T)
where:
Z = goods produced in the home 
T = transfers between members.
These utility functions are maximised subject to individual budget 
constraints.
Demand function:
X = X( P, If, Im; T )
Carter and Katz bring in a concept that they call 'voice' - the degree to 
which either partner can influence, or bargain over the size of the 
transfer. If the wife has a low level of 'voice' she will not demand 
adequate compensation for the reduction in her husband's contribution to 
household production.
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'Voice* is not formalised in the form of a co-efficient, it is just 
conceptualised as the socially recognized right (or ability) to bargain over 
the conjugal contract. In a strongly patriarchal society, a woman may not 
have such a right. Carter and Katz allow for some level of economic 
autonomy to be achieved, even when a woman has no 'voice1. Through secrecy, 
or in neo-classical terminology 'asymmetric information', a woman is able to 
use her income as she wishes, without negotiating with her husband. 
Although 'voice' and the 'sympathy' co-efficient are conceptualised in 
different ways, they effectively represent the same characteristic - the 
degree to which the outcomes achieved by one spouse are different from 
his/her original aim due to the influence of the other spouse. (In the 
'sympathy' version the first spouse has willingly changed his/her aims; in 
the 'voice' version weaker bargaining power has forced the first spouse to 
accept an alternative solution.)
Katz (1992) has argued that because the McElroy model assumes income is 
pooled, "the potential importance of accrual of individual income to the 
realisation of household members' consumption and labour allocation 
preferences is neglected." (1992:42). "There is growing empirical evidence 
that income itself, and not just the goods and services it can buy, is most 
appropriately seen in many cultural contexts as the private property of the 
individual who earns it, although it may be subject to the claims of other 
household members." (1992:42)
The claims of other members may be strong. In many cultures a husband has a 
claim over his wife's income. This is often the case where a brideprice has 
been paid which may entitle a husband to his wife's labour or the product of 
her labour. In such circumstances secrecy, rather than negotiation, may 
enable an individual's preferences to be attained.
As they stand, these models have no empirical features that enable
differentiation between the various possible bargaining processes (Haddad et 
al 1994, Chiappori 1992, Kooreman and Kapteyn 1991). It is possible to test, 
however, whether the outcome is Pareto-efficient or not - whether the 
outcome is such that no-one can be made better-off without someone-else 
being made worse-off - which may indicate whether the bargaining process was 
cooperative or not. For example, in a study in Northern Cameroon, Jones 
(1983, 1 986) found that although the profit from rice was higher than from
sorghum, men and women continued to grow sorghum because sorghum was 
cultivated separately, whereas rice was cultivated jointly. Udry (1994)
finds a similar result from a study in Burkino Faso. Household output/income
would be higher if fertilizer and labour were reallocated from men's plots 
to women's plots - fertilizer and labour were not allocated according to the 
highest returns for the household as a whole (cited in Doss 1996). These are
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both Pareto-inefficient outcomes that must have resulted from uncooperative 
bargaining processes, rather than a cooperative one. Yet the Pareto-
efficient outcome is not necessarily a cooperative one. An individual may 
refuse to give a little so that the other may gain - this may either be the 
best joint option in the current 'game1, or an uncooperative stalemate. 2
Earlier it was mentioned that Kooreman and Kapteyn (1991) proposed to 
compare preferred with actual working hours as a means of assessing the 
weights given the utility functions. In theory, this would produce clearer 
representation of the bargaining process. But it highlights the flaw in 
using a game theoretic approach in analysing the household allocation 
process - preferences are not exogenous to the bargaining process, but are 
determined during the 'game'. The following section examines some of the 
theoretical problems entailed in the bargaining approach and at the same 
time highlights themes that are developed in later chapters.
2.4 Validity of the bargaining approach
* How valid is it to conceptualise the negotiating- process as either co­
operative, where binding agreements hold participants to their word3, or non- 
cooperative, where division of responsibilities is determined by gender 
roles?
As many of the theorists acknowledge, binding agreements cannot be made. 
Yet, cooperation can take place without the agreements being enforceable. 
Circumstances may arise such that one spouse is unable to fulfil his/her 
side of the bargain, yet there may well be an acceptable explanation, and 
the other spouse will not necessarily penalise her/him. Marriage entails a 
stream of complex social interactions through which trust is built up and 
depleted. To view a marriage as being in one of two possible states - co­
operative or non-cooperative - belies the complexity of the situation. This 
simplification hides a spectrum of fluctuating levels of co-operation, with 
temporary separations.
* How valid is this notion of separate spheres, where the division of 
responsibility for household work and expenses on the basis of predetermined 
norms, reduces the need for negotiation ?
Separate gender identities, sexual division of labour, and separate
*This to some extent depends on what is viewed as being uncooperative, if individual A could give a little such that B 
could gain considerably, but refuses - this would be viewed as uncooperative* Yet if the loss and the gain were equal, the 
outcome could be viewed as cooperative given that this is one ’game1 in a series of ’games’, where B may lose today, but gain 
tomorrow.
The assumption is that unless agreements can be enforced, default will occur, and participants will be unwilling to 
make cooperative agreements*
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responsibility for different components of household expenses all have an
important part to play in understanding gender relations. Yet without care
such an approach will result in attempts to define gender spheres or roles, 
and therefore delimit them. This would be a return to the use of sex roles 
as an explanation of women's subordination, rather than an analysis of the 
construction of gender and how gender relations actually vary.
The notion of separate spheres is at fault not only theoretically, but also 
in a practical sense. For example, it is possible to imagine household 
chores being allocated to individuals so that a stable routine is
established. Similarly, if only one spouse earns any money s/he may be
solely responsible for expenditure. However, problems emerge when both 
spouses are earning and both are responsible for purchases. Given that the 
more an individual spends on public goods the less he/she has for personal 
consumption, and that there may be a tendency to assume that if one spouse 
spends less on public goods the other spouse will spend more, negotiation 
may be unavoidable.
Further light is thrown on this issue if the nature of the household public 
goods that are being purchased is examined, and this requires a digression 
from the theoretical discussion to a particular cultural context. In 
Uganda, it is possible to group household public goods into three 
categories:
a) Recurrent expenditure (Food, paraffin, water, charcoal, medical 
expenses, school fees) This group is likely to be the source of 
considerable conflict. With small daily or frequent purchases, such 
as food, a routine may well be established. In rural and semi-rural 
areas the bulk of the food is produced at home; the purchase of food 
is not a regular event, and its purchase is subject to dispute. 
Education and medical bills are large irregular expenses, which are 
difficult to allocate equitably between the spouses, without 
negotiation. This is particularly true when income flows are uncertain 
and fluctuate in amount. One of the benefits of being married is the 
ability to smooth the unevenness of income and expense flows through 
intra-household transfers, but these are likely to require 
negotiation.
b) Household durables (beds, tables, chairs, saucepans, plastic basins 
etc) . These items tend to be bought with the cash earned by one 
spouse, used by both spouses, and should the marriage end in divorce, 
maybe divided up according to the original purchaser. Division of 
responsibility may be less of an issue if spouses have the facility to 
hold on to any assets.
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c) Household production, In Uganda norms have developed for how the 
agricultural work is divided between husband and wife. 4 If cash is 
required to purchase one or more inputs, the crop then becomes the 
responsibility and property of the spouse who provided the cash (eg 
tomatoes, greens, passion fruit). Rarely is such a crop intended for 
home consumption; it is usually sold. If household labour is required 
for cash crops, the amount of labour and the appropriate compensation 
will have to be negotiated. This is less true for coffee - it is 
common practice for women to pick and dry coffee, but the men are 
responsible for selling it and will retain the income. As a form of 
payment for women's labour men may buy their wives a new dress. Coffee 
has been established as a cash crop since the early 1900s and this may 
explain the existence of these particular social norms related to its 
joint production.
Owing to these problems, particularly uneven cash flows, it is difficult to 
envisage a household that continues to function on the basis of established 
social norms without resorting to negotiation. The notion of separate 
spheres also begs the question of how the social norms are established, 
maintained, and adjust due to changing circumstances without negotiation. 
For example, a relatively stable division of labour may exist over domestic 
work and agricultural production for home consumption. If, however, women's 
participation in the market economy is increasing, this may (or may not) 
lead to increases in bargaining power, which in turn may cause the 
established spheres to be challenged (Chapters 6 & 7) .
* The bargaining- approach does not capture the social relations embedded in 
the marriage contract.
The importance of social relations becomes apparent in the context of 
Uganda. If bridewealth has been paid by the extended family, then the 
husband, and to some extent his family, have appropriated rights over the 
new bride. These rights can include control over the wife's assets, and 
whether she can earn an income. Often unstated at the marriage are the 
likely division of assets should the marriage end in divorce. The division 
may well follow a pattern established by social norms, rather than any 
considerations of equity. Both the implicit marriage contract and 
expectations of what will happen on divorce shape the social relations of 
the marriage itself, and act as a framework in which all negotiations take 
place. (The relevance of these issues to the Kauga/Ngogwe study is examined 
in chapter 5.)
4
Considerable evidence was collected in the focus group discussions on division of agricultural labour, but it has 
not been presented to any great extent in the thesis.
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McElroy's use of 'extra-environmental parameters' acknowledges the 
importance of the social context, and its impact on negotiations. Yet in 
many cases such parameters must be based on qualitative information that is 
specific to a particular context - ie. the factors in a society that affect 
women's position. These could vary from norms about the acceptability of 
women moving outside the home, to the extent of provision of child care by 
the state.
* Income, and the control of resources is seen as a crucial determinant of 
power within bargaining models. Yet the social relations within a marriage
affecting a woman's decision to earn an income and to accumulate assets are
not examined.
For example, husbands may forbid or actively discourage their wives from 
working outside the home. Assets above a certain value may be considered 
unsuitable for a woman to own, and may be forcibly appropriated by the 
husband. In such circumstances women cannot be seen as free agents who 
control their income (Chapter 6) . Moore makes the same point when she 
argues that although having access to "an independent income or productive 
assets does have an impact on gender inequalities within the 
household....what is important is the context in which women's economic 
participation takes place." (Moore 1993:133) She reiterates Roldan's point 
that "the existing power imbalance between spouses mediates between the 
wife's access to an independent income and its later control and disposal." 
(Moore 1993:134) Women's position in the home may not depend on whether she 
chooses to go out to work, but whether the conjugal contract is such that
she is able to go out to work.
As well as failing to provide an analysis of the social relations behind the 
formal interaction, the bargaining approach fails to appreciate the 
complexity of the interaction between different aspects of marriage. The 
social relations that discourage a woman from earning an income, may act as 
a disincentive to contribute to the household, leading her to accumulate 
assets outside the home.
* To what extent is the bargaining framework an improvement of our ability 
to predict household outcomes, or to estimate the importance of particular 
determinants of household outcomes?
Estimation using the bargaining approach still involves reduced form 
equations that relate household outcomes to exogenous changes such as 
income, prices etc. Any shift in the internal processes is not represented. 
It may be argued that such a shift may be the result of external factors,
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but it would be impossible to distinguish between the two effects. For 
example, female labour supply may increase without an increase in the female 
wage rate. The cause may either be a change in the wife's opportunity cost 
of time relative to that of her husband, or her level of bargaining power 
may have increased, giving her greater control over her income, and so 
encouraging her to increase her working hours (Behrman 1990). The unitary 
model assumes it is the former case; in the bargaining approach it could be 
either.
Further identification within the equations requires a variable that 
represents how the preferences of the two spouses are weighted in the 
negotiating process - effectively the balance of power. (It would then be 
possible to test whether women's bargaining power had increased.) Yet 
bargaining power is very difficult to deal with empirically. A common 
strategy used by spouses is to acquiesce in one area in order to prevail in 
another. It is not possible for one data set to represent the balance of 
power across the whole range of possible interactions. Given this, the 
benefits of econometric analysis have to be weighed against the 
disadvantages of the simplification required. The subsequent discussion 
examines how the bargaining approach conceptualises power, and the problems 
that arise when attempting to include power in an estimation framework.
* To what extent do the bargaining models encapsulate an adequate theory of 
power?
The game-theoretic framework used in the bargaining models was first 
formulated by Nash (1950, 1953). His work has generated an extensive
literature on game theory and the bargaining process between two actors. The
most common application is the behaviour of two firms in various market
conditions. Some of the theoretical literature refers simply to two 
'anonymous' actors, devoid of any social context. In the introduction to a 
game theoretic text 'Economics of Bargaining', Binmore and Dasgupta (1987) 
reveal the extent to which they perceive the economics of bargaining not as 
an analysis of social interaction, but as a purely theoretical formulation:
"(T)he solution of a game can be identified with a whole continuum of 
possible outcomes called the negotiation set or core of the game. To 
identify a particular outcome within the core, (von Neumann and 
Morgenstern, 1944) suggest, is an enterprise outside the scope of the 
game theorist on the grounds that the outcome on which the players 
finally agree will depend on their bargaining powers and such 
psychological factors that elude adequate formalisation. Nash himself 
makes a reference to a similar behavioral notion of 'bargaining
skill' in 1950, but corrects himself in a later paper (1953) where he
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asserts that... 'with people who are sufficiently intelligent and 
rational there should not be any question of 'bargaining ability' a 
term which suggests something like skill in duping the other fellow'.
  Such events are only suitable for behavioral analysis, but what
is being attempted here is game theoretic analysis." 5 (1987:6)
It would appear that the process of bargaining between two individuals can 
be discussed without reference to human behavioural responses, or what is 
commonly understood as social interaction. Within this framework there seems 
to be very little concept of power. Social interaction or bargaining is a 
process of attempting to second-guess what the other actor will do in 
response to your next move. There is no acknowledgement that 'rational' 
individuals cajole, bully or even threaten one another. This flaw in game 
theory has been acknowledged by authors of the bargaining models when they 
conceptualise power in terms of 'voice' or 'sympathy', but these concepts 
have not been encapsulated within the models in an empirical form, partially 
owing to the enormous problems in doing so.
Power is integral to all social interaction. It is part of all levels of 
social life, from social institutions, and political groups to the
interaction between two individuals. In a discussion of Gidden's concept of 
power, Davis (1991) defines the relationship between power and social
interaction. "Any social interaction has three elements: a/ its
constitution as meaningful; b/ its constitution as a moral or normative
order; and c/ its constitution as the operation of relations of power"
(Davis 1991:71) . To rephrase this in a way that is more relevant to the 
concerns of this chapter, there are three aspects to decisions concerning 
intra-household allocation: a/the definition and formulation of an
individual's needs and deserts; b/ the determination of which needs and
deserts are legitimate; c/the decision as to whether those needs and deserts 
are met. 6
These three elements are subject to negotiation. They are strongly
influenced by a society's particular perception of gender identities. For
example, the construction of motherhood as a suitable role, creates
expectations that constrain the kind of strategies that an individual can 
employ in the process of bargaining. If a woman does not perform her given 
role adequately she will not be able to make demands on others (Moore 
1993:138). The perception of an individual's role influences decisions 
about need and desert. "The sexual division of labour, income distribution 
within the household, educational provision of sons and daughters are all 
outcomes of ideas about the appropriate behaviour of men and women...
5
My emphasis.
Moore makes a similar point following Fraser's (1989) approach to the politics of need (Moore 1993:139).
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Differentiated social identities are related to the exercise of power 
because the very definitions of those identities are connected to normative 
or conventional explanations for the social order, as well as the 
legitimation of that order. " (Moore 1993:135)
In such a context, the assumption that an individual has well-defined 
preferences, that can be represented by an ordinal utility function, prior 
to the start of the negotiation process, is inadequate. "Bargaining power 
consists in part of the capacity to challenge and redefine the rules, and 
cannot therefore be captured simply by specifying fixed or threat points or 
fall-back positions in relation to a given set of rules." (Hart 1993:120)
It would appear that there are two unresolved issues troubling econometric 
approaches: how to quantify bargaining power that is used to achieve
objectives, and how to represent the fact that those objectives themselves 
may well be determined by the level of bargaining power - that preferences 
are endogenous. The following sections will look at both of these issues, 
but first the notion of voice is examined in the light of the previous 
discussion on power.
* How valid is the concept of 'voice'?
Carter and Katz's notion of voice captures the idea that the division of the 
product or fruits of household labour may be unequal due to differing 
abilities to assert one's own interests. This is true, but in a sense it 
does not go far enough. It does not acknowledge the complex link between 
social identities and debates over rights and needs - the emphasis is on 
ability without recognising that ability/capacity may be limited by the 
definition of differentiated social identities.
In Carter and Katz's model 'voice' determines transfers between husband and 
wife. Moore develops this theme further with what she terms 'a system of 
redistribution1 (Moore 1993:139). She argues that the division of labour 
between production and reproductive tasks within the household necessitates 
the redistribution of the fruits of productive labour between spouses. Given 
that the division of labour and the system of production is gendered, so is 
the process of redistribution. This enables a shift of emphasis away from a 
preoccupation with the system of production as the source of women's 
subordination and the related debate between class and gender, to a wider 
arena that includes relations within the household (between spouses, and 
between adults and children), within the lineage, and with the state. The 
importance of the gendered distribution is taken up in following chapters in 
several instances - the distribution of marital assets on death or divorce, 
the control of income and assets, and the distribution of the household
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product between children.
Endogenity of preferences 1
* If preferences are endogenous, what are the implications for policy
analysis?
Sen (1990) discusses this issue in a way that reveals the practical
implications. Family identity may exert such a strong influence on a 
person's perceptions that s/he may not find it easy to formulate any clear 
notion of his/her own individual welfare. "..if a typical Indian rural 
woman was asked about her personal 'welfare1, she would find the question 
unintelligible, and if she was able to reply, she might answer the question 
in terms of her reading of the welfare of her family." (Sen 1990)
Sen highlights the particular problem that these issues pose for Nash 
bargaining models. "(There is) the need to distinguish between the 
perception of interest (of different parties) and some more objective notion 
of their respective well-being." (Sen 1990:133). 8 In essence Sen is arguing 
that an individual's preferences/choices may not necessarily be the ones
that will lead to an improvement in their well-being - the Indian woman who
puts her family before herself. (The bargaining models allow for a gap 
between preferences and outcomes, but due to problems of scarcity and
allocation, rather than the endogenity of preferences.) He discusses the
importance of information on "perceptions of desert and legitimacy, 
contribution and interest". These are ultimately ingredients that play a 
part in the operation of power discussed above.
Hart (1993) points out Sen's analysis contains the assumption that it is 
possible to distinguish between perception of interests and contributions 
that influence the bargaining process, and some objective level of these 
categories. It is as "if ideology and meaning are essentially illusions that 
must be stripped away to reveal the 'objective' condition that they mask" 
(Hart 1 993: 1 21). 9 From a theoretical perspective Hart is correct - the
removal of one layer of ideology will simply reveal another. Yet, Sen's 
discussion contains a sense of a practical imperative that is missing in 
Hart. "The 'ill-fare' associated with morbidity or undernourishment has an 
immediacy that does not await the person's inclination or willingness to 
answer detailed questions regarding her welfare. Indeed, the well-being of
7
The endogenity of preferences is the same as the issue of false consciousness.
8
Sen uses the phrase 'perception of interest rather than preference .
9
This is a similar point to one made above in explaining the inadequacy of Kooremen and Kapteyn s attempt to quantify 
bargaining power.
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a person may plausibly be seen in terms of a person's functioning and 
capabilities" (Sen 1990:126).
There is a second difficulty with Sen's analysis of the problem. Just 
because a woman does not conceptualise her own needs as distinguishable from 
those of her family, or because her needs are at the bottom of the priority 
list, doesn't necessarily mean a woman is unaware of what her needs are. She 
may be in a situation where her family is her only means of survival, and to 
challenge the hierarchy may lead to a breakdown of the family structure. To 
suggest that what is needed is to separate an individual's perception of 
interest from their actual level of well-being implies that the individual 
does not know what his or her needs are, and that the policy maker does! In 
Sen's example preferences may be endogenous, but he does not provide proof 
that they are. Preferences are generated by the social context that 
surrounds the individual, and therefore are by definition endogenous. Yet 
there are additional reasons that can lead individuals to do something that 
is not in their own best interest: a) intentional self-sacrifice; b) a lack 
of power to carry out their own interest; as well as c) endogenity of 
preferences leads them to confuse their own interests with those of others.
Behrman (1990) asks whether the endogenity of preferences has an impact on 
the estimation framework used for policy decisions. If the aim of estimation 
is to identify the relative importance of the determinants of malnutrition 
with the purpose of assisting policy, and if this can be achieved relatively 
accurately without allowing preferences to be endogenous, does it matter 
that the model is incorrectly specified? Behrman answers his own question by 
saying that it depends on the circumstances, and gives the following 
example. If nutritional status is influenced by a mother's education, and 
her preferences and her actions are determined by education, it would not 
matter that preferences are assumed to be exogenous. The relevant variables 
are in the equation - nutritional status and education - and there would be 
no bias due to an omitted variable.
Perhaps a fuller answer to this question would be that the estimation 
procedure attempts to identify important determinants of particular 
outcomes. It does not attempt to model a complete social context. Yet an 
awareness of the social context enables the identification of certain 
factors that may determine preferences for a particular outcome. To add one 
further layer of analysis, individuals have to prioritise their aims and 
the preference for one outcome may be influenced by the preference for 
another outcome. Outcomes do not occur independently of one another, but it 
is assumed that they do when they are modelled as discrete, and separate 
events. Preferences are endogenous because their prioritisation depends on 
the constraints and opportunities that individuals face. Behrman's 
justification for mis-specification assumes that a mother has one priority
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which is a healthy child, and lack of education prevents her from achieving 
that end. Women often have to juggle a variety of priorities, which may 
compete with one another for her resources and time. (For example, paying 
for education of other offspring or ensuring her own economic security.) 
Rather than single equations that model particular outcomes, perhaps what is 
needed is a range of equations that model household outcomes simultaneously, 
thereby allowing for competing priorities.
To summarise, preferences are endogenous for two reasons: a) the influence 
of others may lead an individual to confuse his/her interests with those of 
others; b) preferences for one outcome are dependent on preferences for, and 
the ability to meet, other outcomes. Yet Sen's suggestion that an attempt to 
measure the extent of endogenity and its effect requires the means to 
distinguish endogenity from other factors that motivate individuals to put 
the interests of others before their own.
Indices of power
It was suggested above that Kooreman and Kapteyn's attempt to compare 
preferred with actual working hours to determine the level of 'sympathy1 for 
the other participant, is invalid due to the endogenity of preferences. This 
needs further explanation. For example, consider a situation where a woman 
is working for 14 or 16 hours a day. Woman A may only consider her
family's needs and opinions, and may state that her actual and preferred 
working hours are one and the same. The degree to which she is prepared to 
sacrifice her own needs for those of her family - the level of her sympathy 
- would be recorded as relatively low. (Or her bargaining power would be 
recorded as relatively high.) Woman B may work the same number of hours as 
woman A, but would work considerably fewer hours if her husband would assist 
with household chores. A large gap would be recorded between actual and 
preferred hours and a higher level of sympathy would be deduced. In reality 
aims and actions are both influenced by the social environment, and the gap 
between the two does not indicate sympathy for others, or bargaining power.
Various empirical studies have attempted to establish a link between access 
to resources, involvement in economic activity, and influence over important 
decisions as a way of assessing different levels of bargaining power. 
Acharya and Bennett's (1981, cited in Engle 1990) study in Nepal finds a
link between extent of the decision-making in various spheres of influence 
and women's involvement in economic activity. Lee and Peterson define the 
access to resources as the percentage of total household subsistence base 
attributable to the labour of particular individuals. They then relate this 
to the level of conjugal power - the extent of independent decision-making - 
in a study covering 113 'patriarchal cultures' (Lee and Peterson 1983).
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There are numerous problems with this approach. Firstly, the relationship 
between access to resources and influence may be circular - it is impossible 
to say which is the causal factor. Secondly, contributing labour is not an 
indicator of control - a husband may well appropriate the fruits of that 
labour. Thirdly, there may be a genuine difference of opinion over who makes 
the decisions (Rogers 1990). Spouses may not admit to the true allocation of 
influence (Rogers 1990). Fourthly, control over resources may not amount to 
very much if, due to poverty, it is a question of allocation shortages and 
fending off creditors. Fifthly, contribution is the other side of the coin 
to control over expenditure decisions. Both spouses may be earning the same 
wage, but their levels of contribution may differ, and influence in spheres 
of decision-making can depend on contribution levels.
In order to devise possible empirical solutions that could be used within 
the context of this thesis, the discussion would perhaps be clarified by 
examining an example of an estimation problem, for example, the nutritional 
status of children. An estimation of the determinants of nutritional status 
might include husband's income, wife's income, education levels as well as 
various household sanitation features, medical service provision, breast 
feeding and inoculation practices. Income is assumed to be a measure of the 
resources that a parent has available to improve nutrition. Within the 
bargaining framework it is also assumed to represent the degree to which a 
spouse can influence expenditure decisions. As such it is an indicator of 
power to influence this particular outcome.
Yet, using income level in the equation assumes a simple relationship 
between individual income and child welfare. It does not recognise that 
earning an income does not necessarily imply controlling the allocation of 
the money. Nor does it account for the fact that the contribution to child 
welfare may differ from the income level. In the analysis in the following 
chapters of the intra-household processes in the survey area, two data 
series have been chosen as representing these characteristics. The 
willingness to contribute is measured by the 'percentage contribution of 
household recurrent expenditure' and 'percentage contribution of household 
consumer durables'. The control over income has been broadened to include 
control over household assets, and is measured by the disposal rights over 
household assets - assets that a spouse would expect to take on divorce. 10
This approach avoids assessing power by asking: 'Who makes decisions ?' and
all the related measurement problems. It yields a measure of differential 
control over resources on the assumption that resource control and power are 
closely linked. Yet these two variables have their share of problems. For
The construction of these variables is discussed in more detail in chapter 3.
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the percentage of contribution, it is a question of accurate measurement 
when faced with issues of inaccurate recall, and of constraints of time and 
money. Using the expected divorce settlement as a measure of asset control 
has the advantage of representing disposal rights over household assets. But 
it is only an 'expected level' and not an actual level. Secondly, again, it 
is not clear whether assets will be left behind because of endogenity, self- 
sacrifice, or insufficient power, but the result is still a measure of 
control over resources whatever explanation. 11 As mentioned above, the 
balance of power between two individuals will fluctuate according the type 
and circumstances of the interaction. Any index will inevitably be a 
simplification. Perhaps ultimately the data used to construct an index of 
power/influence must vary according to the issue being considered, as well 
as the cultural context, and its limitations must always be kept in mind.
* Does an analysis of power adequately deal with the nature of a conjugal 
relationship: conflict or cooperation?
Much of the discussion so far has been about bargaining and levels of power, 
and has essentially referred to a conflict situation. Folbre (1988) points 
out that although unitary models assumed that altruism is unbounded within 
the household, the bargaining, models appear to assume a constant state of 
conflict between spouses - the market now exists within the household. 12 On 
the other hand, Sen calls for 'an analysis of the existence of both co­
operating and conflicting elements in family relations' (Sen 1984).
If it is feasible to assume that altruism is more prevalent amongst 
household members than in the market place, why should this be the case? 
Becker's explanation for his assumption of altruism is that 'small is 
beautiful' - that it is possible within a small intimate unit (Becker, cited 
in Folbre 1988). Folbre (1988:261) argues that socialisation is a more 
convincing answer - 'sharing inside the family is viewed as a 
responsibility, but outside it is little more than charity'.
* How should altruism be dealt with on a theoretical level?
Kooreman and Kapteyn encapsulate the notion of altruism in their 'sympathy' 
variable - the benefit gained from someone else's welfare. Each individual 
chooses a site on a spectrum with altruism at one end and self-interest at 
the other. Although it is not included in Kooreman and Kapteyn's model,
1 1
In the data on disposal rights over household assets, it would be possible to distinguish between the endogenity, 
self-sacrifice and lack of power using the following question: "Why would you leave items that you purchased with your
husband on divorce ?" Possible answers could be: " Because they belonged to him (endogenity); for the benefit of the children 
(self-sacrifice - fathers normally have custody); because my husband would prevent me." Unfortunately this data was not 
collected.
1 2
It is only the non-cooperative bargaining models that make this assumption.
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socialisation influences the choice of that position, and power enables the 
enactment of it.
So far the frameworks discussed are all essentially static. Do individuals 
change their level of altruism? Altruism can be constant irrespective of 
circumstances, but most individuals will cease making sacrifices if their 
actions are unreciprocated (or perhaps unappreciated) after a period of 
time. Perhaps the series of incidents that make up daily life produce either 
altruistic or self-interested responses. The effect is the intermingling of 
cooperation and conflict, that can have a long-term cumulative effect - the 
creation or depletion of trust between spouses. 13 The reactions functions 
used in the non-cooperative bargaining models could apply here. Yet the 
assumption in the non-cooperative models is that the aim of a spouse's 
response is to obtain the 'best deal' for themselves given the actions of 
the other. An extra layer could be added such that a mixture of co­
operative and non-cooperative actions occurs that builds or deplete trust - 
that a spouse's reaction is not only dependent on the other's last action 
but also on the level of trust.
Structures that maintain the status quo (principally through socialisation), 
and those that transmit change have a part to play. Changing circumstances 
can lead to action outside of the expected roles and engendered spheres (for 
example a married woman earning an income). Once the guidelines to 
acceptable behaviour have been broken, the other spouse's sphere can become 
encroached upon, gendered ideologies that maintained identities are 
challenged, and trust that is nurtured through remaining within given 
boundaries can be threatened. Change may lead to the renegotiation of the 
conjugal contract, or to a possible hostile response that attempts to 
prevent the change (Chapters 6 and 7).
2.5 Conclusion
The bargaining approach provides useful concepts for analysing processes of 
negotiation between spouses - reaction functions, economic threat points, 
voice, gender spheres. Yet many of these notions could be developed further. 
Reaction functions could be the result of cooperative and non-cooperative 
actions that lead to the creation or depletion of trust, rather than simply 
a response to the previous action. The notion of 'voice' acknowledges that 
individuals may have unequal abilities to assert their own interests, but 
fails to recognise that the 'system of redistribution' may be gendered. The 
concept of gender spheres points to the importance that gender 
roles/activities play in the interaction between men and women, but fails to
Using less accurately descriptive neo-classical terminology - the interaction between, and movement of, short-term 
and long-term equilibria.
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examine how these spheres are established, and adapt to changing
circumstances, through negotiation over gender identities.
It is the use of gender identities to determine the legitimacy of need and 
desert, and the negotiation over such identities, that leads to the
endogenity of preferences. Because the process of defining gender identities 
is part of the 'game1, so too are the preferences that arise out of those 
identities. Given that negotiation over identity is possible, and to some 
extent dependent on resource control, bargaining power itself is also 
endogenous. To put it another way, given the circular nature of the 
relationship between influence/power and control over resources, it is not 
possible to assume which is the determining factor.
Much of the rationale behind the bargaining approach is an attempt to 
explain the process by which gender inequalities exist within the household. 
The models highlight one particular explanation - a lower level of resources 
(income and assets) that leads to a lower level of bargaining power, which 
in turn leads to a lower share of household resources. As pointed out, this
argument is circular. The discussion above argued that there are three
possible interpretations: a) preferences are endogenous (women confuse their 
own interests with those of others; b) intentional self-sacrifice; c) lack 
of power/resources to assert one's preferences. A few attempts to 
measure/identify these factors were mentioned - Sen's difference between 
perceived interest and actual wellbeing (endogenity), Kooreman and Kapteyn's 
'sympathy' variable (self-sacrifice), and Acharya and Bennett's link between 
involvement in economic activity and influence in decision-making (power to 
assert preferences). None of these attempts succeed in separating what they 
intend to measure from the other factors. (Kooremen and Kapteyn claim to 
measure sympathy, but in fact the difference between preferred and actual 
working hours could be due to endogenity or lack of power.) Does this 
matter? It may do if the intention is to improve women's situation.
In criticising economic models it is important to recognise that their aim 
is ultimately to examine the statistical relationship between different 
variables for the purposes of policy. Such an exercise cannot encompass the 
complexity of the social environment. The issue then becomes whether the
simplifications chosen are justified, or whether too much is lost in the 
process of abbreviation. Is it simply a question of methodological 
preference where model building and more qualitative approaches both 
contribute to our understanding, but that neither approach is superior to 
the other? It is my belief that approaches that attempt to grapple with the 
complexity and variation of social relations and structures are more likely 
to improve our understanding. Modelling and statistical analysis can 
suggest possible linkages and explanations, but qualitative understanding of
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the data is necessary to verify these hypotheses. The process of testing
models against data, and against more qualitative evidence is essential to 
ensure their relevance. Without an understanding of the social context - 
relations and structures - it is not possible to be confident of the
validity of a model.
There is also a sense in which the workings of power (including the
endogenity of preferences) and the role played by gender identities must be 
at the heart of any discussion of bargaining between men and women - this is 
what the bargaining models fail to do. If a particular index is chosen to 
represent the balance of power, a discussion is required as to the relevance 
of that index given the social relations in which the negotiations are
embedded. To assume that income is a universal indicator of power fails to 
acknowledge the variety of factors that influence whether a woman works or 
not and whether she controls the allocation of that income. The following 
chapters use data from Uganda to show the importance of social relations for 
understanding intra-household allocation processes.
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3METHODOLOGY: 
COMBINING QUALITATIVE WITH QUANTITATIVE APPROACHES
3.1 Introduction
This chapter examines the way in which theory meets practice: theoretical
preconceptions lead to certain assumptions in the field; practical 
constraints may lead to misleading findings, and therefore, to false 
theoretical conclusions. This chapter will look at some of the
methodological issues that bedevil fieldwork: defining such terms as
'household' and 'marriage', ensuring representativity without sacrificing 
detailed qualitative research, and devising accurate data collection
techniques suitable for difficult and particular circumstances. It will 
give a flavour of the problems faced, and some of the attempted solutions. 
The fieldwork took place between June 1 995 - May 1996 in Mukono District, 
Uganda.
3.2 Choice of the field site.
Given that large national surveys are not possible (or perhaps desirable) 
with limited PhD funding, the choice of the field site becomes important. 
Uganda was chosen because I had been resident there for one year prior to 
the PhD, and had visited the country many times. Mukono district was chosen 
primarily because it is experiencing the economic growth and stability that 
is occurring in the southern part of Uganda. With support from the ESRC I 
was able to purchase a second-hand 4-wheel drive vehicle. (It took three 
months to come by one within my means, and I learnt a considerable amount 
about vehicle repair.) This enabled the study to include two field sites, 
one semi-urban and one rural, in an attempt to enable analysis of the effect 
of infrastructure, and of different levels of economic activity.
The choice of villages was both mine, and that of the local officials. On 
approaching the district official I specified that I would like to work in
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four villages on the perimeter of Mukono town, and two villages in a rural 
sub-county called Ngogwe, close to Lake Victoria and inaccessible by tarmac 
road. I was introduced to a female sub-county official from a village 
outside Mukono town, who was responsible for women's issues. The motivation 
for this choice may have been the emphasis that I placed on 'gender' being 
the subject of the research project, (which was simply interpreted as 
meaning women's issues) or the knowledge that this particular woman was 
likely to be cooperative. Whatever the reason, her assistance was 
invaluable. In Ngogwe, halfway through the fieldwork new officials were 
elected and one of the new representatives was not as cooperative as his 
predecessor. Unfortunately, he was regularly intoxicated, and would go out 
of his way to avoid us. In this case we were able to call on the help of the 
previous officials.
There has been a considerable amount of literature on the difficulties, (and 
the necessity), of working with local officials (Devereux and Hoddinott 
1992, Razavi 1992). In the belief that there may be some financial gain to 
be had, officials may choose some households while ignoring others. In 
theory this problem did not occur, as every household within the village 
boundary was interviewed in the early stages, and the sample was chosen from 
the resulting population list. Yet we had to rely on the official for 
information on where the boundary was, and to trust that he/she did not 
include or exclude households for his/her own political reasons. Once the 
official had introduced the enumerator to the respondent, the official left, 
so that the interview could be confidential. There were one or two occasions 
where the occupants of a household were uncooperative and where, perhaps due 
to previous experience, the officials were unwilling to assist us in our 
attempts at persuasion.
Given that the rural field sites in Ngogwe were 3 hours drive from Mukono, 
daily commuting would have required 6 hours of travel a day. A local 
catholic mission was able to give us accommodation. (Built in the 1960s, 
originally the mission must have had around 30 residents, but currently 
there were only 3 sisters. It is on a hill-top with magnificent views over 
the lake and adjacent rain forest. The remnants of a white colonial culture 
prior to the civil war were scattered across the property; an abandoned 
flower garden, a badminton court, a library. We shared a kitchen with a 
disused stove now inhabited by rats.)
It should be said that there were various false starts to the fieldwork.
The final field site was by no means the first choice. Work initially 
started on some tea estates, but it became obvious that resident employees 
formed a community that was in many ways separated and distinct from the 
surrounding villages, and as a result the village communities were chosen in
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preference. Initially one assistant was hired, but after one month she left 
to work elsewhere. The decision to employ 2 assistants was to some extent to 
prevent reliance on a single individual. 1
Description of field site
Mukono district stretches along the northern shore of Lake Victoria from 
Kampala (population of 840,700), the capital city, to Jinja, the second 
largest town (population 65,000) (See maps pgs 68-69). 2 It also stretches 
northwards towards Lake Kyoga. Mukono town (population of 7400), is a 30 
minutes drive outside Kampala, on the trans-African highway that links 
Mombassa and Nairobi with Rwanda, Zaire and Burundi. 3
Mukono district is part of the fertile crescent north of the lake that was 
rainforested prior to increased settlement. The area is used mostly for 
smallholder agriculture in which the main crops are coffee and bananas. 
There are, however, several large sugar and tea estates, providing both 
permanent and casual employment.
Both its situation, the fertility of the land and the local climate have 
given the district advantages over other areas in Uganda. This is reflected 
in its high population density (179 persons per sq km) (Table 3.1). The 
population density for Uganda as a whole (85 persons per sq km) is 
relatively high in comparison with the rest of East Africa (31 persons per 
sq km) and that of Africa (21 persons per sq km). As shown in table 3.1, 
Mukono1s population has slightly better vital statistics than those recorded 
for the country as whole (including nearly double the level of per capita 
income). 4
1
The decision to employ research assistants, their selection, and training are discussed below.
2
Source: Ugandan 1991 Census.
3
The current crisis in Kenya, and the resulting neglect of their road infrastructure, has made it more difficult for 
goods to come in and out of Uganda, affecting other East African economies.
4
The predominate ethnic group living in Mukono district are Baganda, and the central region as a whole is known as
3uganda.
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Table 3.1: Vital statistics for Uganda and Mukono district
Statistic (1991) Mukono
district
Uganda
Population density (persons per sq km) 179 85
Infant mortality (Deaths per 1000 live births) 102 1 22
Life expectancy at birth (yrs) 50 48
Crude death rate (Rate per 1000 per population per year) 16 1 7
Per capita income per annum (Ush) 220,000 124,000
Percentage of population 0-17 yrs with only one parent 
living
10.9 11 .6
Source: Government of Uganda National Integrated Household Survey 1991, Government of Uganda Abstract of 
statistics 1997
Four of the chosen villages are within Kauga, a sub-county on the edge of 
Mukono town (Namubirur Kirangira, Ttakkajjunge, and Llwanyonyi). Two others
are in Ngogwe (Zitwe and Ggunda) , a sub-county 3 hours' drive on a murum 
road south-east of Mukono. The two sites were chosen as being typical of 
peri-urban and rural communities respectively. Average per capita income in 
1992-3 gives an indication of the differences between the rural and urban 
communities in the central region as a whole: 140,000 Ush per annum in the
rural areas and 365,000 Ush for urban areas. 5 6
Mukono is an economically active town, supporting a sizeable evening food 
and clothes market, three health clinics, three secondary schools,
approximately 200 shops, a large hotel and conference centre. There is also 
a theological college that is part of Makerere University and attracts 
students from all over Uganda7.
Ssi, the main trading centre in Ngogwe, is approximately 2 hours walk from 
the study villages. (There is no public transport, and only a few residents 
have bicycles.) In the two villages there are 3 shops, one primary school, 
and one clinic at the catholic mission. The items on sale in the shops are 
maize flour, tomatoes, sodas, eggs, bananas and matches. (In contrast, in 
Mukono, it is possible to buy a television, obtain photocopies and a whole
5
Source: Govt of Uganda National Integrated Household Survey 1992-1993.
6
The Kauga/Ngogwe survey did not collect data suitable for comparison with these statistics. Income data were 
collected from the two spouses, not all working individuals within the household, and therefore neither income per household, 
nor per capita income, could be calculated. (Per capita income is defined as total household income divided by the number of 
working and non-working residents.)
7
I was able to rent a small house on the campus.
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range of relatively sophisticated building equipment8, as well as the basic 
food and household items.)
The peri-urban villages are adjacent to one another around Mukono, but show 
considerable variety despite their close proximity. Namubiru and Kiranoira 
are smaller communities, both in population and area, and perhaps as a 
result appeared to be slightly closer-knit. Both had active local 
councillors and resident former councillors who had been elected to higher 
office, and as a result had some resources at their disposal. Ttakkaiiunge 
is a more disparate community stretching along a tarmac road running north 
into a more rural area. Unlike Namubiru and Kirangira, the local councillors 
in Ttakkajjunge did not know all the residents within their community. In 
Lwanyonyi, many of the residents are non-Bugandans, typically Acholi 
(Nilotic rather than Bantu) from northern Uganda. There has been a long 
tradition of migrant labour flowing south from Acholi, and some residents 
were second or third generation. Others were recent refugees from the 
current civil war in the north. The village bordered a sugar estate, which 
was a source of waged employment for some residents. Alcoholism was a 
visible problem, with two or three drinking groups congregating each day.
The two rural villages showed similar variation. Zitwe had residents who 
were active former councillors who had moved up to the second or third tier 
of local government. Ggunda was once an active fishing village, and a 
landing site for smugglers bringing in goods from Kenya. With the new 
government the tariff system has changed and little smuggling occurs, other 
than fuel. Fishing is also difficult because of the spread of the water 
hyacinth over the surface of the lake. Again alcoholism was a visible 
problem.
3.3 Testing representativity
Defining marital status
Given the wide range of marital relations, it is difficult to choose one 
definition that captures the extent of the variation. A woman with a regular 
visiting lover may consider herself to be married. Yet, the number of 
'female-headed households’ within a society is becoming a more commonly 
quoted statistic (Appleton 1996, Buvinic 1997, Peters 1995). This statistic 
assumes that there is a simple division between dual-spouse and female­
headed households.
The number of retail building suppliers and visible construction are indicators of the current economic growth.
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In the Ugandan 1991 census the number of female-headed households is 
determined by two questions: 'Name of all those who slept here last night?'
and 'What is their relationship to head of household?' The list of those who 
slept in the household the previous night may only include permanent 
residents, and not part-time residents. A polygamous husband, or one who is 
only resident part-time due to work, may be excluded from the household, and 
the household may be classified as 'single female' when it is not. As 
discussed above, to assume that these households are poor on the basis of 
this classification may be a mistake. Both polygamous and part-time husbands 
may make substantial financial and labour contributions. 9
In the Kauga/Ngogwe study, information on marital status was gathered using 
the following questions: 'Are you married/co-habiting, divorced, widowed,
not married?' 'Do you / your husband have other wives or partners?' 'Do 
you / your husband stay here all the time, once a week, once a month, or 
several times a year?'10 The data are therefore specific on how often the 
husband is resident, and whether he has other commitments in terms of other 
households.
According to the definition used by the Ugandan census (1991-2) 30% of
households are female-headed in the Mukono district (Table 3.2). The 
Kauga/Ngogwe survey produced a much smaller estimate of 17.2% of households 
in the female-headed category - because women with part-time resident or 
polygamous husbands were registered as married. If, using the Kauga/Ngogwe 
data, single women and women with part-time husbands are placed in one 
category, i.e. using a definition equivalent to the one used in the Ugandan 
census, the total of female-headed households is 33.9% - a result similar
to the census figure of 30.0% This suggests that the census figure 
classified households with part-time resident husbands as female-headed. It 
also indicates that the Kauga/Ngogwe results are broadly comparable to those 
of the Ugandan census.
9
There is considerable debate as to whether targeting female-headed households is an effective way of reducing 
poverty, owing to the problem of defining of headship and conflicting evidence of poverty (Appleton 1996, Buvinic et al 
1997).
The question was designed so that the respondent could either be the wife or the husband, but the subject of the 
question is the husband.
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Table 3.2: Percentage distribution of households according to marital status
and head of household
Marital status Kauga/Ngogwe11 Kauga/Ngogwe data 
Census definition
Mukono District 
Census 1991
Married Full-time monogamous 53.9%
66.0%
Full-time polygamous 12.1%
Part-time monogamous 3.0%
33.9%
Part-time polygamous 8.7%
Single women 17.2%
Male head of household 70.0%
Female head of household 30.0%
Source: Kauga/Ngogwe survey ana Ugandan Census I y y I .
Stratification and representativity
Representativity requires ensuring that the proportion of respondents in the 
different strata is representative of that in the population. For example 
the ratio of urban to rural residents in the sample should be similar to the 
population ratio. In order to achieve a reasonable sample size in each 
stratum, each of the more common categories would contain 100+ respondents. 
Given the district ratio of urban:rural residents of 1:8, a sample of 30 
urban residents would require a sample of 240 rural residents. Because of 
the need to keep the total sample size to a manageable level, the emphasis 
in this research was placed on obtaining 30 respondents from each of the 
socio-economic strata, identified in the fieldwork census.12 Table 3.3 gives 
the sample size for each stratum, and table 3.4 compares the between strata 
ratios within the sample with those in the population.
11
The data used here are from the Kauga/Ngogwe census prior to the exclusion of those with no children under 5 years.
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Table 3.3: Number of respondents in each category of the sample
Stratum Housing index Total
Wealthy Middle Poor
Full-time monogamous husband 35 39 32 106
Polygamous husband 1 2 19 4 35
Part-time resident husband 9 11 12 32
Married 56 69 48 173
Single 11 32 28 71
Semi-urban 58 73 54 185
Rural 9 26 21 56
Total 67 1 01 76 244
Source':' kauga/K’gogwe survey.
Table 3.4: Comparison of married/single and rural/semi-urban ratios in
sample and district populations
Ratio Sample population District population from 
Census 1991
Married women/Single women 13 2.4 : 1 4.8 : 1
Rural women/Semi-urban women 0.3 : 1 7.3 : 1
Source: Kauga/Ngogwe survey ana Uganda TSy"! Census, MUKono aastrace trgures.
In order to obtain sufficient numbers of single women in each wealth 
stratum, for the results of the statistical analysis to be likely to be 
significant, single women are over-represented. This was justified because 
it enabled comparisons between married and single women in order examine the 
effect of being married on resource allocation. The predominance of urban 
residents, despite a low level of urbanisation within the district, was 
intentional because of an interest in an area with a greater level of 
economic activity and variation amongst the population.
An indicator of the extent of representativity is income distribution - a 
similar distribution should exist in the sample and district population. 
Table 3.5 compares the Kauga/Ngogwe distribution with that of the central 
region which includes the capital city as well as 7 other districts. 
(Unfortunately no income distribution is available for Mukono district 
alone.) Both total and rural central region distributions appear similar to 
that of Kauga/Ngogwe, with Kauga/Ngogwe achieving a slightly higher 
variance. (This may indicate a better representation of the poorest and the
Using the Kauga/Ngogwe definition specified above and not the census definition.
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richest, or a greater level of accuracy in collecting income data.) The 
urban central region distribution is significantly different because it 
contains the capital city. This suggests that although the Kauga respondents 
have been called 'urban or semi-urban' within this study for purposes of 
comparison with the Ngogwe residents, in fact their income levels are 
actually closer to those termed 'rural' in the other Ugandan data sources. 
(A comparison between urban and rural income levels in the Kauga/Ngogwe 
survey is made in chapter 4.)
Table 3.5: Percentage distribution of households according to income class
Monthly household 
income class 
COOO) Ush
Kauga/Ngogwe 
(n= 2 2 5)
Central Region 
TOTAL
(IHS 1992-3) 
(n=1,136,060)
Central Region 
RURAL
(IHS 1992-3) 
(n=816,250)
Central Region 
URBAN
(IHS 1992-3) 
(n=31 9,810)
0-50 66.7% 54.3% 64.0% 29.6%
50-100 14.2% 28.1% 25.1% 35.8%
100-150 7.6% 8.4% 7.2% 11 .7%
150-200 3.1% 3.6% 1 .8% 8.1 %
200-300 3.6% 2.4% 1 .0% 6.0%
300-400 1 .3% 1 .2% 0.4% 3.1 %
Above 400 3.6 % 2.0% 0.5% 5.7%
Source: Government or Uganda integrated Household. Survey iy92-3, Kauga/Ngogwe survey.
The housing index was an attempt to collect data on socio-economic status 
prior to the main survey to ensure that both the poorest and the richest 
were represented. Table 3.8 above suggests that this was achieved. Table
3.6 matches the housing index with other more specific wealth variables that 
were collected in the main survey, and shows the degree to which the housing 
index is an accurate indicator of income and ownership of consumer durables.
LONDON
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Table 3.6: Average value of consumer durables14 and income by socio-economic 
status and marital status (sample size)
Socio­
economic 
status (a)
Married 'households 1 Single 1 households1
Consumer durable 
score (Ush) (b)
Income (Ush 
per month)
Consumer durable 
score (Ush)
Income (Ush 
per month)
Wealthy 424,320 (59) 166,000 (45) 272,830 (9) 10,000 (9)
Middle 326,000 (70) 105,000 (63) 197,390 (30) 9,000 (32)
Poor 232,700 (46) 75,000 (40) 193,730 (25) 6,000 (25)
Note: (a) Socio-economic status is derived from a housing index, the construction of which is discussed
below.
(b) Consumer durable score is the replacement value (Ush) of durables within the household. The 
construction of this score is described below.
(c) Sample size varies according to the variable under consideration because of incomplete data.
It would appear that both ownership of consumer durables and income is 
higher in the _higher socio-economic status groups denoted by the housing 
index - for both married and single women households.
A fourth area where the sample design may have caused a bias is age.
It may be possible that the exclusion of households with no child under 5 
years of age led to a higher representation of younger families than exists 
in the population as a whole. A comparison of the adult age distribution for 
Mukono district from the Ugandan 1991 Census with the equivalent data from 
the Kauga/Ngogwe data shows the extent to which this has occurred (Table 
3.7) .
14
A explanation of the construction of these values is given above.
50
Table 3,7: Percentage of respondents in particular age groups by marital
status
Age Single Women Men Married women
Kauga/
Ngogwe
Mukono
District
Kauga/
Ngogwe
Mukono
District
Kauga/
Ngogwe
Mukono
District
Teens 2.7 3.5 0.6 2.4 13.6
20 1 s 20.3 11 .5 24.9 31 ■ 3 43.2 41 .6
30' s 21 .6 19.9 35.3 26.5 31.8 23.3
40 1 s 1 2 ^ 15.6 15.4 13.6 11.6
50' s 27.0 17.0 10.4 11.6 2.8 5.9
60 1 s 13.5 12.3 8.7 7.4 1 .7 2.7
70 + 6.8 10.6 4.6 5.4 1 .1 1 .1
Note: Underlined number indicates age group is under-represented in Kauga/Ngogwe survey, bold number
indicates age group is over-represented.
Married women in their teens are under-represented in the sample, either 
because few have children, or because they are still living within a larger 
parental household, and have been missed by the survey. Married women in 
their 30's are over-represented, because of the high proportion with young 
children. The same is true of married men both in their 20's and 30's.
Single women in their 20's are over-represented in the Kauga/Ngogwe sample 
as a high percentage have young children. Single women in their 501 s are 
also over-represented because they are caring for their grandchildren. Those 
in their 40's have neither young children of their own nor grandchildren and 
are therefore under-represented.
The anticipated bias was that adults over 40 years would be significantly 
under-represented. Given that marital relationships change over time, with 
perhaps negotiations developing into a more stable pattern, an emphasis on 
the younger group may have given a biased view of intra-household allocation 
of resources. However, this bias does not exist in the case of married men
and women. It is true for single women in their 40's, but those in their
50's are over-represented. It is unlikely that the characteristics of 
single women in their 40’s differ so much from those of single women in the 
50's such that the survey missed a significant proportion of single women in 
their 40's with young children. It is more probable that this group is less 
likely to be caring for under fives, and as a result this bias is an 
unavoidable consequence of choosing to measure nutritional status. It may 
have affected the analysis of the situation of single women in that the
offspring of women in their 40's may be less likely to be able to support
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their mothers than those their 50's. For example, a son of a 40 year old 
woman is likely to be in his mid-twenties, and may not be as well 
established as a son of a 50 year old woman who is in his mid-thirties. (The 
implications of mother-child relationships for the economic strategies of 
women is discussed in chapter 8 below.)
3.4 Defining the unit of analysis
In theory
There has been considerable literature on the problems of choosing a unit of 
analysis for both theoretical and fieldwork purposes. Much of the recent 
literature has berated the sometimes blind reliance on the concept of 
discrete households (Peters 1995, Guyer 1981, Guyer/Peters 1987, O'Laughlin 
1995). Yet, as these authors explain, it is important to understand the 
reason for this emphasis. Much of the early, anthropological literature on 
Africa concentrated its efforts on the study of kinship principles - 
explaining the 'constitution and dissolution1 of lineages. This emphasis on 
ethnic variation did not fit with the need to pursue goals of national 
integration after decolonisation. Nor did this approach lend itself to 
examining the relationship between domestic groups and between such groups 
and larger political units such as the state, or the international arena. 
The notion of the peasant household was in part a solution to these 
problems. It also suited the methodological needs of many economists. But
precisely because inter-household kinship links are important in Africa, the
use of ’household' has a chequered past.
As Rogers (1990:9) points out the definition of the household is an 
intractable theoretical problem. There are a variety of possible defining 
characteristics - joint residence, joint consumption, joint production - yet 
no one attribute fits all situations. Households may contain a variety of 
overlapping units and actual boundaries of the household are far from clear 
- or, to use Peters' term, the boundaries are 'permeable' (Peters 1995). 
For example, a polygamous husband may have two wives who carry out 
agricultural production separately, yet live under the same roof. Or the two 
wives may live in separate houses in different villages, yet the husband has
one plot of land from which he financially supports both wives. (In the
Kauga/Ngogwe census 20% of men were polygamous and 17% of men were part-time 
residents in household.) A single mother may be living on her brother's or 
father's compound and yet obtain financial support either from other members 
of the household, or from a visiting lover. (41% of single women lived other 
adults.)
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Imposing the notion of a coherent and discrete household has generated 
misleading images of domestic life. Much of the economics literature (prior 
to the bargaining literature discussed in chapter 2) has treated the 
household as a unitary social actor, with no internal sub-divisions. It has 
also tended to ignore the importance of inter-household linkages in 
resource distribution and labour allocation.
In practice
So where does this leave us when faced with doing field research? Peters 
(1995) recognises the need to identify key social units for policy purposes, 
yet suggests that this must entail an acknowledgement of the plurality of 
social, domestic units. She suggests that more emphasis must be placed on 
how households survive or change over time and on the extent of flows 
between households. 'In this way, one is led to enquire simultaneously into 
both units and processes.' (Peters 1995:101)
Guyer and Peters (1987) suggest looking at smaller and larger domestic units 
and the overlapping membership, where an individual may be member of the 
small unit but not the larger encompassing unit, or how one unit (for 
example a mother and child) may be nested within another larger unit. 
Gastellu (1987) recommends looking at the activities and relationships 
involved in production and consumption in order to map the 'flows1. Rogers 
(1990) suggests choosing the definition that best suits the situation and 
the purpose of the study.
The emphasis in this thesis is the relationship between spouses - detailed 
information was collected from both husbands and wives. Questions concerning 
income, education, social position and assets kept separately from the 
'household' were directed at the individual concerned - either the husband 
or wife. Without the need to collect data on all 'household members' from 
one particular respondent, it was not necessary to list members as distinct 
from non-members, and therefore the surveys did not depend on defining the 
boundaries of the household. Questions about apparently 'joint household' 
assets and recurrent expenditure were directed to the adult female (with 
children) in the dwelling - contributors to household expenses were not 
categorised by their 'membership' but by their relation to the adult woman 
concerned. Questions concerning the nutrition and education of the children 
were also addressed to the adult woman. In a sense the unit of concern was 
the married couple, and how their interactions impacted on the children for 
whom they cared. All resident children, irrespective of their relation to 
the adult respondents, and all non-resident biological children were
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included.
By including, and identifying, households with polymous and/or part-time 
men, and single women living with other adults, as well as dual spouse 
households, a variety of household forms were encompassed by the survey. 
This particular allocation of questions contains to some extent the 
assumption that the mother and child form a closer-knit unit than the father 
and child. (For example, it assumes that the woman is more likely to know 
about a child's recent illnesses.) As such it follows Guyer and Peters' 
(1987) recommendation to examine smaller units with the larger ones. It was 
also chosen to suit the needs of collecting nutrition data.
In theory it was also possible to cross-check information on 'household' 
assets obtained from the wife by also asking the husband. This was only 
done in one instance - both spouses where asked who 'owned' the house and 
the land. Only a few discrepancies emerged - mostly in polygamous households 
were the woman felt the need to assert her right to retain usage over her 
portion of the household land. This may have revealed a fear that her 
husband may allocate her land to another wife.
For the purposes of this thesis, it was assumed that one of the key 
variations in the nature of spousal relations is the degree to which a 
husband/father contributes financially or otherwise. It was necessary to 
stratify the sample accordingly to ensure that it was representative of the 
varying levels of male contribution. Rarely in fieldwork is it possible to 
collect detailed information on financial contribution prior to the 
stratification of sample. Ostensible substitutes, such as residency or 
marital status, may not give accurate impressions of the actual level of 
financial contribution. For example, a migrant worker may contribute more 
than an alcoholic, permanently resident father. Or, if marital status is 
used, an apparently single woman may gain substantially from an informal 
relationship, or a brother.
In this instance information gathered during a census of the survey villages 
on marital status (married/cohabiting, single), residency (part-time or 
full-time), type of marriage (polygamous/monogamous) were used as indicators 
of the level of contribution by the relevant male. In terms of the debate 
above, this assumed that children would be living with an adult female who 
was primarily responsible for their care, and that men's contribution in 
terms of time and money was more variable. (This proved to be an inaccurate 
over-simplification - see chapter 7 and 8.)
Table 3.8 makes an after-the-fact comparison between the husband's 
contribution and type of marriage and residency. It would appear that as a
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husband's share rises he is less likely to be either a part-time resident or 
polygamous, and that residency and type of marriage may be reasonable 
indicators of spousal contribution. It is also interesting to note that the 
households that are more likely to be wealthy are not those where the 
husband meets all the costs, or where the wife contributes more than half, 
but where husband meets the majority share 48-99%.
Table 3.8: Percentage of part-time and polygamous husbands by share of
recurrent expenditure paid for by husband (sample size). 15
Husband1s 
share of 
recurrent 
expenditure
Percentage of husbands 
who are part-time 
residents
Percentage of 
husbands who 
are polygamous
Percentage of HH in 
the highest housing 
index category 16
0 - 48 % 37.8 (45) 22.2 (45) 30.2 (43)
49 - 99 % 32.4 (37) 18.9 (39) 45.9 (37)
100 % 20.0 (30) 10.0 (30) 40.0 (30)
Note: Sample size varies with according to the variable under consideration because of incomplete data
It is also possible to compare the distribution of married and single female 
households according to contribution either by husband, ex-husband or 
relative (Table 3.9). (The relative tended to be either a brother, father, 
or an adult son or daughter.) It would appear that 30% of single women are 
dependent on someone else for more than 50% of their recurrent expenditure, 
whereas nearly 17% of married women have to meet more than 50% of recurrent 
expenditure. In the case of single women, marital status does not seem to 
be a good indicator of the level of financial support, and financial 
dependancy on a husband cannot be inferred from being married.
Table 3.9: Percentage distribution of married and single women by share of 
recurrent expenditure met by husband, ex-husband or relative (sample size).
Percentage share met by 
either husband, ex- 
husband, or relative
Percentage distribution 
of single women (48)
Percentage distribution 
of married women (118)
0 - 49 % 70.8 16.9
50 - 100 % 14.6 57.6
100 % 14.6 25.4
As mentioned above, the emphasis on this thesis is on the spousal
The collection and construction of the percentage contributions to recurrent expenditure are discussed later in 
this chapter.
^ T h e  definition and construction of the housing index used is discussed below.
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relationship, and therefore the level of financial dependence does not 
invalidate the division of the sample into married and unmarried women. 
There is, however, an implicit assumption that single women (divorced or 
widowed) no longer have to contend with spousal authority. But actually 
single women may be dependent on male relatives, and therefore, to some 
extent, subject to their authority. A young divorced woman with young 
children may be unable to set up a household on her own but may have to rely 
on the charity of a relative, usually male. Table 3.10 shows the percentage 
of single women who are living with other adults. 17
Table 3.10: Percentage of households with extra adults and relation of extra 
adult to female respondent (sample size).
Relationship of extra 
adult to female 
respondent
Percentage of single 
women living with extra 
adult (55)
No extra adult
OJ00Lrt
Son/Daughter 7.3
Grandchild 14.5
Niece/Nephew 1 .8
Mother 3.6
Father 5.4
Brother 3.6
Sister 12.7
Source: Kauga/Ngogwe survey.
Over 50% of single women lived alone with children under 18 years. Of these, 
7% live with their adult children, 14% with their adult grandchildren and 
nearly 13% with a sister. Only 9% live with their parent(s), and only 9% 
live with either a brother or father. On the assumption that it is resident 
male relatives that are likely to impose restrictive authority, it would 
appear that only a small proportion of single women are subject to such 
authority.
3.5 Combining qualitative and quantitative methodologies
In theory
The underlying aim behind the chosen methodology was to blend qualitative
17During Che child survey a list of all resident members and non-resident children was compiled. Because these 
individuals were not considered crucial to the survey, no attempt was made to distinguish between those more frequently 
resident and those rarely resident.
56
and quantitative methods gaining, hopefully, the advantages of both.
Scrimshaw (1990) argues that there are two methodological questions that vex 
field research in intra-household allocation. 'The first is how to measure 
accurately the actual behaviours, motivations, feelings and outcomes related 
to intra-household resource allocation. The second is how to ensure an 
accurate understanding of the meanincr of the behaviours and concepts
measured' (Scrimshaw 1990:86). Quantitative methods aim to achieve the 
first, and qualitative the second. (The difference between the two 
approaches can be encapsulated in an appreciation of how the two methods use 
'words'. In a quantitative approach the interaction between the interviewee 
and interviewer is structured such that the meaning of a particular word is 
determined by the researcher prior to the interview. In a qualitative 
approach, the aim of the research is to understand the meaning (or 
intention) behind the interviewee's use of a particular word.) Qualitative 
methods are designed with the aim of achieving validity, quantitative 
methods are designed with the aim of being representative of a broader
population. The former generates hypotheses and the latter tests them.
In practice
In reality there are a number of possible interview styles ranging from 
participant observation, conversations/group discussions and informal
interviews to formal/structured interviews. It was decided to use group 
discussions as a means of understanding the respondent's perception of the 
issues being studied, and structured interviews to gather data on 
individuals' behaviour. One issue was whether my language skills would be 
sufficient to gain most from both types of interviews, or whether the 
benefit in employing local research assistants would be lost due to myself 
being one step removed from the process.
Cultural meaning and language are intertwined. 18 I spent three months prior 
to the fieldwork learning the language, and six months while working in the 
field. Yet given the constraints on time, and the need to acquire a detailed 
knowledge of the language in order to conduct sensitive interviews, I 
decided to employ two research assistants. As both had university degrees 
in the social sciences, and previous fieldwork experience, it was hoped that 
good communication between myself and the assistants would make up for the 
short-comings of my language skills. Owing to the sensitivity of research 
and the need to interview both men and women, one female and one male 
research assistant were chosen. The research assistants also acted as 
moderators in the single-sex group discussions.
^ A n  interesting example of this is the connection between the verb ’to cook' (okfumba) and the question. 'Are you 
married ? ’ when directed to a woman (Ofumbirwa ?), literally translated as 'Do you cook ?'
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If the benefits of a small-scale, detailed project were not to be lost, it 
was necessary to ensure that the assistants had a good conceptual grasp of 
the subject. Two weeks' training preceded the fieldwork, and 3-4 days at the 
beginning of each stage. The training included a theoretical discussion, and 
an outline of the current literature. The formal questionnaires, and a 
topic list for the focus groups were prepared in a rough format in advance 
of the training. The questionnaires were translated into Luganda, and re­
translated back into English. This procedure enabled the checking of the 
meaning and the local understanding of words prior to going into the field. 
Role plays were also carried out to see how long each questionnaire took, 
whether it flowed easily, and to check for errors. The topic list for the 
discussions was also tried out in role plays. The training was also a two- 
way process. As a background to this practical task it was possible to 
discuss the purpose and aims of the fieldwork, enabling me to 
discover/discuss my own preconceptions about what I expected we would find.
The fieldwork was organised in the following way:
* A census of all 'dwellings' in the chosen villages to collect data
required for selection of a stratified sample - marital status, 
residency, quality of housing, and the number of children under five 
years.
* Focus group discussions with a random selection of the respondents 
from each strata of the chosen sample. Male and female groups were
conducted separately,
* Structured interviews with each spouse and a sample of single women.
The census generated a list of all the households within the six
communities. It gathered information on marital status, residency of 
husband, the number of children under 5 years, and the quality of the 
building (Appendix A) . This information was used to choose the sample for 
the household survey ensuring that it included a proportion of dual-spouse, 
'single female households', and households with part-time and polygamous 
husbands. 19 Only households with children under 5 years were included in the 
sample because of the decision to collect nutritional status data of under 
fives as an outcome variable.
The information on the quality of housing from the census was used to
19
No unmarried men were included in the sample,
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stratify the sample according to socio-economic status. A housing index was 
constructed, giving a total score of 1-3, based on the materials used for 
the construction of the roof and walls, and their state of repair.
Single gender group discussions, with approximately 10-12 respondents, were 
held in each community. The moderator and assistant were the same gender as 
the group to encourage a full expression of views. The conversations were 
recorded on a tape cassette, and a full English transcription was completed 
at a later date. The purpose was to understand the respondents' perception 
of the issues relating to intra-household allocation of resources. A 
subject list was used as a guide by the moderator (see appendix B) . It 
included topics such as bridewealth, polygamous marriage, division of 
household and agricultural production tasks, decision-making, control of 
income and assets, custody of children and assets on divorce or death of 
husband, and marital violence.
The transcriptions of these discussions provided some evidence of how these 
issues are perceived, where there is apparent conflict between different 
viewpoints, and an impression of how cultural norms are changing. It 
provided an understanding of the cultural context in which the statistical 
data had to be analysed. It also helped to ensure that the questionnaires 
used in the quantitative survey were culturally relevant, both in terms of 
general questions and the translation of particular phrases. For example it 
became apparent during the group discussions that spouses rarely pool their 
finances, often kept their income a secret, and that there was considerable 
disagreement over whether purchase of household durables conferred disposal 
rights over the asset. Questions were designed accordingly.
The purpose of the structured interviews was to collect quantitative data 
from each spouse in such a way that it was possible in the analysis stage to 
match the information from one spouse with the other. There were four 
questionnaires, carried out in two rounds. The asset and income survey 
targeted both men and women, asking questions on education, training, 
positions of responsibility within the community, crops grown, income, 
recurrent expenditure, personal and household assets, inheritance and 
property ownership (appendices C, D & E).
Women were the respondents for the child survey. Details of the education, 
nutrition and health were collected for all resident children, irrespective 
of their relationship to the adults. Information on the survival rate of 
the respondent's children and education of non-resident children was also 
collected (see appendix F). 20
2°The data on child survival rate and education of non-resident children were not included in the final analysis, but 
may be used at a later date.
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A proportion of the sample were also chosen for a life history survey. The 
respondents were asked about previous stages of their life - who had cared 
for them while young, what other places had they lived in, with whom, why 
they had moved on, had there been any previous marriages, why had they 
ended. The aim was to provide a form of explanation for the respondent's 
current situation captured in the asset/income and child survey. 21
The collection of data on intra-household allocation of resources presents 
some specific problems. Only a few surveys have attempted to collect intra­
household data simply because of the expense of interviewing both husband 
and wife. Many surveys ask the 'head of the household', often the husband, 
for data on their spouse and other household members. For example, the 
standard approach to income in the majority of household surveys is to ask 
the 'head' of household what the household income is. When there are 
difficult negotiations over who should contribute what to general household 
goods, it is common for spouses not to reveal to one another what they earn 
(Faphounda 1988, Engle 1990, Roldan 1988). This enables the retention of a 
certain proportion of income for personal consumption. Asking one spouse 
about the other will not provide accurate information. This is also the 
case with assets - many women accumulate assets outside the marital home as 
a form of security. Secrecy is often essential for women to retain control 
of these assets.
Obtaining accurate information on income is notoriously difficult, even when 
the questions are concerned with the respondent's income. Respondents may be 
unwilling to discuss their income, due to suspicion of the authorities.
Rather than offend the interviewer by refusing to give any information, some 
may give inaccurate details. During the fieldwork all attempts were made to 
allay fears about the confidentiality of the interview. Only two or three 
respondents refused outright, and one or two hid on our arrival.
Respondents may be involved in a range of informal activities: casual wage 
labour, part-time self-employment business activities, as well as more 
formal wage labour. The questionnaire has to be designed to elicit
information on a range of informal, as well as formal, activities. This is 
particularly true if the aim of the survey is to gain accurate information 
on the income of women, who are less likely to be involved in formal
employment. Asking the respondent concerned for a total monthly income 
figure may be pointless, as he/she may not know his/her own income, let
21
This was not very successful because both time allocated and the form of the questionnaire did not encourage the 
discussion to flow freely sufficiently for interviewer to get a real sense of the respondent's life history that had shaped 
his/her current situation. In retrospect the research assistants should also have been retrained in the skills of conducting 
unstructured interviews. As a result this information was not used in the analysis.
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alone that of a spouse.
In this survey, there was a separate question for each different type of 
economic activity - wage labour (formal and informal), self-employment, and 
property-related income. One typical cycle of each economic activity was 
discussed with the respondent and details of the costs of each input and the 
revenue per cycle were recorded. (A cycle could be a two hour session of 
producing pancakes that were then taken to town and sold the same day, or a 
week's fishing trip, or one season's production of tomatoes.) The profit was 
calculated for each cycle and then translated into a monthly figure 
according to how many times the cycle took place in a month. The cycle 
recorded was the respondent's notion of typical costs and revenue, but the 
information may not represent average monthly incomes.
In order to determine household membership the Ugandan data sets use the 
question: 'Who slept here last night?' The results are often used to 
determine whether there is a permanently resident and therefore contributing 
adult man in the household. As discussed above, in a society where 
polygamy (de-facto or de-jure), and part-time residency are common, a 
husband who plays a major role in the household may not have spent the night 
there. Questions about marital status and residency have to be quite direct 
and specific. 22
Surveys often assume that household durables are owned 'jointly' by the two 
spouses ('by the household'), but this is rarely so. There are often joint 
usufruct rights, but rarely joint disposal rights. In order to gain an 
accurate asset position for each spouse the questionnaire has to be written 
with an understanding of how to delineate the fault lines of that 'joint' 
ownership. Simply the payment of bridewealth may entitle the husband to 
disposal rights of durables purchased with the wife's income. Or a wife may 
be entitled to dispose of items she purchased with her own income, but not 
those purchased with the husband's income, although she was contributing to 
domestic production at the time of purchase. Women's rights over household 
assets vary across different communities, and focus group discussions are 
one method of ensuring that the questionnaire is worded in a way that will 
elicit the correct information. Women were asked how many of a particular 
item there were in the household, how many of those items she herself had 
purchased with her own income, and how many of those items did she think 
that she would be able to take upon divorce. The items purchased were 
assumed to represent an indicator of wealth, whereas those expected to be 
taken upon divorce were assumed to indicate disposal rights and control over
22
It is now common in the major international data sets to use a variation of: " Who slept here for 14 days in the 
last month?" as a definition of a household resident, and "Who slept here for 14 days in the last year?" as a definition of a 
household member. The distinction between resident and member is to enable the identification of migrant workers who sent 
remittances back home.
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household assets. The data collected in this manner are used in the analysis 
in the following chapters. Specific scores were calculated for ease of 
analysis and the details of the construction of these scores are discussed 
in the following section of this chapter.
Men may consider the involvement of women in surveys or discussions as 
leading to a possible threat to their authority, and as a result prevent 
their wife from participating. Ensuring that both men and women are 
involved, and to attempt to communicate inclusiveness of the word 'gender' 
can be important to the success of the fieldwork project. Several
respondents refused to cooperate because they felt the questions were too
personal in nature.
If the aim of the survey is not only to obtain an assessment of the economic 
situation of women, but also of the obstructions that they face in improving 
their own situation, and that of their household, it is important to 
understand how the attitudes surrounding authority, money and power are 
'engendered1. For example: Do men prevent their wives from working? What 
is the attitude of other men to a husband whose wife earns more than he 
does? What is the attitude towards single women who are economically
independent? Are women encouraged to be economically successful?
Any attempts to obtain representative results can fall foul of the timing of 
interviews. A particular section of the community may be missed due to 
interviews taking place during the day. Interviewing began at around 10-11am 
when respondents had finished their digging for the day. Yet those 
respondents who had businesses elsewhere, or full-time jobs, were unlikely 
to be present during the day. After the main body of interviews had been 
carried out by the research assistants returned to each village on different 
occasions, including Sunday to catch those not present in the first round. 
Despite such efforts several respondants were available for one part of the 
survey but not others. At the analysis stage this lead to varying sample
sizes according to which variables were being analysed.
With the employment of research assistants misunderstanding can occur, and 
it may not be noticed until the data are keyed into the computer at the 
analysis stage. One of the benefits of doing a small study, and only 
starting interviewing at around 10 am, was that there is a portion of the 
day available for checking previously completed questionnaires. Checking the 
questionnaires in the morning had the advantage of not being at the end of a 
long day, when there is a strong desire to go home, for all parties.
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3.6 Construction of wealth scores
A variety of wealth scores, used in the analysis in subsequent chapters, 
were constructed from the data. 23 For the sake of clarity, the process of 
that construction is described here.
As indicated above, the female respondents were asked the following 
questions:
* How many of the following items are there in your household?
There were three categories of items: consumer durable items (charcoal and
paraffin stoves, jerry cans, basins, saucepans, chairs, benches, tables, 
cupboards, sleeping mats, mattresses, beds, radios, tape cassettes, and 
TVs) ; agricultural assets from which income could be derived (hoes, pangas, 
hens, goats, sheep, pigs, cattle); other items that could also generate 
wealth (bicycles, motorcycles, vehicles, and sewing machines). The reason 
for these distinctions was that if agricultural activity was associated with 
a low level of wealth, a high level of agricultural assets did not 
necessarily indicate a high level of general wealth.
* Whose money purchased these items? (Possible answers: wife, husband, 
both, or other.)
If the woman was married she was also asked:
* Which of items in the household would you be able to take on divorce 
or death of your husband?
If the woman was not married she was asked:
* How many items were there in your household before your husband died 
/ or you were divorced?
* Which of those items were you able to take with you?
The resulting data were used to construct a series of scores. A consumer 
durable, and a total possession score including all items, (consumer 
durables, as well as agricultural and other wealth generating assets), were 
calculated for each household. A consumer durable score and a total 
possession score were calculated for each individual (male and female),
23
The ’scores' are monetary values, not a point system with a limited range.
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according to the items the individual purchased. The consumer durables were 
treated separately because wealth-generating assets may be more related to 
the source of income rather than the level of wealth. (A poor individual may 
be more dependent on agriculture, and so have a greater number of 
agricultural assets.) An expected divorce score was calculated for married 
women, and an actual divorce/widowed score was calculated for single women.24 
In each case a standard value was assigned to each item, and the sum of the 
values of the items gave the score. 25 The resulting scores are closer to the 
replacement value of the assets, than to an accurate current value.
The household scores were assumed to represent household wealth.26 The
individual consumer durable scores were assumed to represent an individual's
(past) ability to generate wealth. The divorce scores were assumed to 
represent an individual's ability to control the wealth that had been
generated - or more simply, disposal rights over property within the 
household.
If the divorce score was to represent the degree of control of assets, the 
value of assets 'controlled' is not as important as the share that this 
represents of total household assets. For example, in a wealthy household a 
wife may be able to take only a small share of the household assets with 
her, yet the value of these items may amount to more than the value of the 
assets taken by a woman from a poor household; yet the second woman may have 
a greater degree of control in comparison to her husband, than does the 
first, even though it is control over fewer items. As a result the divorce 
score used is the percentage of assets taken/expected to be taken of total 
household assets.
In many instances, though not all, the items women expected to take were 
those they had purchased. In such cases, as described so far the divorce 
score represents the items purchased. However, given that women often do a 
greater proportion of domestic work and household production for 
consumption, but earn a lower proportion of household income, there is a 
sense in which equity would suggest that they be entitled to some of the 
assets purchased by the husband. A measure of control over household assets 
should include this. The final divorce score - used in subsequent chapters - 
is the difference between items that a wife expects to take on divorce and
24
Both of these scores only included consumer durables.
25
The following are the values in Uganda shillings assigned to each asset: hoe 3,500; panga 3,500; wheelbarrow 35,00; 
charcoal stove 2,500; paraffin stove 10,000; jerry can 1,500; basin 1,000; saucepan 5,000; chair 10,000; bench 8,000; table 
35,000; cupboard 35,000; sleeping mat 5,000; mattress 30,000; bed 30,000; hen 4,000; goat 40,000; sheep 30,000; pig 60,000; 
cow 150,000; bicycle 70,000; radio 15,000; tape-cassette 45,000; sewing machine 100,000; TV 125,000; motorcycle 800,000; 
vehicle 2 million.
26Sender and Smith (1992) use a similar system of scores to measure wealth.
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those purchased, as a percentage of the household score. A positive score 
indicates that a woman expects to take a greater proportion of household
assets than she purchased - she has control over some of assets generated by
her husband, while she was doing domestic work. A negative score indicates 
she expects to take a smaller proportion than she purchased - that she does 
not have disposal rights over all items that she purchased.
There are various problems with the interpretation of this divorce score. 
Firstly, some women said they would leave certain items behind so that their 
children could benefit from them. (The question could have been adapted to 
take account of this, but unfortunately the problem was not identified until 
too late.) Secondly, what women expected to take on divorce or widowhood may
not necessarily be the same as any actual outcome, should divorce or death
occur. This was to some extent tested against the scores for divorced or 
widowed women. (A tabular comparison is given in chapter 5.)
Married women were also asked:
* How many assets do you own independently of the household, that are 
stored elsewhere?
* Does you husband know about each of these items?
Using the same method as described above, a score was calculated for each 
married woman of the value of the assets that she owned outside the marital 
home, and for the value of the assets of which her husband had knowledge. 
Women may keep assets away from the marital household for a number of 
reasons: a) the assets may be part of joint inheritance shared with other
siblings; b) they may be on loan to a friend or relative; or, c) they may be 
a form of insurance against marriage failure. Women were not asked directly 
about their motives (except in the focus group discussions), but if the
husband has not been told it would suggest that the woman wanted to ensure
that she retained control of the items concerned. It was assumed, though it 
need not be the case, that secrecy was more likely to be associated with a 
desire to have some form of future insurance. (Secrecy, or rather husband
having no knowledge of the items, could also arise from the item being
insignificant, and not worth informing him; but given the average level of 
income, and the cost of the items concerned, this is unlikely.)
3.7 Methodolgy for collection of nutritional status data
Information on height, weight and age was collected on all children of five 
years and younger. A measuring mat was used for babies and a standing rule
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was used for older children. An electronic scale was used for weighing 
children. To avoid the difficulty of weighing babies/ mothers and babies 
were weighed together, and then mothers on their own - the difference being 
the weight of the baby. The data assembled by the United States National 
Centre for Health Statistics were used as a reference population to 
determine whether the Ugandan population was malnourished in comparison with 
this standard. 27
The indices used to describe a child's anthropometric status were weight- 
for-age, height-for-age, and weight-for-height. Malnourishment is present if 
an index was two standard deviations below the median (-2SD's) of the 
reference population. The number of standard deviations away from the median 
is termed the z-score. If a child's height-for-age is more than -2SD's away 
from the median, s/he is considered to be "stunted". A low weight-for-age is 
considered to be "underweight", and a low weight-for-height is "wasting".
Stunting results from chronic/long term undernutrition, and is the result of 
growth retardation over a long period of time. The functional consequences 
can be increased vulnerability to disease, and reduced mental development. 
In a child, stunting reflects poor diet, health and inadequate child care. 
Fresh high-bulk foods with low nutrient density are commonly used in Uganda, 
often with only one or two meals a day with a few snacks (Kakitahi 1985, 
Vella et al 1988). Such food satisfies hunger but can starve the body of 
nutrients, particularly those important for energy. In adulthood, stunting 
results in poor reproductive performance, low physical work capacity and 
perhaps social stigma. Wasting (weight-for-height) is seen as sign of 
acute/recent malnourishment, where any long-term loss of height is not 
captured, but low weight for actual height achieved is. In Uganda, where 
many children are already stunted, wasting is often less significant. The 
underweight measure does not distinguish between current or past 
malnourishment, but is a more general indicator.
For the analysis of the Kauga/Ngogwe data it was decided to combine the z- 
scores for the three indices (height-for-age, weight-for-age, weight-for- 
height) into one 'score' for each child. 28 This combination score is used 
unless the results are being compared with another data set. Unfortunately 
only a few of the Kauga/Ngogwe results are statistically significant. In
27
The World Health Organisation recommends the use of data produced by U.S. Centre for Health Statistics as a 
reference population. The same data set was used by the Demographic Health Survey of Uganda. Work being done by Stephan 
Klasen examines the weakness of using a such reference population, particularly for an African community, where the genetic 
diversity is thought to be much greater than in other ethnic groups (Personal communication 1997). As there is currently no 
alternative, this study will continue using the U.S data.
28Nutritional score = height-for-age score + weight-for-age score + weight-for-height score. Construction of height- 
for-age score: If z-score is -3SDs, ~2SDs, -1SDS away from median, score is 1, 2, 3 etc. respectively. The weight-for-age 
and weight-for-height scores were constructed in a similar way. Poor nutritional status = score of 3-9, good nutritional 
status = score of 10-24
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some cases this may be due to the size of the sample. Despite this weakness 
it was still decided to present the data. Further research would have to 
done before any strong conclusions can be drawn about the relevance to the 
total population.
3,8 Significance testing
Much of the statistical analysis of the nutritional data involves the 
comparison of sample means. The probability that the sample means would 
differ to the observed extent, even if the population means are equal is 
tested using a separate variance t-test. If the probability of obtaining a 
particular result is less that 0.05, (or 0.01 for a more stingent test) then 
the hypothesis that the two population means are equal is rejected. Results 
of the T-tests are only discussed where they are significant, and sample 
sizes are included in order to give an indication of the validity of the 
results.
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4THE GENDER GAP: 
HEALTH, WEALTH AND EDUCATION
The aim of this chapter is to examine indicators of well-being, and the gap 
between the male and female indicators in the Kauga/Ngogwe study area. The 
statistics examined are those on education and literacy, economic activity, 
income, assets and health. 1 The results from the study area are compared 
with national statistics to give an impression of how the study area fares 
in comparison with the rest of the country. They are also compared with 
other Mukono district figures, where they are available, to give an
indication of how representative the Kauga/Ngogwe survey is of the district. 
Married women are compared with single women with children, where possible, 
to gain an impression of the impact of having a spouse.
As outlined in the introduction, much of the thesis examines the allocation 
decisions that men and women make, the different contexts in which they are 
made, and their impact on nutritional status of children. It does not
examine statistics that reveal the differential impact of the allocation 
decisions on the well-being of men and women themselves. This is partly 
because it would be difficult to relate a 'snapshot1 of allocation decisions 
to indicators that are the result of a life-time of discrimination between 
men and women, but also because the allocation decisions are both the cause 
and result of the socio-economic situation that the indicators represent.
As a result the purpose of this chapter is to give an overview of the 
results of discrimination between men and women as a background to the
thesis, with the aim of establishing the different situations that men and 
women face.
4.1 Education
Education is important in enabling resource control, firstly through 
increasing an individual's potential wage/profit rate, and secondly, by
improving an individual's ability in any negotiating process.
i
There are other indicators of well-being that are not examined, for example, safety and security, sanitation & 
water, housing. The latter two are only relevant to the household and not the individual, and so a gender comparison cannot 
be made. No statistics on safety and security were collected in the survey.
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There is a considerable gap in the education levels achieved by men and 
women. According to the Kauga/Ngogwe survey 25% of women in the sample have 
no education. In comparison, only 9% of men have not attended school, and 
34% of men have reached secondary level. Only 13% of women have done so 
(Table 4.1).
Table 4.1: Distribution of men and women by education levels according to 
different data sources
Data source Percentage of individuals who have...education
No education Primary Secondary Tertiary
Census 1991 
All Uganda
Men 28.4 58.9 11.1 0.4
Women 45.9 47.1 6.7 0.1
Census 1991
Mukono
district
Men 23.8 58.4 12.6 **
Women 32.9 57.2 8.7 **
Kauga/Ngogwe
1995/6
Men 9.2 56.1 34.1 0.6
Women 26.6 60.2 13.4 1 .2
Source: Government: or Uganaa TUTi Census, ana Kauga/Ngogwe survey.
The Kauga/Ngogwe figures show higher attendance levels than the Census 
figures for Mukono or at the national level. It might be assumed that this 
reflects the preponderance of peri-urban respondents over rural respondents 
in the Kauga/Ngogwe survey2 or that as a rural area Ngogwe has relatively 
high attendance rates in comparison with other parts of the- district. Table
4.2 suggests that it is the latter.
Table 4.2: Percentage of individuals with at least primary education by
gender, marital status and location (sample size).
Gender and marital status Semi-urban Rural All
Men (178) 92.4 85.0 90.8
Married women (178) 75.2 81 .0 77.0
Single women (76) 69.8 26.7 69.7
source: Kauga/Ngogwe survey.
It would appear that urban men are more likely to be educated than rural men 
(92% and 85% respectively), but this is not the case for women (75% and 81% 
respectively). Perhaps in poorer families with lower education levels, and 
less land available for division between siblings, brothers may be given
2
The rural/urban ratios of the different surveys are discussed in chapter 3.
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preference over sisters when it comes to land allocation. With a lower 
possibility of inheriting land, and fewer employment opportunities, 
uneducated women are more likely to migrate to urban areas. Uneducated men 
on the other hand will probably inherit land from their fathers, and may 
have greater opportunities in rural areas than uneducated women. This factor 
seems more pronounced among single woman than married women. Perhaps it is 
because once women are either divorced or widowed - without the support of a 
husband, that uneducated women with fewer opportunities migrate to the urban 
areas.
The last column in table 4.2 (above) suggests that uneducated women are less 
likely to be currently married than educated women. Table 4.3 below supports 
this, showing the percentage of women who are married rising with education.
Table 4.3: Marital status by women's education level (sample size).
Women's education level Percentage of women 
currently married
None 71.4 (63)
Primary 72.0 (150)
Secondary 82.4 (34)
Tertiary 100.0 (3)
Source: Kauga/Ngogwe survey.
It could be argued that education increases women's access to marriage -
perhaps making them more desirable wives. 3 If both marriage and education
facilitate women's ability to accumulate wealth, is it possible to say which 
is the more important factor? Table 4.4 compares wealth and marital status 
with education levels.
Table 4.4: Distribution of women across socio-economic levels (based on
housing index) according to marital status and education (sample size).
Women1s
education level
Married women Single women
% in
wealthiest
group
% in
poorest
group
% in
wealthiest
group
% in poorest 
group
Secondary 42.9 (28) 14.3 33.3 (6) 50.0
Primary 34.6 (1 04) 25.0 11.9 (42) 40.5
None 22.5 (40) 40.0 11.1 (18) 33.3
Source: Kauga/Ngogwe survey.
3
When one respondant was asked why he had divorced his first wife, and married another, his response was that the 
first did not have primary education, so she was unable to assist in the running of his shop. Presumably the second one was 
chosen partly because she did have primary education.
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Amongst married women better education is associated with higher socio­
economic status ~ women with secondary education are more likely to be in 
the wealthier group, women with no education are more likely to be in the 
poorest group. Amongst single women there is not an equivalent pattern - 50% 
of women with secondary education are in the poorest group in comparison 
with 33% of women with no education being in the poorest group. This 
suggests that education can facilitate a 'good' marriage, which in turn can 
lead to wealth, but whilst a woman is single, education is less likely to
lead to wealth. Because of unequal access to resources, single women are
unable to use their education as effectively as married women.
Yet the wealth indicator used in the above table is 'household socio­
economic status', and one of the main questions that this thesis attempts to
answer is to what extent a measure of 'household wealth' is applicable to 
the individual members - in particular the wife. She may enjoy usage rights 
over household assets, and benefit from a husband's high income, but what is 
her level of control over household income, or of decision-making over 
household assets? The married women who are recorded as having a high 
socio-economic status in the table above do so because they are living in a 
certain household, not because they themselves are necessarily in control of 
a certain level of wealth. (This issue is discussed in chapter 7.)
Literacy
Both the Census, Integrated Household survey, and the Kauga/Ngogwe survey 
show that a much higher percentage of men are literate than women - the 
male literacy rate is approximately 20% better than the female rate (Table 
4.5). There are, however, large discrepancies between the actual levels of 
literacy given by the different sources - the male rate varies between 7 3% 
down to 57%, the female rate varies from 57% to 38%. There may be several 
reasons for this inaccuracy. Firstly, respondents may have an incentive to 
claim literacy in the presence of a probably secondary, if not tertiary 
educated, interviewer. Secondly, when asked whether he/she can read and 
write, it is not clear in what level of literacy the interviewer is 
interested, and the question is open to interpretation. For example, is it 
sufficient to be able to read and write the respondent' s own name? The 
Kauga/Ngogwe was the only survey to test the respondent's literacy by asking 
him/her to read a sentence on the questionnaire, and to write a sentence of 
their choice. Given this, and that the Kauga/Ngogwe figures show a lower 
level of literacy than the other sources, it is probable that Kauga/Ngogwe 
figures are more accurate. (This lower level of literacy is despite the 
higher attendance rates for the Kauga/Ngogwe survey, suggesting that the 
Kauga/Ngogwe respondants simply received a poorer education, or more likely,
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it confirms the inaccuracy of the data from the other sources.)
Table 4.5: Percentage of literate adults.
Source of data Percentage of literate adults
Men Women
Uganda IHS 72.7 51 .5
Uganda 1991 Census 63.5 44.9
Mukono 1991 Census 65.7 56.9
Kauga/Ngogwe survey 57.3 38.2
Source: Government of Uganda Integrated Household survey 1992-3, Government of Uganda 1991 census.
Improvements in education levels
Education levels have improved over the past 40-50 years. If the level of 
education reached is analysed by age, the figures reveal improvements made 
by both men and women. There has been a steady decline in the number of men 
and women who have not attended school {Table 4.6). The gap between men and 
women has also narrowed - from 35% down to -1.3%. The current generation of 
girls seems to be faring better than their mothers, and their male peers.
In the 6-10 age group approximately 40% of both boys and girls have not 
attended school, with girls having a slightly higher attendance rate than 
boys. It may be that girls are more likely to attend school while under 10 
years, but will drop out after 10 years of age. Boys may be kept at home 
while relatively young to look after the animals, and then stay at school 
until a later age than girls.
74
Table 4.6: Percentage of individuals with no education according to age in 
Mukono district
Age Men Women Gap
6-10 years 41 .4 40.1 -1 .3
10-20 10.5 13.1 2.6
20-30 14.4 22.9 8.5
30-40 18.4 36.4 18.0
40-50 29.2 55.5 26.3
50-60 38.5 73.7 35.2
60-70 49.8 73.6 23.8
70+ 62.3 81 .2 18.9
Source: Government of Uganda 1991 Census
Despite the fact that by the age of 20, the current generation of teenage 
boys are more likely to have attended school than girls, girls that do 
attend are more likely to attend all possible years for their age. In the 
age group 5-10 years, 25% of girls have attended during all possible years 
at school (Table 4.7)5. 18% of boys have the same record. In the age group 
11-18 years far fewer of either gender have achieved 100% - 5.9% of girls 
and 2.2% of boys, but the gap between girls and boys has halved. Despite the 
low record of full attendance at secondary level, those girls that do attend 
appear to be doing better than boys.
Table 4.7: Percentage of children who have achieved 100% of total potential 
years of education for their age
Age Percentage of 
boys who have 
achieved... .
Percentage of 
girls who have 
achieved.....
Gap between girls 
and boys
10 years and under 18.5 25.0 - 6.5
11 - 18 years 2.2 5.9 - 3.7
Source: Kauga/Ngogwe survey.
Table 4.8 compares households where the children have a good secondary 
school attendance rate, with those than do not. (The chosen dividing line 
was children that had achieved above 50% of total potential years, whatever 
their age.) As might be expected, children with high attendance rates are 
more likely to have better educated parents, and a higher socio-economic 
status. (16% of children with BELOW 50% potential years have a mother with
4
The Kauga/Ngogwe data are not used here as the bias in the sample, due to the selection of only households with 
children under five, distorts the age distribution.
5
A pupil has attended all possible years, if, for example at age 13 years s/he has received 8 years of schooling when 
the starting age is 5 years. Or, if aged 15 s/he has received 10 years.
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secondary education, whereas 25% of children with ABOVE 50% potential years 
have a mother with secondary education. 25% of children with BELOW 50% 
potential years live in a poor household, whereas only 13% of children with 
ABOVE 50% potential years live in a poor household.)
Table 4.8: Children with either above or below 50% of potential secondary 
school years by education of mother, father and socio-economic status of 
household (sample size)
Percentage of 
children with/in...
Children with BELOW 
50% potential 
secondary years
Children with ABOVE 
50% potential 
secondary years
Mother with 
secondary education
16.3 (260) 25.5 (55)
Father with 
secondary education
38.1 (260) 48.7 (55)
Wealthy household 27.9 (405) 31.9 (94)
Poor household 25-7 (405) 13.8 (94)
Source: Kauga/Ngogwe survey.
Table 4.9 compares boys with high attendance levels with girls with the same 
record. 10% of girls with ABOVE 50% of potential secondary years have an 
uneducated mother. 8% of boys with ABOVE 50% of potential secondary years 
have a mother with no education. The opposite is true when the father's 
education level is considered. 12% of boys with ABOVE 50% of potential years 
have an uneducated father, whereas only 10% of girls with ABOVE 50% of 
potential years have an uneducated father. The difference between the 
numbers is small, but a possible conclusion is that mothers may be more 
concerned that their daughters receive an education, whereas fathers are 
more concerned about their sons' education. Tansel (1997) finds a similar 
result when examining Ghanaian data - the mother1s education level has a 
greater effect on her daughters' level of education than on her sons1. (This 
theme of differential parental discrimination is taken up in chapter 8 in 
the discussion of nutrition levels.)
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Table 4.9: Percentage of boys and girls with uneducated parents, or who live 
in a poor or wealthy household, who have above 50% potential secondary 
years of education (Sample size)
Percentage of 
children with/in...
BOYS with ABOVE 
50% potential 
secondary years
GIRLS with ABOVE 
50% potential 
secondary years
Mother with No 
education
8.0 (25) 10.0 (30)
Father with NO 
education
12.0 (25) 10.3 (29)
Wealthy household 38.6 (44) 26.0 (50)
Poor household 4.5 (44) 22.0 (50)
Source: Kauga/wgogwe survey.
4.2 Participation in economic activity
As suggested in the methodology chapter, accurate statistics on the level of 
women's involvement in economic activities are difficult to collect for 
several reasons. Some women consider their cash activities as unimportant 
and marginal, particularly in comparison with their main activity of unpaid 
domestic work, and in comparison with their husband's income. If asked to 
select only one category of activity, women may often choose domestic work, 
rather than paid work, in which case the latter activities would not be 
recorded. Secondly, women tend to be involved in several small-scale 
activities, and to record an accurate picture of women's market activities 
it is necessary to allow for such a situation on the questionnaire. Thirdly, 
women also tend to be involved in the informal sector, on which statistics 
are, by definition, notoriously poor. 5
Table 4.10 shows figures from three sources - the 1996 Kauga/Ngogwe survey, 
1992-3 Integrated Household survey, and 1991 Census. The Kauga/Ngogwe figure 
for involvement in income-generating activities is significantly higher at 
62%, in comparison with 42% of Mukono District (1991 Census), and 44% for 
the Central region (Integrated Household survey 1992-3). There are three 
possible explanations for this variation: a) the difficulty in obtaining
accurate figures; b) each survey used a different question; c) the 
Kauga/Ngogwe sample was not respresentative of the broader population; d) 
the female labour participation rate may have increased over the period 
1991-1997.
Anker/Dixon-Mueller (1988) give a discussion of the problems of collecting accurate female participation rates.
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Table 4.10: Percentage of women involved in income generating activities
according to different data sources
Country/District Gender Percentage of 
individuals involved 
in income generating 
activities 7
Mukono District Census 1991 Women 42.0
Central Region IHS 1992-33 44.7
Kauga/Ngogwe survey 1995-6 62.1
Kauga/Ngogwe survey 1995-6 Men 96.7
(IHS), and Kauga/Ngogwe survey.
The Census asked: What was the activity status of this person in the last 
week? The Integrated Household survey asked: What is the usual activity (of 
this person)? The range of possible categories include employed, self- 
employed, unemployed, looking for work, student, unpaid family helper, 
domestic worker, too old, too disabled. 9 Both of these questions only allow
for an individual to specify one activity, which for women in most cases
will be unpaid family worker, or domestic worker. Generally, the male head
of the household will answer the questions for the other members of the 
household, and may identify a different activity than the actual person
concerned would choose.
The Kauga/Ngogwe survey was designed so that it would record a range of 
economic activities for each respondent, and as a result probably obtained a 
more accurate (and therefore higher) figures on the level of involvement in 
economic activity. It used the following questions: Do you work for wages? 
Do you earn cash by doing business, selling things etc? Can you list the 
different business activities that you are involved in?
The unrepresentativity of the Kauga/Ngogwe survey may also be a problem. It 
may be possible that the higher Kauga/Ngogwe figure is due to a 
preponderance of semi-urban residents. Yet if the data is split according to 
the rural/urban divide, the participation rate is 64% for urban respondents 
and 51% for rural respondants. The latter is still higher than the earlier 
data sources, indicating that higher figure cannot be completely accounted 
for by the place of residence. Similarly with marital status - 53% of
married women in the Kauga/Ngogwe sample were earning an income, which is
7
Includes the employed and self-employed, but not the helper in the household enterprise.
8
The central region is the fertile crescent on the north side of Lake Victoria, including the following districts: 
Kalangala, Kampala, Kiboga, Luwero, Masaka, Mpigi, Mubende, Mukono, Rakai.
9
The two questionnaires had a different set of labels, but each was a variant of those listed.
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again still higher than the other sources.
Table 4.11 shows the percentage real growth rate in GDP from 1983-1996,
showing 3 years of poor, or negative, performance from 1984-6 during the
civil war, followed by relatively high growth that fluctuated between 4.5%
to 10%. Unless such growth is only due to increases in capital utilisation 
rates (unlikely, given that the Ugandan economy is dominated by small,
uncapitalised agriculture), or increases in productivity, employment or 
self-employment must have occurred. (During the period of 1992-1996 the 
increase of informal activity was actually visible on the streets of Kampala 
and Mukono.) This suggests that the difference between the figures may be 
due to an increase in activity, and not just differences in methodology or 
issues of representivity.
Table 4.11: Yearly percentage growth rate in real GDP (at 1987 prices)
Year Percentage growth 
rate
Year Percentage growth 
rate
1 983 7.5 1 990 5.5
1984 -6.5 1 991 5.2
1 985 2.0 1 992 4.5
1 986 0.6 1993 6.3
1987 6.7 1994 10.1
1988 7.1 1995 8.4
1989 6.4 1996 5.0
7, 1993.
Nearly all men were reported to be earning an income (96.7%). Involvement in 
economic activity varies with marital status, as well as gender. Only half 
of married women were earning (52.7%), but the figure is much higher for 
single women (82.4%) - presumably due to a lower level of financial support
(Table 4.12).
Table 4.12: Women's involvement in income-generating activity by marital
status (sample size)
Marital status Percentage 
involvement rate
Married (178) 52.7
Single (76) 82.4
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4.3 Income, working hours and type of activity
The average monthly income of married women is approximately a third of the 
men's average (Table 4.13). Single women earn about a tenth of the male
average. These figures to some extent reflect the hours spent involved in 
cash generating activities, but also the lower hourly profit/wage rate. The 
difference between men and women's wage/profit rate can be explained by 
different education levels and access to resources, as well as
discrimination. However, gender-based discrimination does not explain why 
the single women's rate is lower than the married women's rate. It may be 
that single women are discriminated against because of their marital status, 
but it is more likely they do not have access to the capital, through a
husband, required to engage in the more productive activities. (This is
discussed in more detail in chapter 6.)
Table 4.13: Average income, hours per month and profit rate by gender and 
marital status (sample size in brackets)
Income
(Ush per month)
Hours per 
month
Average profit rate 
(Ush per hour)
Men 90,770 (148) 1 96 (1 23) 460
Married women 33,210 (87) 96 (84) 340
Single women 9,590 (61) 63 (53) 152
Note: Sample sizes vary according to the variable under considerable because of incomplete data
The latter argument is supported by comparisons of the type of activities in 
which married and single women are involved. Married women are more likely 
to be involved in artisanal work and types of home production that require 
capital. Single women are more likely to be casual labourers, or involved 
in roadside trading, and in production that requires little or no capital 
(Table 4.14) because of their desperate poverty. This difference between 
married and single women is probably compounded by the endogenity of 
marriage suggested earlier. If education facilitates marriage, the 
difference between the two groups may be due to a difference in the women's 
potential earning power as well as access to capital.
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Table 4.14:Type of economic activity by gender and marital status (sample 
size)
Activity Men (148) Married 
Women (87)
Single women 
(61)
Casual worker 6.2 8.8 10.3
Permanent wage worker 4.5 0.7 0
Skilled wage worker 6.2 0 0
Artisan/little capital 21 .5 32.4 11.5
Artisan/more capital 14.9 6.8 4.6
Agriculture/no capital 29.1 31 .1 56.3
Agriculture/capital 9.3 6.8 0
Trader 6.9 13.5 17.2
Source: Kauga/hgogwe survey.
This overall picture hides rural/urban differences. Married women and men 
have similar wage/profit rates in urban areas, which are considerably higher 
than those of single women (Table 4.15).
Rural men have a higher average income than urban men. These data may be 
skewed due to a small number of rural men who have abnormally high incomes 
because they are involved in shopkeeping and fishing. Shopkeeping and 
fishing are highly profitable activities in rural areas. Both of these 
activities require substantial capital outlay, and as a result there are 
high entry costs, and monopoly rents. Due to the isolation of the study 
site, a shopkeeper requires his/her own means of transport. Fishermen with 
an outboard engine are able to get away from the coastal infestation of 
water hyacinth, to where the fishing is more productive.
Both married and single women have lower income levels in the rural areas 
which match the generally lower level of economic activity. Married women 
are still slightly better off than single women, but either rural men are 
less willing to provide capital or there simply are not the equivalent 
female opportunities in rural areas that would allow married women to make 
use of their husband's capital.
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Table 4.15: Average monthly income and profit/wage rate by location (sample 
size).
Location Men (148) Married women (87) Single women (61)
Income 
(Ush pm)
Profit/wage 
rate (Ush ph)
Income 
(Ush pm)
Profit/wage 
rate (Ush ph)
Income Profit/wage 
rate (Ush ph)
Urban 71,340 340 42,890 350 9,910 130
Rural 98,320 680 11,260 220 4, 510 40
Source: Kauga/Ngogwe survey.
4.4 Assets: Land, dwellings and consumer durables
As might be expected, men are much more likely to own land and property than 
women (Table 4.16 & 4.17) . The marital home is normally owned by the 
husband. 10 55% of married men own the land used by the household, and 7 2%
own the house. 7% of married women own the land used by the household, and 
9% own the house. Single women are in better position than married women, 
but they are not equal to a male head of household. 30% own the land, and 
40% own the house. Separated or divorced women often return to their 
parents' village, and some will be given land on which to support 
themselves. Others will have to rely on the generosity of relatives for 
space in the house, and simply assist the others in agricultural production, 
rather than being able to farm on her own account.
Table 4.16: Land ownership by gender and marital status (percentage)
Married
households (169)
Single women 
households (68)
Wife 7.7 30.8
Husband (or ex-husband) 56.8 13.2
Husband & wife jointly 1 . 2 0
Somebody else 1 34.7 55.9
Source: Kauga/Ngogwe' survey.
10
Wives do sometimes own the marital home. The implications of this are discussed in chapter 6.
1 1
Unfortunately data were not collected on the relationship of the owners to the respondents.
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Table 4.17: Dwelling ownership by gender and marital status (percentage)
Married
households (176)
Single women 
households (76)
Wife 9.1 40.8
Husband (or ex-husband) 71 .9 10.5
Husband & wife jointly 0.6 0
Somebody else52 18.8 48.7
Source! Kauga7"I'lgogwe""survey.
The data on the inheritance of land show that single women are just as 
likely to have inherited land as men (Table 4.18). If parents have land to 
pass on to their children, it would appear that sons and unmarried or 
separated daughters tend to be treated equally. (As suggested above this may 
not be the case in poorer families where there is greater competition 
between siblings for land.) It is assumed that married daughters have no 
need of land because they will have access through their husbands.
Table 4.18: Inheritance of land by gender and marital status (sample size).
Percentage of individuals 
who inherited land
Men 31.8 (179)
Married women 20.1 (179)
Single women 31.6 (79)
Source: Kauga/wgogwe survey.
The implication is that gender differences in land ownership between men and 
single women are not due to discrimination through inheritance, but that 
single women are less likely/less able to buy land than men. This may be due 
to greater poverty, unequal access to capital, or reluctance to sell land to 
women. (This is discussed further in chapter 6.)
Women own fewer productive assets and consumer durables than men (Table 
4.19), Despite earning a lower income, single women own a greater number of 
farm assets and consumer durables than married women. Without the support of 
a husband, single women are forced to obtain the basic items themselves, 
leaving even less income for recurrent expenditure. Given that married women 
may have access to their husbands assets, their low score does not represent 
their current position accurately.
1 2
As above.
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Table 4.19: Average ownership score of productive assets and consumer
durables (sample size)13
Productive assets (Ush) (a) Consumer durables (Ush) (b)
Men 1 06,014 (1 78) 361,440 (178)
Married women 59,960 (177) 60,310 (177)
Single women 72,51 0 (64) 201,210 (73)
Note: (a) Replacement value of productive assets owned by individual; (b) replacement value of consumer
durables owned by individual
4.5 Nutritional status of adults
Chronic energy deficiency (CED) is defined as "low body weight and low 
energy stores, but due to the energy intake equalling energy expenditure, 
the adult is not in a state of prolonged continuous loss of body weight and 
energy. But by never growing to a normal size or having experienced one or 
more stages of energy deficiency, the individual has arrived at a reduced 
body weight with possibly limited physical activity.1,14 (Shetty and James 
1994). A lower basal metabolic rate (BMR) and reduced amounts of activity 
are balanced against a lower intake.
The body mass index (BMI) is considered to be a reliable anthropometric 
measure of CED, A person's weight is a general measure of the steady state 
of energy balance, yet it is influenced by the individual's height. Body 
mass index (weight/[height x height]) is less dependent on variations in 
height, and as a result is a relatively good measure of the body's energy 
stores.
Shetty and James (1994) argue that a low BMI is an indicator of socio­
economic status, reflecting low household income and food consumption. It 
can also reflect changes that occur as a result of agricultural seasons, 
particularly during the harvest season when there may be food shortages, but 
considerable demand for physical activity. The functional consequences of a 
low BMI are a reduced capacity for physical work, and tendency to be more 
sedentary during leisure activities.
Much of the literature on gender inequalities within developing countries 
points to the longer hours that women work on a daily basis, as they often
The construction of these scores is described in detail in chapter 3.
1 4
Acute energy deficiency is defined "as a state of negative energy balance, where energy intake is less than energy 
expenditure. Despite changes in metabolic efficiency or physical activity patterns, there is a progressive loss of body 
weight and body energy stores" (Shetty and James 1994).
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are involved in economically productive work as well as domestic chores. 
The literature also places much emphasis on the unequal access to resources, 
whether it be land, labour or capital. It could be argued that BMI is a 
long-term measure of an individual's average energy expenditure and energy 
intake. Significantly longer working hours, and difficult access to 
resources, should be reflected in a low BMI. As such, the BMI may be a good 
indicator of the impact of intra-household allocation of resources on 
spouses. Higgins and Alderman (1992) use Ghanaian data to show that women's 
poor nutritional status is affected by length of their working day and their 
fertility levels,
A BMI below 18.5 for men and 17.5 for women is considered as a sign of 
chronic energy deficiency. The difference is due to men, on average, having 
a heavier body weight for the same height as women. It would appear that 
only marginally more women suffer from chronic energy deficiency than men 
(Table 4.20). Yet if women are divided by marital status, single women have 
a lower level of nutritional status (Table 4.20), and married women in the 
sample have a better nutritional status than married men. 15
Table 4.20: Percentage of adults with chronic energy deficiency (CED) by
gender and marital status (sample size)
Percentage of individuals 
with chronic energy 
deficiency
Men 4.0 (173)
All women 4.7 (242)
Married women 0.6 (179)
Single women 10.3 (63)
Source: Kauga/Ngogwe survey.
Poor nutritional status in single women is associated with a variety of 
characteristics: living in a rural area, not receiving financial support
from a relative, and earning income as well as looking after a child (or 
children) under five years. The following table examines the impact of these 
factors on the nutritional status of single women (Table 4.21).
Given the prevalence of AIDS in Uganda, and its likely effect on BMI data, these results may be problematic. Yet it
is unlikely AIDS would explain the high percentage of single women suffering from CED, unless they are single due to their 
husbands' AIDS-related death. Only one of the single women who suffers from CED is a widow, the other are divorcees. It is 
more likely that AIDS affects men, women, married or single alike, and therefore does not prejudice these results.
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Table 4.21: Percentage of single women with chronic energy deficiency by
socio-economic characteristics.
Socio-economic
characteristics
Percentage of single women 
with CED (63)
Earning cash 12.0
Not earning cash 0.0
Urban 8.5
Rural 18.2
Receiving financial support 8.8
No financial support 12.5
Source: Kauga/Ngogwe survey
4.6 Conelus ion
This chapter has described the backdrop against which intra-household 
negoitation takes place - the 'un-level playing field1 that inevitably 
affects household outcomes.
To summarise, it would appear that the current generation of secondary 
school-age girls have better enrolment rates than their mothers, but not as 
high as their male peers. However, those girls who do enrol are likely to 
attend more years than their male peers.
Women are less likely to be involved in cash generating activities than men. 
Single women (with children under five years) have higher involvement rates, 
but work fewer hours and earn a lower hourly rate than married women. 
Married women appear to have access to capital through their spouses, 
capital that is necessary for involvement in the more productive types 
income generating activity.
Women are less likely to own land or a house than men. If single, women are 
as likely to inherit as men, but are less likely to buy property. Married 
women are unlikely to inherit land or property.
The nutritional status of single women appears to be much poorer than 
married women. The nutritional status of married men appears to be lower 
than that of married women, suggesting that the gains from marriage for 
women should not be underestimated.
Given these results it is possible to argue that married women receive 
considerable support (financial and otherwise) from their husbands, that 
leads to a differential between the circumstances of single and married
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women. Despite this difference there is still a substantial gender gap 
between men and women in terms of income, ownership of assets, education, 
wage/profit, and access to capital.
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5BUGANDAN MARRIAGE CUSTOMS: 
BRIDEWEALTH, DIVORCE AND VIOLENCE
The study of lineage and kinship has been one of the basic building blocks 
used by anthropologists to understand social and political structures in 
different cultural contexts. The term lineage implies a political/jural 
unit, as well as collective ownership, responsibility, and political 
representation in a wider arena. Much anthropological work and descriptions 
of kinship have concentrated on the most visible and, as a result, male 
kinship relations and spheres of influence. In 1981 Guyer argued 'kinship
systems disguise too much of the variability of the way things get done....
how children are brought up, livings made, authority achieved and assigned1 
(Guyer 1981 :89). She describes kinship as the study of 1 (h)ow land, labour 
and incomes are controlled, ...involving a complex of rights and duties, 
sanction and consequences... that are bargained and fought over'. If 
anthropological studies are undertaken from the point of view of women, the 
important questions become 'whether women can or cannot own land, manage 
their own incomes, absent themselves from their husband's home, be received 
in their natal home in case of divorce, or make a living in any other sector 
of the economy...'. The answer to these questions creates an image of the 
structures (or strictures) within which women have to operate and the range 
of alternatives that they face. It is within this framework that women have 
to make everyday decisions about how to ensure that their children are fed 
and clothed, that school fees are paid, and that their own needs are met, 
including the issue of their own (and therefore their children's) long-term 
economic security.
In a book entitled 'Gender, kinship and power' Maynes et al aim to explore 
'how despite the presumption of male domination written into many rules, in 
practice men are often unwilling or unable to fulfil the roles proscribed to 
them' (Maynes et al 1996:7). The authors document situations in which men's 
theoretical responsibilities towards women and children are unmet, in which 
men's authority over women is far from complete or absolute, and cases 
where men are marginal to the domestic scene.
This chapter will first argue briefly that the conjugal tie and its inter-
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relationship with class has been neglected, and secondly, examine the 
literature on bridewealth. The main body of the chapter will discuss 
Bugandan marriage and bridewealth. One of the first landmarks in the 
increasing interest in domestic kinship was a conference on ' The history of 
the family in Africa1, that resulted in an series of articles in the Journal 
of African History (Volume 24, 1983). In their introduction, Rathbone and
Marks argue that much of the early literature examines kinship in terms of 
'cultural zones' that form broad sweeps of Africa. Murdock echoes Engel's 
thesis with the argument that the shift from matrilineal to patrilineal 
societies is the result of the development of private property in the 
colonial era - in order to amass the newly available assets men exercised 
control over women's labour (Murdock 1949). 1 Douglas makes a slightly more 
sophisticated argument. As long as women's labour is more valuable than 
any fixed asset, matriliny will survive. Once the predominant aim is to 
accumulate wealth, rather than simply to control labour, men will be 
willing to exchange women for assets (ie. cattle) (Douglas and Kaberry 
1969). Yet Douglas recognised the importance of matrilineal links
particularly for poor and vulnerable women, despite the apparent dominance 
of patriliny. Megan Vaughan's (in same issue of JAH) work in Malawi 
provides an example of this by showing the significance of non-kin 
relationships in terms of sharing food (Vaughan 1983).
O'Laughlin (1995) argues that descent theory under-emphasises the importance 
of the conjugal relationship. For example, although Elizabeth Colson (1962) 
noted the importance of matrilineal links in patrilineal systems, she 
emphasised the importance of women's kinship links over their conjugal ties.
'Colson suggested that cash cropping, land shortages, wage employment, 
labour migration and changes in legal codes tended to strengthen 
matrilateral ties at the expense of patrilineal ties and gave new 
independence to nuclear families based on a woman and her children rather 
than the conjugal tie' (O'Laughlin 1995:72).
O'Laughlin points out that the strength of kinship links in Africa, and 
women's apparent independence in comparison with Asia and Latin America, 
have led other authors to categorise the conjugal bond as 'weak'2. McNicoll 
and Cain (1990) claim that weak conjugal bonds, or rather strong kinship 
links have contributed to poor economic performance: it supposedly
encourages population growth, lineage rights hamper the development of the 
market, and it has been seen as an explanation for the large numbers of 
female-headed households. O'Laughlin correctly argues that 'weak conjugal 
ties cannot be derived a priori either from the structure of African lineage 
systems, or from the pre-colonial gender division of labour' . She uses her
1
Hitching (1980) makes a similar argument in his study of Kenya.
2
O'Laughlin cites both McNicoll and Cain (1990) and Lesthaeghe (1989b)
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research experience in Tchad and Mozambique to show both the variation in 
conjugal relations, and that historical forces are the source of that 
variation. By creating a dualism of the dependence versus autonomy of women, 
we are unable to examine the nature of the inter-dependence between spouses.
O'Laughlin also points out the neglect of class relations, and how class and 
conjugal relations can be mutually determining. For example, wage labour, 
and accompanying migration can lead to many women-headed households, some 
unsupported by remittances from wage-earning men. The financial contribution 
of both husband and wife is important for determining the class position of 
the household.
'Households of either a nuclear or extended type that integrated men 
on a regular basis were more likely than mother/child units to 
establish title to prime commercial land through regular use, and 
sometimes through formal registry. Some households were more likely to 
be able to pay school fees and to withstand the loss of their 
children's labour through school attendance. Their children commanded 
better wages or took over positions in state employment that gave them 
access to economic as well as political resources. The strength of 
conjugal ties thus came to have important consequences for the class 
position of men and women.' (O'Laughlin 1995:73).
Sender and Smith approach this issue from another angle. They argue that 
contrary to economic theory (both neo-classical and Marxist) it is not 
necessarily poverty (or the marginal wage being higher than gains from 
subsistence) that leads to proletarianisation. Unmarried / divorced / 
deserted women living in wealthy households have neither a husband to 
appropriate their labour, nor the right to access to land as the means of 
production through marriage. Sender and Smith show how these women turn to 
wage labour (Sender and Smith 1990). Whether married or unmarried women are 
being considered, their marital status and conjugal relations can determine 
class, whether it is defined by involvement in wage labour, or income.
The study of bridewealth within anthropology is an area where the nature of 
the conjugal relationship might have come under the spotlight. In a 
theoretical overview of the study of bridewealth, Ekong (1992) argues that 
the three main schools of anthropology tended to treat women 'as mere pawns 
willing to act out marriage games devised in the interest of men' (Ekong 
1 992:1 0) .
"In jural models of the structuralist-functionalist approach 
bridewealth (is viewed) as a means of regulating the sexual access to 
women, legalising marriage and clearly defining the affiliation of the
90
children to a particular descent group.... In models of reciprocity of 
the structuralists, women are treated as objects exchanged by men to
ratify their alliances.....Marxist approaches postulate the
'exploitation' of young men by elders though the control of the means 
of reproduction (women and surplus product)' (Ekong 1992:10).
Ekong argues that there has been little consideration of how this control 
over women is achieved, the extent to which women comply, what happens when 
they resist, or how this supposed control of women by men affects relations 
between the sexes. In essence, what has been left out is a discussion of 
the nature of the relationship between men and women - both the conjugal and 
kin relationships. It is insufficient to assume that because women are 
important in agricultural production, both because of their own labour, and 
their ability to 'reproduce' labour, that the most important component of 
their relationship with men is men's dominance over women's labour, 
sexuality and fertility.
The aim of this chapter and the following one is to discuss the nature of 
the Bagandan marriage, particularly how it affects women. This chapter is 
concerned with the structures that women face in terms of the current social 
rules/norms surrounding marriage, divorce and the control of resources, as 
well as the part played by marital violence. The following chapter deals 
with how the conjugal relations affect a woman's ability to earn an income 
and accumulate assets. Later chapters examine the realities of how men and 
women share domestic responsibilities, of how the norms/structures described 
in this chapter effect day-to-day decisions, and the impact of these 
structures on the well-being of children.
5.1 Bugandan marriage customs
Much of the following discussion relies on the accounts by Kisekka (197 3), 
Akelo (nd, 1980s?), and Obbo (1980) as well as conversations during the 
fieldwork. It is intended as a brief overview of common ceremonies that 
still occur during marriage today.
Marriage in Bugandan society requires two ceremonies. The first is called 
the 'introduction', the second is the 'wedding'. Arranged marriages are not 
very common amongst the Baganda, and young people have a considerable amount 
of freedom of choice of their partner (Kisekka 1973). At the introduction 
ceremony the husband-to-be, accompanied by his family, arrives to meet the 
bride's parents. The purpose is to ensure that the bride's family know whom 
she is marrying, and where she will be living. The husband will know where 
his wife is from. If she is sick, or there is a problem, he will know where
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to go for help- In a rural environment where it is difficult to give 
practical map directions, such information is important.
The second purpose of the ceremony is the negotiation over the extent and 
value of the bridewealth. Some of the items the husband will bring with 
him, others will be delivered either before or after the wedding. Many young 
men rely on their family for financial assistance in order to make the 
required payment. In some cases the payment of the bridewealth is not 
complete until several years after the wedding. In urban areas young 
couples may live together for several years and have children before getting 
married. In such circumstances it will be unacceptable for the husband to 
meet the wife's family until they are ready to get married, and to pay the 
bridewealth.
If the families are Christian, a church wedding is followed by a 'honeymoon* 
(kisenge) in the couples' new home, accompanied by the aunt. 3 The bride is 
supposed to be demure and quiet without smiling on her wedding day (Kisekka 
1 973). The bride does not 'join' her husband's clan, but maintains close 
links with one of her brothers, who will provide refuge should the marriage 
fail. 4 Such provision is no longer common, and will to some extent depend on 
the brother's ability to support his sister and possibly her children. 
Single women have to either impose on relatives' generosity, who may give 
begrudgingly, inherit or buy land, or obtain employment in their own right. 5 
The in-laws maintain a relationship of avoidance, where for example, father 
and daughter-in-law, do not touch one another, or look into one another’s 
faces. Breach of such a custom is said to strike the offender with disease, 
but the intention is presumably to prevent sexual relations6.
Any wealth accumulated during the marriage belongs to the husband's clan. 
The children belong to their father - he has the custodial rights on 
divorce.
Kisekka states that the aunt's role is seen as instructing the couple in sexual intercourse, and she may have
intercourse with the husband (Kisekka 1973). Informal conversations revealed that this was rare by the 1990s-
Such linkages are often the result of a tradition where bridewealth received is used to obtain a wife for a son.
5
Only 3% of single women in the Kauga/Ngogwe survey were living with a brother.
6
One female respondent, whose father-in-law was the local official, was unable to inform us of her husband's name
because he had been named after his father, and it is disrespectful of her to mention her father-in-law's name,
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5.2 Impact of the colonial era
The imposition of a new political structure, and the influence of a new 
religious and moral order had considerable impact on women, particularly 
through the legislation concerning marriage. Chanock has argued and 
effectively shown that 'customary law', reported in colonial records and 
anthropological accounts of the first half of this century, was a creation 
of the colonial era. He describes how "claims came in front of the court 
system, where they were given in evidence and 'proved' and from whence they 
emerged as customary law." (Chanock 1985:50). He uses two examples from 
Northern Zambia to illustrate his argument: the issue of returning the
bridewealth and adultery. Cases came before the British courts on the issue 
of inheritance of widows - women who refused to become the wives of their 
dead husbands' heirs." If a widow married again, her father would gain a 
second bridewealth, while the dead husband's family remain with nothing. 
Rather than force a woman into marriage, the answer appeared to be to order 
the return of the bride wealth. The British courts began an inquiry into 
'native law and custom' to decide whether there was a legal basis for such a 
ruling." (Chanock 1985:60)
Chanock's examination of the recorded discussions between the colonial 
officials and local chiefs reveals two points: that much of the evidence
consists of categorical statements, followed by qualifications that were 
more descriptive of real life. For example, in theory bridewealth was 
returnable, but it was rarely claimed because this would mean a severing of 
the relationship with the wife's family; because it would mean that the 
husband 'had his eye on the neighbour's wife.' If the wife had died, a 
successor could be claimed, but if one was not provided the matter would be 
left open in the hope that one day a successor would be provided. As these 
qualifications were less amenable to 'legalisation1 they were often 
forgotten, and the return of bridewealth became 'customary law'. Secondly, 
the chiefs giving evidence were concerned with "the increasing rejection of 
elders' control over the sexual relationship by the young" (Chanock 
1985:59). Statements about the 'customary' punishments for adultery - 
death, mutilation, slavery - although they were again followed by 
qualifications, led "the colonial legal system to abandon its initial 
practice of treating adultery as a civil offence, .... and to punish 
adulterers as criminals instead." (Chanock 1985:60). This remained the case 
until 1933 when Judge Hall issued a circular stating that adultery was to be 
civil, rather than a customary offence.
Chanock's research concerns Zambia, and similar research has not been done 
for Uganda. Yet there are several pieces of evidence in an account of 
Ugandan customary marriage law by Morris (1960) that would suggest that the
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situation was very similar. Morris states quite clearly that: "The
termination of the customary marriage contract (involves) the return of the 
wife to her father and the handing back to the husband of the 
bridewealth...". On the issues of customary treatment of adultery, Morris 
states "Adultery is in all cases treated as a crime, that is to say, a 
punishment is imposed as well as an order for compensation,"
Several pieces of colonial legislation directly affected women's rights. The 
1904 Succession Ordinance attempted to provide some protection for widows.
It provided a widow of man who died intestate with half of his estate if she 
had children, and a third if not. If the husband chose to leave his property 
elsewhere the Ordinance provided no protection. In reality this legislation 
is likely to have had little effect. In most situations those individuals in 
positions of authority would be those who had most to gain - the deceased's 
male relatives. Few women would have been in a position to ensure that this 
legislation was carried out. If the husband did leave his property to his 
wife in a will, it was not difficult to overturn the will due to some 
technical irregularity, enabling the male relatives to claim the land.
The 1900 Bugandan Agreement with the British enabled women to inherit 
freehold land or rent or purchase land under customary tenure. Obbo (1980) 
argues that this offered Bugandan women the possibility of economic 
independence. Initially probably only the daughter and wives of chiefs 
benefitted, while few other women were in a position to save sufficient 
money to buy land. This is still the case today for the majority of Bugandan 
women, although there are now a significant number of women who do own land.
In addition to the British government officials, the religious authorities 
had a significant impact on Ugandan marriage. The aim of both the Catholic 
and Anglican missionaries in Uganda was to encourage Christian monogamous 
marriage. In 1897 there was an attempt to abolish the payment of 
bridewealth, but leading African Christians convinced the mission of its 
social value, its contribution to strengthening the marriage ties, and 
providing security for the woman. Instead limits were set on its value, but 
despite efforts by the mission these were in no way enforceable (Hansen 
1984). A Christian marriage bestowed considerable prestige in Bugandan 
society, particularly the wearing of a ring. Women married in church were 
often called 'ring wives' (Brown 1983). At the time, the missions expressed 
the concern that church marriages were conducted simply for social prestige, 
rather than religious commitment (Obbo 1980). It is probable that the 'new' 
type of marriage did much to upset the delicate balance between co-wives.
The missions were convinced that polygamy was incompatible with the church's 
teaching. Yet many of their converts continued to be polygamists, with one
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public/church wife, and other private ones. Marriage to many wives was after 
all a sign of wealth and social standing, and an 'insignia of chieftainship, 
on which the political system rested' (Akello nd). The church was faced with 
the dilemma as to the procedure when a polygamous man wished to be baptised. 
Their concern was that to recognise his current marriage would be to 
legalise polygamy, yet without some kind of formal acknowledgement of his 
current union, the church had no option but to consider the man to be 
'living in sin', and therefore not suitable for baptism. Their solution was 
to insist that one wife was chosen, and the others divorced. One or two 
officials did raise objections to this policy due to the hardship suffered 
by the divorcees. Yet the Buganda Regents, supported by the missions, argued 
that no hardship would occur (Hansen 1984). The repercussions of this 
legislation are still being felt today. In the early 1990s a society for the 
legal recognition of second wives was formed. A politician who had divorced 
his customary wives, in favour of a church marriage, was defeated in his 
election campaign due to public disapproval of his conduct in his private 
life.
5.3 Bugandan marriage today
The following quotations are taken from transcripts of single gender focus 
group discussions that were held in the 6 survey villages in the Mukono 
area. Various topics were raised for discussion, 7 and in some cases 
disagreement stimulated heated debate. The core topics that emerged as 
important were bridewealth, distribution of household property on the death 
of husband or on divorce, acceptability of economically independent women, 
and marital violence. The views expressed in the first section describe the 
social importance of bridewealth and its effect on women today. In the 
second section, the divergent views expressed by respondents indicate the 
level of disagreement as to the appropriate social behaviour of both men and 
women. These views represent both forces for change and maintenance of the 
status quo, that are being precipitated by the changing economic and 
political conditions. The purpose of the commentary that accompanies the 
following quotations is to highlight the opposing viewpoints and suggest how 
these views may be linked to changes in social behaviour.
7
For list of discussion topics see appendix.
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Bridewealth
An important reason given for payment of bridewealth is that the parents are 
losing a young and trained worker, who may well have cost a considerable 
amount of money to educate. They should therefore be compensated for the 
loss of their offspring.
"From the time a child is born she/he takes a lot of money. You take 
her and she bears you about 10 children and yet at her father's place 
you took nothing - it is very difficult. That thing hurts. A child 
deserves to be valued for the money which I will have told you. I 
don't want you to take my daughter for free." (Ggunda Men's Focus 
Group Discussion)
The husband-to-be is gaining a valuable worker who will look after his home, 
grow food, bear him children and may well earn money.
"A man should pay bride price, because the profits that this girl is 
going to make are too much... she is going to produce, she has given 
them riches. Digging, she has dug everything, buys food, cows and 
everything." (Llwanyonyi, Women's FGD)
The payment and the size of the bridewealth conveys honour to the woman.
"When a wife is bought she feels that she has honour in the home. But 
if you did not buy her, she will even ask you: 'What did you buy me
with?1 (Laughter) But if you went and gave in that appreciation to 
her parents, she also feels that she is an honoured person, and you 
also have to take her as a wife who is 'precious', rather than being a 
useless thing you found and decided to take." (Ggunda Men's FGD)
The aim is to encourage a husband to treat his wife well.
"It is good because my parents eat things because of me (receive bride 
wealth) , and I do not just go, the man will also respect me. The man 
does not despise me: 'You who I picked up on the road, uuh, even I
just helped you, what did I give at your home, do they know me?' 
These are some of the questions he can ask you." (Zitwe Women's FGD)
Women face a double-edged sword. It is an honour to be 'bought' for a high 
price, but the exchange gives the husband considerable authority over his 
wife. The following respondent recounted the views and actions of men whose 
abuse of their wives was legitimated by the payment of bridewealth.
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"For my part, most people who bought wives, often have a bad
behaviour, thinking: 'Let me buy this woman'. However much I oppress
her, there is nowhere she is going to go. Let me buy her and use her
until my money is finished. Even if you run off to anywhere, I'll
catch you; I bought you.'" (Ggunda Men's FGD)
Many respondents indicated that it was acceptable for a husband to 'rule' 
over his wife, with the word 'rule' being used frequently when discussing 
marital relationships.
"The reason you pay for her, is that all responsibility for her is 
yours and you'll rule her because you paid for your 'thing8'." (Ggunda 
Men's FGD)
This combination of honour conveyed by bridewealth and submission to the 
husband's authority is apparently contradictory - it is not an honour to 
submit unconditionally to another's control. Conveying honour on married 
women is part of the sanction against women who choose to remain single. 
Some of those who choose to remain single, and who have independant economic 
means to do so, are regarded with suspicion. (Bugandan society's views on 
financially independent women are discussed below.)
The following male respondent is aware of the indignity that women suffer 
when they are bought and sold.
"The buying of a wife hurts a lot. She knows you are ruling over her 
in the sense that you bought her. If you did not buy her, you would 
not use her like that." (Ggunda Men's FGD)
One respondent argued that to treat a woman like an inanimate object by 
buying and selling her is inhumane.
"Sir, on my part, for a person to sell his child, is the funniest 
thing of the last order. Many things are sold; a man sells his bicycle 
and it is no longer his, even if the buyer destroys it or does 
whatever, it is no longer his. But to do that to a child that you 
have borne for yourself and you say: 'Now I've sold you, whether they
kill you, or they eat you9, or do what, I've sold you, ' that is not a 
wise thing." (Ggunda Men's FGD)
This is the literal translation of the word used.
9The district where this discussion took place is called Ssi Bgunja. The name originates from a phrase: They don t
take dead trees, they take live ones." This is a reference to cannibalism. During the fieldwork there was much informal 
conversation about the naked night dancer, a cannibal, who will carry away unsuspecting victims. It is difficult to assess 
whether the possibility of a young bride being eaten is (or was) a real threat.
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If the bride's father demands too high a price, many expressed the view that 
the husband would force his wife to work exceptionally hard in order to pay 
back the wealth given to her parents.
"If you ask for a lot of his things and he goes and gets a debt, your
daughter will be the one who will work to pay the debt once she is
married. He makes you dig in the morning and in the evening, and on 
top of that you are producing (children) . By the time you get to 30 
years, you look like a woman of 60 years." (Zitwe Women's FGD)
Bridewealth and change
It became clear that a proportion of the respondents felt that the custom 
should change. The following respondent is happy with the introduction part 
of the ceremony, but he argues that the young couple should decide on what 
to give the bride's parents on the basis of what they can afford.
"Let the idea come from the two 'children', who are getting married, 
depending on their capacity. So they come and please their parents. 
But to make it a rule to 'buy' a person - buying with cows or
'omutwalo'10 should be stopped." (Llwanyonyi Men's FGD)
A respondent in the same group disagreed with the above respondent, arguing 
that the custom of negotiation between the two families should be 
maintained, because that is the tradition. However, rather than talking in 
terms of a bridewealth being used to purchase a wife, it should be
considered as a sign of appreciation for what the bride's parents have done
for their daughter. The intention appears to be to give the practice more
humane overtones, without having to make significant changes.
"The reason for giving things, is that first of all it is something we 
found being done. From our great, great forefathers, that is how it 
was. Now we also have to follow that. Also these things that are 
given - we should not say that is buying, it is appreciation. I still 
support [the practice], but I do not want to talk of buying." 
(Agreement by about half of the participants.) (Llwanyonyi Men's FGD)
Another suggested that he and his wife would work together, and take what 
they could afford after the marriage. Instead of the men of the husband's
clan contributing to the bridewealth, and negotiating on his behalf, he is
proposing that payment of the bridewealth be something that the new husband 
and wife do together. In informal conversations with university graduates it
10
Bridewealth. Literal meaning - a bundle of ten thousand shillings.
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was apparent that this practice is common among the educated, urban 
Bugandans.
"The practice I want for myself is, I get my little sugar, take it 
there and bring this girl, we work and we shall take things [to her 
parents] little by little." (Llwanyonyi Men's FGD)
These quotations signify several quite fundamental changes. Firstly, the 
extended family is beginning to play a smaller role in the process of 
marriage, and the young couple take the initiative and the responsibility 
for the ceremony. Secondly, it is something they do together. Previously, 
this was not the case. Marriage is something done by one person to another - 
'the man marries the woman' and she moves into his home. (If she is 
economically independent and he moves into her home, then 'she has married 
him'.) Normal marriage was synonymous with the wife leaving home, and going 
to live with her husband and (inevitably) his clan. It did not mean setting 
up home together, independently of both sets of parents, as this last 
quotation implies.
As an indication of the diversity of views, the following quotations are 
part of a debate that took place in one of the men's groups as to whether
'omutwalo' is necessary for the success of a marriage. Respondent 2 is of
the opinion that it is payment of the bridewealth that ensures the loyalty 
of the wife. Respondent 1 argues that the success of the marriage depends 
on whether the wife chooses to begin a relationship with someone else, and 
payment of the 'omutwalo' is unlikely to prevent this.
Respondent 1 : "Does the 'omutwalo' make a marriage? Are you saying
the 'omutwalo' gives her the status of a married woman? That I do not
agree with. That is not what makes a marriage." (Other respondents 
give positive nods and noises.)
Respondent 2; "She knows that she is a married woman and she did not 
come to play around."
Respondent. 1 : "What I see, what I am basing my argument on, what
really makes a marriage is to first meet your partner and agree - and 
there is understanding. That is what makes a marriage. How many tens 
of thousands have got married and their marriages have died? Yet a 
man can get a woman from a bar, they talk, and stay in marriage for 
years because they understand each other. But for me, to say that 
because that woman was bought for 'mitwalos' (many tens of thousands) 
she will be compelled to stay in a marriage - I do not support this. "
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B.e_sp_ond_e_nt_.2: "Me, I support it. If I meet her in your house, I lock 
you up, I really get hold of you. But if we just had an understanding 
with a woman, and my 'omutwalo' is not there, you can say I am joking, 
I am just a hanger-on. "
Respondent 1:"If she decides to leave you who has paid 'omutwalo' and 
she looks for another, your breaking the house is a waste of time. The
one who says: 'Discussion is better', he is right, because if you
discuss, you agree on one thing. But if you break the house she will 
still go to so and so anyway...." (Llwanyonyi Men's FGD)
Underlying this debate are two different perceptions of the nature of a 
marital relationship, one being characterised by the rule of authority, and 
the other by consensus. The latter position must be more conducive to both 
men and women benefitting from economic development, to say nothing of human 
rights.
Comparison with Haakanssan's study of bridewealth and social change amongst 
the Gusii of Kenya, shows similarities between the Gusii and the Baganda,
and suggests further explanations for the changes in the importance of
bridewealth amongst the Baganda. The study took place just over the Ugandan 
border, in western Kenya. It is a productive cash crop area, that has 
experienced economic growth as well as population growth. Most men have at 
least experience of intermittent employment and/or business activities as, 
for example, farm labourers, tea pickers, construction workers, watchmen, or 
drivers. Haakanssan describes the socio-economic differentiation in the 
following way: 'a small elite of wealthy and politically influential
families; wealthy farmers with early school attendance and long experience 
of off-farm employment; young men and women with high levels of education 
and well-paid jobs; farmers with little education and access to unqualified 
employment' (Haakanssan 1988:126).
Such a description is as apt for the Baganda as it is for the Gusii, with 
perhaps two important differences. Firstly the population per sq km in 
Kisumu district (Kenya) is nearly double what it is in Kauga sub-county 
(Uganda) (460 as opposed to 27 0 persons per sq km) . In Kisumu there is 
considerable pressure on the land, and sub-division has made much of the 
land unprofitable. Secondly, the burgeoning of the informal sector in 
Buganda has created a class of particularly men, but also women, with 
primary education, who, as well as some agricultural activities, are 
involved in a variety of profitable business activities (for example 
trading, fishing, shopkeeping, butchery, baking etc).
The Buganda and the Gusii share many similar marriage customs, including an
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avoidance relationship between in-laws, paternal rights in children only- 
being conferred on payment of bridewealth, women's main access to land being 
through marriage. The payment of bridewealth places a woman under the
authority of her husband, and gives him right to the fruits of her labour or
her monetary income.
Haakanssan argues, as did Murdock above, that in the precolonial era women 
had greater independence, but the increasing prevalence of the cash economy 
and the institutional change of colonialism encouraged men to increase their 
rights in women's labour and children. Sender and Smith (1986) portray a
different picture - as coercive methods used to obtain labour, such as
slavery, were replaced by the development of a market for labour, women 
could turn to wage employment as an alternative to an undesirable marriage, 
or being supported by their natal kin.
With the diversification of the East African economy in the past 50 years, 
young men are no longer dependent on marriage and women's agricultural 
labour for economic independence. 'The importance of formal marriage had 
declined because education, work and earning money are sources of wealth and 
respect, all of which a young man can attain without being married’ 
(Haakanssan 1988:141). Previously sons were only allowed to participate in 
community affairs if married, and they were dependent on the clan for the 
provision of the bridewealth. Now sons pay their own bridewealth, even if 
their fathers conduct the negotiations. '[Today] most unions are established 
upon the initiative of the couple themselves' (Haakanssan 1988:138). 'Many 
old men and women complained that despite their explicit orders, their sons 
were [co-habiting with a woman] and had not paid bridewealth' (Haakanssan 
1988:141). This description appears to be similar to the changes occurring 
amongst the Baganda.
In an explanation of these changes, Haakanssan argues that the decline of 
polygamy due to the reduced need for agricultural family labour and 
educational expenses involved in rearing children, has led to an increase in 
the number of women wishing to marry. Unlike young men, young women are 
still accorded respectability through marriage, economically independent 
women being considered 'loose'. They also probably have fewer employment 
opportunities, and marriage is an important means to obtain access to land 
and the economic means of production. And in turn fathers and brothers may 
well be keen for young women to leave the natal home due to the need for 
land for their wives. Haakanssan provides evidence that many young women 
are co-habiting in order to be effectively married, in the hope that their 
partner will pay bridewealth at a later date.
The insecurity that is caused by the non-payment of bridewealth is the other
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side of the coin to the importance of honour that payment conveys. 'Women 
constantly expressed the dissatisfaction, stress and fear they felt due to 
the insecurity of a non-bridewealth union. ...Leaving the man will result in 
economic insecurity and poverty, and will expose her to her parents anger at 
her elopement, the community's branding of her as a 'loose woman' and her 
ostracism by its members.' (Haakanssan 1988:181)
Women who are employed or self-employed face a very different prospect. 
Such women are reluctant to leave home without the payment of bridewealth as 
compensation to their parents in return for money spent on education. A wife 
who has a monetary income is an attractive prospect for a man, particularly
as payment of the bridewealth gives him authority over her income. Yet,
employed or self-employed women are able to exert more control over their 
income than women who are involved in a joint agricultural enterprise. Cash 
income is easy to hide, and can be spent without the knowledge of a husband. 
This is not the case with agricultural produce - many husbands keep account 
of how many bunches of bananas (matooke) there are in the household 
plantation to ensure that a wife cannot sell any without their knowledge. 11 
The argument articulated by Haakanssan above - that it was the introduction 
of the cash economy that enabled men to increase their rights over women - 
is incomplete. The cash economy did provide an alternative for some women. 
But it was/is men's ability to prevent women from having equal access to the 
market, and equal opportunities within it, that helps to sustain the
asymmetric balance of power. (This is a major theme of chapter 6.)
Haakanssan asks whether there is any incentive for a change in the system of 
bridewealth. The status quo is to men's advantage because of the legal 
component of bridewealth, entitling the husband to the rights over the
children and the wife's labour. 12 Once married, it validates women's 
status, and defines their position in the hierarchy, leading many women to 
support it. If, as the respondents suggest in the following chapter, 
marriage entails loss of control over income and accumulated assets for 
employed women, it may be such women who push for a change in men's 
bridewealth rights. Yet perhaps further research could determine to what 
extent men are still able to 'rule' their wives in unions where no payment 
is made. If this is the case, a change in the system of bridewealth would 
have little impact on women's situation, A more fundamental change in the 
perception of conjugal rights would then be necessary to ensure a greater 
degree of equality.
Matooke is a savory banana that is used as the main carbohydrate, and is a cash crop due to the demand from the 
urban Katjifjala population.
Disputes occur between young and old men over the level of the bridewealth - the young wanting a low price, and old
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5.4 Widowhood
The cultural practices that surround the beginning of a marriage have direct 
implications for the division of assets when the marriage ends. Payment of 
brideprice 'traditionally' implies that the product of the wife's labour 
belongs to the husband. As a consequence of this the household assets 
acquired during the marriage belong to the husband or his relatives. (The 
cultural rationale was/is to prevent assets being transferred through 
inheritance from one clan to another through the wife.) In the focus group 
discussions many respondents described situations where widows were forced 
to leave with nothing. The following quotation is a dialogue that took 
place between the respondents and the moderator. It indicates, firstly, that 
widows are 'traditionally' not allowed to take any of the household assets. 
Secondly, widows (and wives) are viewed as the property of the clan, and it 
is acceptable that they should be passed on to another male member of the 
clan.
Respondent 1 : "On that matter, there is a practice that has not gone 
well, in our nature. Our brothers, where there is no clear will, come 
from somewhere knowing that in so and so' s homestead there are things 
like this and that. Once he comes, he says: 'I am the head of the
homesteads.1 13 When he gets there he starts barking: 'The big cow is
for the head of the homestead. A good chair is for the head of the 
homesteads.' The children are left to inherit insignificant things,
with those who should have been responsible, the head of the
homesteads, having just taken care of themselves."
Moderator: "Is there no thought for the wife, as far as those things
left behind are concerned?"
Respondent 1:"You see, those we call the heads of the homesteads, once
they come, they don't take the wife as someone important. They take
her as something acquired, theirs that they bought (property). Yet 
the wife is not property, but they take her in that view. The one who 
says: 'I have finished the funeral rites', the one who is the
guardian, he goes into the house and starts eating the things of the 
children. The widow he beats because he is the one who has completed 
the funeral rites."
Respondent 2 (cutting in):"Even chasing, he chases her away."
Respondent 3: "Most of them would take them (as wives.)
arguing |^r a higher one - due to their position in giving and receiving. 
A clan title
Respondent 2:1 She looks for where to go, but she cannot see where." 
(Ggunda Men's. FGD)
This last quotation illustrates the dire circumstances in which many widows 
find themselves. A female respondent narrated the following story.
"For me, I saw a woman, who was at Namayuba, the husband got sick for 
a long time. But when the car was taking the body, the brothers and 
sisters were lifting things. One lifted a T.V. , another a radio­
cassette, the tablecloths that were folded neatly on the table - for 
the woman thought that they were helping her to pack her things. But 
then, that was the end. They took the body to be buried, and on 
coming back she only found chairs with no cushions, beds with no 
mattresses, tables with most of the things taken off." (Llwanyonyi 
Women's FGD)
The respondents were nearly unanimous in condemning such events, which 
indicates it may no longer be as common as it used to be. Statistics 
collected in the survey showed that 47% of widows took between 75-100% of 
the household assets, but 23% were allowed to take less than a quarter 
(Table 5.1 ) . 14
Table 5.1: Percentage of total household durables taken by widow (sample
size)
Percentage of household 
durables taken by widow (a)
Percentage of 
widows (17)
0-25% 23.5%
25-50% 17.7%
50-75% 11.7%
75-100% 47.1%
Source: Kauga/Ngogwe survey.
Note: (a) Calculated from the total replacement value of items taken on death of husband.
It could be argued that the wife being left with 75-100% is a reasonable share, given that the husband may have 
wished to leave something to his other relatives. However less than 25% does not appear to be equitable.
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5.5 Divorce
Data on the number of marriages that end in divorce was not collected.
However, 11.5% of the respondents during the census (men and women) were 
found to be currently divorced/separated (Sample size: 641). (This figure
does not included divorcees who have remarried.) 35% of married women have 
children by another man other than their current husband (The sample (150) 
includes widows who have been remarried.) The divorce rate is probably 
somewhat less that the sum of these two figures (46%) , perhaps between 30- 
40%. It appeared that divorce was relatively easy, with little legal
procedure involved, with one of the spouses simply packing up and leaving.
A woman's contribution to the household (either in terms of labour or
income) does not necessarily entitle her to take some of the assets on
divorce. This view still predominated amongst male respondents. The general 
perception was that a woman would get married again, and her second husband 
would provide consumer durables. A female divorcee has neither any right to, 
nor any need of the household assets.
"Most things - radio, saucepans, plates, bedding, whatever, even if I
bought the radio when she was the one cooking the food - the radio is
mine for the home. She, wherever she goes, marries another man. So a 
woman does not have the responsibility of getting things in the home 
except on your death." (Llwanyonyi Men's FGD)
'Although he is using his wife' money, all property is registered in 
his name, and if there is a divorce she will lose everything for which 
she has paid.' (Haakanssan:201)
In reality, it would appear that some women assert ownership rights over 
items they have purchased. A discussion took place indicating that if women 
purchase items with their own income, some will insist on taking those 
items. The first respondent concludes that if husbands allow their wives to
buy items, when it comes to separation she will take everything with her.
Such a conclusion reveals the threat that men feel.
Respondent 1 : "You may go off to your work, and your wife sells five
or so heaps of cassava or ten. She sees hawkers moving around with 
saucepans and buys one out of that money. She will show you I sold my 
cassava and bought a saucepan with the money."
Respondent 2: "That is not yours (ie. the saucepan). In fact when she
1 05
leaves your home, she will go with it." (A chorus of voices agree.)
Respondent 1:"That saucepan cannot be yours, and when she starts 
leaving your home, she will say: 'My saucepan, I worked for it, I am
taking it. 1 She will throw it outside (ready to be packed) . If you 
say the woman should buy things, you will have nothing, even the 
mattress she will take." (Many voices agree). (Ttakkajjunge Men's FGD)
In both male and female groups respondents mentioned engraving of the items 
that they purchased or keeping purchase receipts. When asked during the 
survey which household items she had purchased, one female respondent 
produced all the purchase receipts that she had carefully been keeping. A 
male respondent recounted the following.
"I was in a seminar of 'gender balance1 in which women were educating 
their fellow women. They were telling them to engrave those things 
(their property). It was a powerful conference. A woman said that 
things you buy while in the homes of your husbands should be engraved 
but in an inconspicuous manner." (The speaker is Local council level 3 
committee member). (Ttakkajjunge Men's FGD)15
The predominant view among the female respondents was that wives are allowed 
to take very few assets with them on divorce. Many women expressed 
resentment at the unfairness of this situation.
"The men are not grateful. You can get married to him when you are
still poor and you suffer the way the home situation is - there is no
bedding, nice clothes. You come a long way from a grass thatched hut, 
you build a house with a sheet iron roof, you have bought a bicycle. 
But it does not shame him to tell you to get out. And he doesn't even 
give you something small to take with you. He can't remember that you 
worked together. He chases you out with nothing. Sometimes he may even 
take away your clothes too. They know how to make you go naked." 
(Zitwe Women's FGD)
Christine Obbo describes hearing of several incidents and witnessed four 
cases where the men would not let their wives take clothes on divorce (Obbo 
1980). Apparently, it is common for a woman to store her clothes of value
with friends, with knowledge of the friend's husband, so that he will not
destroy them by mistake (Obbo 1980).
In a discussion of marriage in Zambia, Munachonga (1988) retells a 
respondent's account of how his particular family settled this issue."Each
The new Government's policy of ensuring that women are elected to all levels of its hierarchy seems to have some
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time a spouse purchased a major household item, relatives from both sides of 
the family were called in to witness who purchased it, and who therefore 
owned it. Other husbands... appear to have been forced into this arrangement 
by their wives. " (Munachonga 1988:193)
Women use a variety of practical strategies in order to retain their 
possessions. It would appear that the options are to remove items secretly, 
or to enlist the support of the community.
"There are two types of divorce. There is when I am sitting there in
the marriage, but when I divorced a long time ago. I started
removing one by one of the property when even my husband does not know 
that I am taking the property slowly. The day I am leaving, the man
does not know. When I wake up and say I am going for a visit. He even
escorts me. He keeps hoping that I am coming back, when I am not.
Then there is this divorce of fighting. You fight each other at
the night. You first go to the local council, or the elders, or his
brothers and sisters. The woman says that she wants her things, and 
the man refuses. The people tell the man that if he has made a
decision to let her leave, he should give her the things that belong 
to her. He has to give you some of the property." (Zitwe Women' FGD)
The statistics from the Kauga/Ngogwe survey revealed that 93% of the 
divorced women took between 0-25% of the total household durables. Only 3% 
were able to take between 25-50%, and another 3% above 50% (Table 5.2). 16 
It would appear that currently married women are optimistic, with 24% 
estimating that they will take between 25-50%. This difference may be due to 
the problem of a self-selecting sample. It is likely that the marriages of 
divorced women may not have been as cooperative as marriages that still 
exist. Perhaps in a more cooperative marriage, a woman could expect to take 
a more equal share. (Or perhaps several of the women in the sample may have 
divorced 10-15 years ago, and attitudes may changed during that period. It 
was argued in chapter 4 that women's involvement in income generating 
activities on their own account is increasing. Perhaps as women's earning 
power is rising, they are purchasing a larger proportion of household 
assets, and as a result intend to assert their rights over such items.
effect iiji^raising awareness, with women devising ways of asserting their rights. 
It is assumed that 50% would be an equitable division.
Table 5.2: Percentage of household durables taken by divorcees and estimates 
by currently married women (sample size)17
Percentage of household 
durables taken by- 
divorcees (a)
Percentage of
divorcees
(29)
Estimates by 
married women 
(153)
0-25% 93.1% 70.6%
25-50% 3.4% 24.2%
50-75% 3.4% 3.2%
75-100% 0.0% 1 .3%
Note: Calculated from total replacement value of items taken on divorce or estimate of items that would be 
taken on divorce.
As divorce is inevitably the result of disagreement between husband and 
wife, the wife is dependent on support from family and the local community 
to defend her claims against a potentially hostile husband. This requires 
the intervention in a marital dispute which may well incur the wrath of both 
parties. Many individuals may be reluctant to play such a role. It is far 
from certain that a woman will gain the support from the community that she 
requires. She may even be accused of theft.
"Even the things that you buy (while at) the man's place, when you 
pack them, they say that you stole the man's things." (Zitwe Women's
FGD)
It would appear that the norms surrounding marriage create an unequal 
balance of power between men and women. On divorce or widowhood, women are
not entitled to a share of the household assets acquired while they were
involved in household production. Such a situation is unlikely to encourage 
women to contribute to the acquisition of household assets. Yet, some women 
appear to be able to assert their right to a proportion of the assets that 
they have purchased. This may signify a more equal balance of power due to 
women's involvement in the cash economy. Women's work and its impact on the
balance of power is discussed in the following chapter.
These estimates were obtained in response to the question:" Which items would you be able to take if you and your 
husband divorce?"
1 08
5.6 Violence
Often social sanction is a sufficient form of control to enable the husband 
to maintain his position of authority, but in many households it is 
supported by the use of violence. In such circumstances women's 
ability/willingness to protest against their situation is diminished. Women 
may either be dependent on the community's willingness to take action 
against marital violence, which may not be forthcoming, particularly if 
violence is an accepted as a tool of authority; or dependent on her parental 
family as a refuge.
After 20 years of civil war, physical violence is part of life in Uganda. 
Many soldiers during the civil war were boys of 10-12 years old, orphaned by 
the war, who became accustomed to watching and carrying out acts of violence 
at a very early age. 18 Marital violence is seen as part of the course, with
only a few prepared to condemn it outright. In a survey carried out by the
Association of Ugandan Women Lawyers, 46% of women reported being beaten by 
a partner (Wakabi and Mwesigye 1991). (The local officials in one survey 
village had a positive policy for dealing with domestic violence. The police 
would be called in and the offender would spend the night in a police cell.)
Many male respondents argued that it was the only way to ensure that your 
wife was obedient.
"What brings men to beat their wives? For my part, I think that is the 
only punishment you can give a wife which will remind her all the time 
and make her fear. She will say: 'The other time I did this, I was
beaten.' And when you are beaten on the body, you feel the hard, dry
thing (ie. stick or cane used). What causes these women to be beaten, 
is that they are 'mind disturbers' - causing the brain to turn." 
(Llwanyonyi Men's FGD)
There is the perception that women are like children, who can stray because 
they are weaker individuals. The only way to teach the difference between 
right and wrong is corporal punishment.
"A woman is like a young child in her attitude to things. If you beat 
her the mind comes back on track." (Llwanyonyi Men's FGD)
But by no means all men hold this view.
"I do not have the wish to beat a wife, an adult, whom you have 
married. She came as an adult and found you. You have to talk to
18
A common practice in the civil war, that is still continuing in the north of Uganda, is to capture young boys and 
girls to force them to be soldiers or wives. Should one try and escape, his or her sibling will be forced to kill the 
escapee.
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her. If she is 'mad' she will not heed what you have said, but if she
understands it, what will she lose?" (Llwanyonyi Men's FGD)
The respondent asserts that women are adults. As long as she is not 'mad1, 
she will understand and agree. The implication is that any disagreements are 
due to her being 'mad', rather than there being an alternative point of 
view.
Many admitted that much of the violence is due to alcohol.
"Nobody is really supposed to be beaten, but there is anger. These 
days women have got out of hand. Women know how to drink, even more 
than us. Now if you are also a taker of alcohol, you may go
somewhere, come back and find that she is more inebriated than you
are. Sometimes she has not fulfilled her duties at home "
(Llwanyonyi Men's FGD)
"[Men beat women] because of alcohol... even if you have done nothing.
The biggest part of his brain gets influenced by alcohol... even if it 
is a minor issue, he has to beat you." (Llwanyonyi Women's FGD)
Both men and women expressed the view that women feel they are not loved 
unless they are beaten. This is a strong indication of the acceptability of 
marital violence. Beating is seen as a suitable method of dealing with 
adultery. If a wife forms a relationship with another man, to ignore it 
would be show indifference on the part of the husband. Indifference to a 
wife's general behaviour, and a lack of disciplinary beatings, may indicate 
that the husband has another woman.
" For us men, if you do not beat your wife, she will not know that you 
love her. But if you spend a year without beating your wife, she will 
think (or know) that you have another woman somewhere, he does not 
care about me. So wives are controlled through beating."
(Ttakkajjunge Men's FGD)
"There are some who say that if my husband does not beat me, I do not 
feel that he loves me." (Zitwe Women's FGD)
The following respondent described the circumstances under which she would 
except physical abuse from her husband.
"It is not right for the man to beat the wife, because you are all 
adults. But the reason why I would want my husband to beat me, is
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walking (committing adultery).19 Because the woman has no law that
permitted her to have two men.20 If he gets me red handed, I want him 
to beat me. But I want it to be between me and him, and the issue to 
be finished. I do not want him to beat me [where the affair was
committed] . I want him to beat me in the bedroom, and he tells me 
that: 'My fellow I do not want you to behave like this.’ But beating 
me in front of many people is not what I want." (Llwanyonyi Women's 
FGD)
In 1991 there was an 'incident' at a boarding school just over the
Ugandan/Kenyan border, approximately 400 km from Mukono. A group of
boarding-school boys went on the rampage. They broke into the girls' 
dormitories, killing 19 of their female classmates and raping 71 of them. 
The precipitating event was a strike, started by the boys, which the girls 
had refused to join. Bradley (1995) looks for possible sociological 
explanations for this horrific event. She argues that women are gaining 
access to education, land and credit in an atmosphere of unemployment, job 
insecurity and shortage of places in the higher education system. Women are 
placed in direct competition with men. Bradley maintains that the boys' 
action was the result of the pressure they felt of an uncertain future in 
the face of increased competition for scare resources. She also argues that 
it reflects an increased level of gender conflict within society as a whole 
- men's dominant position is being threatened by increasing awareness of 
women's rights.
No data on violence were collected in the Mukono survey. There is no direct 
evidence that marital abuse is on the increase. But given that men openly 
state that women's increasing economic freedom is a threat to their 
authority (this is discussed in detail in the next chapter), and that 
violence is an acceptable way of resolving disputes, it would seem to be 
likely that the incidence of physical abuse has risen. In a study of 90 
societies, Levinson identified four factors that appear to be associated 
with high levels of domestic violence: economic inequality between men and 
women, male authority and decision-making in the home, a pattern of using 
physical violence for conflict resolution, and divorce restrictions for 
women (Levinson 1989). The first two factors - economic inequality and male 
authority - are prevalent in Buganda and are the subject of chapters 4 & 6. 
It is also likely that individuals' experience of physical violence as a 
means of conflict resolution increased during the civil war. There are no 
restrictions on divorce for women, other than the fact that the resulting 
economic hardship, and possible lack of support from natal kin, may prevent 
a wife from leaving an undesirable marriage. During any period of
19
It is interesting to note the use of the word 'walking' to imply adultery, and that some women have to ask 
permission before they are allowed to visit friends and relatives. Perhaps there is an assumption that women who walk round 
the village, visiting neighbours, are committing adultery.
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sociological change there are forces that attempt to maintain the status 
quo, as well as those driving the change. Some men are unwilling to accept 
women's new freedom, others realise that it may well be beneficial - marital 
violence is an indication of those attempting to maintain their authority.
5.7 Conclusion
This chapter has argued that, although a typical Bugandan marriage contract 
and likely settlement on divorce does not encourage women to contribute 
towards the purchase of household assets, there are signs of significant 
changes. There has been a change in the attitude towards bridewealth. Some 
men expressed the view that it should be seen as a sign of appreciation, 
rather than a payment, and that, in some cases, it is something that the 
couple do together, independently of their kin. Despite this, bridewealth is 
still symbolically important, and is associated with a husband's rights to 
the product of his wife's labour.
Some women are beginning to assert their rights on divorce over household 
property that they purchased with their own income. With increasing female 
participation rates, womens' independent purchasing power may have also 
risen. With both spouses earning, and purchasing, (rather than simply 
contributing to household production) it is much easier to see whose labour 
produced which items, and to assert disposal rights over those items.
This chapter has also argued that, in some instances, women's increasing 
economic independence may come at a price - that of increased marital 
violence. The link between money, power and the challenge that women's 
economic independence poses for male authority is examined in the following 
chapter.
It would appear that the marriage contract between two families, attitudes 
towards female ownership of household assets, and marital violence are all 
important factors that affect intra-household allocation of resources.
Having multiple partners is acceptable for men - ie.polygamy - but not for women.
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6WOMEN'S WORK: 
PARTICIPATION, CONTROL OVER INCOME AND ACCESS TO CAPITAL
In an introduction to an edited volume on women and household income Dwyer 
and Bruce (1988) emphasise how the importance of women's 'perception of 
themselves and how they value what they do, may in part determine what they 
can attain1. A woman's negotiating skills are to some extent dependent on 
her perception of her strengths. In the outline of his co-operative/conflict 
model, Sen (1985) argues perception is an important parameter in determining 
household allocation. Yet these perceptions in turn are shaped by the 
social norms that delimit gender identities - what are 'suitable' activities 
for men and women. And, as suggested in chapter 2, gender identities are 
used to perpetuate the social order.
Gender identities can affect the type of work that men and women do, and the 
remuneration that they receive. In the introduction to an edited volume, 
Sinclair (1991) highlights how gender stereotypes can be used as a language 
of control. Men and women are assumed to have different characteristics 
that provide them with different skills. The engendering of skills 
generates value judgements about the importance of the different skills, 
which in turn influences the wage paid. Value is defined culturally as well 
as by the possibility of monetary exchange. For example, in a study of the 
division of labour in a department store, Broadbridge shows how saleswomen 
may be employed to sell low cost items with a high turnover, while male 
assistants were employed in departments with the opposite characteristics 
(Broadbridge 1991). Men's higher basic pay is sometimes said to result from 
the higher market value of the goods that they produce or sell (Craig et al. 
1982:82, cited in Sinclair 1991). Broadbridge shows how female sales 
assistants were expected to display an attractive appearance and to be 
tolerant to sexual harassment. Ecevit's account of factory workers in Turkey 
documents how manual jobs were 'allocated on the basis of women's assumed 
dexterity, cleanliness, and patience, while men's jobs were said to require 
characteristics of greater strength' (Ecevit 1991). Often defining the 
difference between not necessarily unequal skills, and their association
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with a particular gender, facilitates the payment of different wage rates. 
Women's low level of pay often does not reflect their skills, but rather 
their low level of bargaining power. 1
At the other end of the scale, gender identities can determine the type of 
work available to women by prescribing their confinement to confined spaces. 
In South and West Asia religion and culture dictate a high degree of 
physical seclusion, limiting women's freedom of movement outside the home, 
despite poverty that necessitates women’s involvement in income-generating 
work. 2 The situation in Buganda is not as extreme as this, yet gender 
identities determine women's ability to earn an income, the type of work 
they can do, ability to accumulate assets, and in some cases, permission has 
to be given by the husband before a wife can visit relatives or friends.
The first part of this chapter explores how Bugandan gender ideologies 
function as means of controlling both women's access to market activities, 
and their ability to accumulate assets. Evidence from the focus group 
discussions reveal the prevalent attitudes towards women who are earning an 
income. The second section uses the Kauga/Ngogwe data in order to assess 
the actual impact of these attitudes on women: the extent to which women are 
prevented from working, whether they are able to accumulate assets, the 
extent to which women contribute financially to the household income. The 
third part compares men and women's market activities and rates of return to 
ascertain whether, once engaged within the market, women face further 
inequalities. (Women's unpaid work, either domestic chores or agricultural 
production for household consumption, is not dealt with in thesis. It is 
important in the sense that the sexual division of labour within the home is 
closely linked with gender identities and any negotiation over the division 
of labour has to deal with the identities from which the division of labour 
derives. Yet the emphasis in this thesis is on work that generates an 
income, because it has much greater potential to influence the balance of 
power. In this chapter the term 'work' refers to any activity that generates 
an income that is initially controlled by the individual concerned ie. 
employment or self-employment, but not labour that is contributed to a 
household enterprise where the husband sells the product and therefore 
initially receives the income.)
i
Cockburn and Furst-Dilic (1994) have written about the interaction between gender and the development of white goods 
technology in Europe, various accounts in an edited volume show how all-male design teams 'contrive to introduce women, real
or imagined, in to their thinking process Despite many devices used by some designers to imagine the woman user she
remains.... 1 Other' to the designer.' (cockburn 1994:11). Cockburn has also documented how the computerisation of the 
newspaper industry in London has led to the reduction in number of 'male' jobs preparing the type for letter press printing, 
and an increase in 'female' typists. The unions openly organised to exclude women from typographical work, in an attempt to 
preserve^the jobs of their male members (Cockburn 1983).
Several studies in Afshar and Agarwal (1989) document the impact of gender ideologies on Asian women’s lives.
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6.1 Money, marriage and power
Men's control over women's economic activities is apparent in their attitude 
and behaviour towards women. Husbands may prevent their wives from working, 
confiscate their earnings or purchases, or beat them because they have 
money in their possession. Women with independent economic means face the 
judgement that they are unlikely to have successful marriages.
A commonly expressed sentiment is that a wife who is dependent on the
husband for cash, leads to a harmonious relationship, whereas a wife who is 
earning an income, may assert her independence.
"Understanding may be there when one side is poor, sometimes it is 
eroded when both of you have money. As it is said: "If all the wood
for lighting a fire is of the same big size, the fire cannot be lit."
You may have mutual understanding when you the husband is the one 
with the money and the wife listens to you well, as she is poor. But 
if she has (money) and you also have, you tell her: 'Put on tea for
me', she replies: 'Can't you put it on for yourself.. Don't you see I'm
busy? How many hands do I have?' (Laughter) But if she doesn't have
money, she will listen to whatever you say." (Ggunda Men's FGD)
Many men stated once a woman is allowed to assert her independence, the
result may well be divorce. A woman who has her own income is unlikely to 
accept being 'ruled' by her husband.
"In fact even if she earns money, if you are not very careful it may 
result in separation between you. Because whenever a wife gets money, 
she asks herself the reason for which she is being 'ruled'. 3 
[Prolonged laughter laced with comments like "Then the home dies", 
"The home falls apart", "In fact you have killed the marriage."] 
(Ggunda Men's FGD)
A husband may also lose his authority if he fritters his money unwisely. He 
will be subject to the taunts and scolding of an angry wife.
"Money is authority. Whenever you do not have money you do not have 
proper authority. It is just like our leaders who 'rule' over us 
the man wants to be a president, a minister, chairman RC5 - he wants 
to control money, not us. So in the same way when you control income 
in the home you have authority. If she knows about your income and 
learns that now you have nothing left, eeh! (emphasis) , she will even 
want you to wash her legs (Laughter) . Your authority will have gone."
(Ttakkajjunge Men's FGD)
3
The word used was ’emufuaa’, the direct translation for which is to ’rule’
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Some men forbade their wives to earn an income.4 If such a husband 
discovered that his wife did have money, or had been able to buy an item, 
some men said they would want a clear explanation about how the money was 
obtained to ensure it was not stolen.
"(If she has) money I will have to know where she got it from, and in 
what way. Is it mine which she has picked from where I place my head? 
Because she may buy, and when I go to check (on the money) , a rat has
pulled off 50,000 Ush and I think it is the money she took. She has
to explain to me clearly, what is she going to buy and how she got it. 
Then I allow her to buy." (Llwanyonyi Men's FGD)
Numerous women recounted how the feelings that the men expressed above can 
lead to them to physically abuse their wives.
"Now, there are some husbands who cannot allow the woman to buy
anything at home. He can ask you that: 'You who do not work, where
did you get the money? Who gave you permission to buy that thing?'
He can beat her because she decided to buy such an article."
(Llwanyonyi Women's FGD)
It would appear that some men view a working wife as a threat to the 
stability of their marriage, as well as a threat to their authority. As a 
result he feels justified in using violence in order to ensure her 
subjugation.
"If you have your cash like that in your basket, he can get it and use 
it. He can also beat you. Money, that belongs to you, can cause you 
to be beaten." (Zitwe Women's FGD)
Just as it is acceptable to prevent a woman from working, it appears to be
legitimate to expropriate a wife's income or her assets. The following
female respondent explains how such a situation makes it very difficult for 
a woman to accumulate assets. Cash flow problems may prompt a husband to 
demand that his wife hand over her income or sell an asset and give him some 
of the proceeds. Although women are legally allowed to own cattle, it is
actually very difficult to do, because such a prominent asset is likely to
attract a man's attention.
"The rights we women have are like, let me say, you buy a pig from Mrs
Lubuga and you rear it, and it belongs to you. Even when he knows
that it belongs to you, he will be on your 'bumper' (pestering you) to 
sell it. When you sell it for 20, 000 Ush he wants you to give him
Approximately 10% of husbands prevent their wives from working (Table 6.1 below). This figure rises to 28% among
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10,000 Ush as if you reared it together. Therefore we have rights, 
yet we do not have them. That is why we fear to buy cattle - because 
we do not have rights. When you sell a pig you want to spend the 
money quickly on a child or on cloth, so that the money does not cause 
a fight. The men are against us." (Zitwe Women's FGD)
It appears there is an informal hierarchy of agricultural livestock. Women 
are allowed to own the less valuable ones.
"A wife should know her chicken and sell it because it is hers. About 
a cow that we have, she cannot say anything. A goat that she bought 
herself is hers. But a sheep is not hers. That is the husband's."
(Ggunda Men1s FGD)
The one asset that it is exceptionally difficult for a woman to own is land.’ 
If a woman owns land it is seen as an outright threat to her marriage, 
because she has the ultimate means by which to live independently. Any man 
that sells to a woman will be subject to the rage of the husband.
"For us village women it is hard to buy a plot of land. When you come 
to get married, you will not have the heart (intention) to say: 'Let
me go to Mr Sowedi and I buy a plot1. If he (your husband) knows that 
Mr Sowedi sold you a plot for around 20,000 Ush, he will want to burn 
Mr Sowedi inside, his house, because he has spoilt your home." (Zitwe 
Women's FGD)
In rural areas, there is still a general sanction against selling land to 
women. If a woman approaches somebody selling land, they may well meet the 
response: "Where is your husband? We will sell to him" (Obbo 1980).
IMen fear that once you have bought a piece of land it is a sign that
you are''planning to leave them." (Obbo 1980:44)
Some argued that the whole household would benefit financially.
"Some (women) get money and listen to you. Like my wife, she has more
money that me. When she gets money it is for our children, it
supports our children. What I haven't got (in terms of cash) she 
provides." (Namubiru Men's FGD)
One or two respondents argued that not all women wish to spread their wings 
and assert their new-found economic freedom. Conflict need not necessarily 
be the result of a wife earning money.
wealthier groups.
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"There is that wife who brings money into the home, but even if you, 
the husband, has not kept pace with her (i.e. she earns more), she is 
calm/settled. In other words she does not have a restless heart that 
desires to be free and break away." (Ggunda Men's FGD)
It is unclear whether the wife is calm because the husband is not so eager
to impose his will, or whether the wife is still prepared to be submissive.
Several male respondents acknowledged that men do abuse their position of 
power within the marriage.
"Another thing is that we men also mistreat women. You may find a man 
who has built a home and makes money. At the end of the month, the 
wife does not get anything. In the second month you have not even 
bought her a dress, she does not get any money - you spend it in 
alcohol. You run with young girls. It gets to the third month, she 
sees nothing, she decides to do her own thing. That brings 
separation." (Llwanyonyi Men's FGD)
One female respondent argued that if a husband does give his wife freedom,
it is important for the wife not to boast that she governs him:
"We have spoken mostly about men's bad behaviour. But also women we
have a bad habit. When a man gives you freedom because he sees you as 
an adult, you will say: 'My man, I have softened him, I even cook any
time I want to.' (Laughter) Then you spoil the freedom he has given
you. You tell your fellow woman: 'I am the one to buy salt and his
shirt. ' You intervene in the business, and you say things that are 
wrong. Then you spoil yourself before him. (He has a bad opinion of
you). When another man thinks of giving his wife freedom, he will see 
how you behave, and will think that his wife will behave similarly." 
(Zitwe Women's FGD)
The majority of the respondents expressed how closely linked money and 
authority are within the home. Culturally, the husband is the 'head1 of the 
household, and money and control of assets ensure his power. This situation 
has been challenged with the growing involvement of women in generating 
income. Many men see this trend as a direct threat to their authority, and 
to the stability of their marriage. Many forbid their wives to work, others 
are prepared to use violence to ensure their dominance. Others are able to 
discuss financial matters with their wives, and achieve agreement on how to 
manage their finances in a way that will benefit the whole household.
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6.2 M e n 's honour and women1s independence
The views expressed about women who are economically independent neatly 
illustrate the relationship between gender, money and power. In Buganda, 
economically independent women are called 1nakyewombekedde1 (meaning
literally 'I prepared this myself'). They are normally women who have a
house and land of their own, and who do not depend on a husband for an
income. Such women are not seen as suitable marriage material, because
they are generally uncompliant. It is often assumed that they have been 
through several failed marriages, and sometimes there are overtones of
prostitution. 'Nakyewombekedde' is not perceived as a complimentary term, 
nor as something that women generally aspire to be, despite the freedom that 
financial independence brings. (In such a cultural context, economic models 
that assume that women wish to maximise their income are simply inaccurate.)
As an indicator of the prevalence of such economically independent women in 
the Kauga/Ngogwe sample 14% of women owned the house.5 If such a woman
should get married, and her husband moves into her home, it is said: 'She
has married him', not vice versa. If a disagreement should occur, between 
husband and wife, she is at liberty to tell him to leave. Traditionally, 
for a man to be in such a situation, is to severely compromise his honour
and his manhood, because the wife is effectively the dominant partner. Just
as a man buys a wife, in this case, the woman will have bought the man.
"We have women here whom we call 'Nakyewombekedde' . Those women have 
the authority that is different from that of those women who have been 
married. She can even chase away the man that she will have brought" 
(Ttakkajjunge Men's FGD)
The following respondent recounts his situation where he is living with a 
'nakyewombekedde', who is able and willing to help him pay the local tax 
collected from male heads of household.
Respondent 1 : "I found a Nakyewombekedde. Any time when graduated tax
comes up, she helps me with it (Laughter). Because she has more money 
than me, I say: 'Nyabo (madam), I don't have money'. They often help
us, those who are of good heart."
A fellow respondent in the same group declares that he finds such a 
situation unacceptable. The husband has effectively agreed to be ruled by
his wife. By accepting financial help, the husband has lost his authority.
Respondent 2: "For my part, I take it to be a very bad thing, because 
it is the man who should control the wife. But if a woman takes
5
This statistic includes both married and single women.
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(marries) you because of the wealth which she has, anytime she can
send you away and you remain with nothing. Or she may find a wealthy
man and she leaves you in tears. For my part, I take it as one of the
worst things, for a wife to see that she is wealthier than you, so as
to rule you."
Respondent 1 : "I continue to try to convince this son here. She has
not taken your authority in the home. In your home you remain the 
owner of the home. What appears to bring about your loss of honour is 
that she gives you money to pay graduated tax. When she gives this 
child money to pay for school fees, she does not take it as a debt you 
have to pay. Where will she base herself to take you as a labourer?"
The first respondent is eager to state that the house belongs to the man, 
and as such, in his position, he cannot be told to leave. He does not see
accepting financial help as a challenge to his control, but the money can
help contribute to household expenses. It is interesting to note that
respondent 1 chooses to argue in terms of honour not being lost, rather than 
the benefits of sharing responsibility equally. The subsequent quotations
reveal that the other respondents are far from convinced that the benefits 
of the financial assistance outweigh the indignity suffered. The core of
their argument is that money is the source of power, and they do not see the
possibility of an intimate relationship mitigating this fact.
Respondent 2: "Ssebo (sir) , you will remain with her because of your 
wretchedness. You will tolerate her because of your poverty, not 
because of your manliness or authority. (Laughter) The wretchedness 
you are in (allows) her to rule you because of her money, but not 
because of your authority."
Respondent 3: "Once a wife is better off in the home, she may have a
motor car, you'll see her driving off and she goes. She will come
back and ask 'Is there food?' (Laughter) You will have become 
something else." (More laughter)
Respondent 4: "Then you will have become the wife and she the 
man/husband." (Laughter) (Ttakkajjunge Men's FGD)
Much of this conversation takes the form of teasing the first respondent. 
It is easy to see how the insults may constitute considerable pressure to 
conform to the normal behaviour of the community. A man who allows his wife 
considerable freedom, and treats her as an equal by allowing her to share 
the financial responsibility, may well be subject to taunts from his fellow 
men.
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6.3 Women and money: The data
The previous discussion raises a series of questions. Scott, in his work on 
Brazil, deals with the gap between an ideology of male dominance and a 
lived-in reality of matrifocal households (Scott 1996). Ako's work on the 
impact of the seaweed project in Paje village, Zanzibar, leads her to state: 
'Most men interviewed did not even want to acknowledge the truth that in 
many cases the daily source of household maintenance was from the women (who 
participated in the project)' (Ako 1995:171). 'They claimed there was no 
rich woman in Paje.' (Ako 1995:171) Such studies show that reiterations of 
the ideology of male dominance can be insufficient to describe a situation 
accurately. It is necessary to provide data to substantiate men and women's 
claims. Where applicable, comparisons will be made with single women to 
ascertain the impact of male restrictions imposed on married women.
* To what extent do husbands prevent their wives from working?
By preventing his wife from earning, a husband is ensuring that her only 
access to cash is through him. Without an independent source of income 
women's actions are severely constrained. As illustrated above, the 
justification given by many men is that allowing their wife access to money 
will simply cause disagreements and eventually separation, or by working 
their wife may find another man. If the wife is only involved in domestic 
production, the husband is able to control the products of her labour, her 
movements and her access to other men much more easily.
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Table 6.1: Percentage of women prevented from earning an income by their
husbands (sample size)
Housing Index Rural Urban
Wealthy 28.6 (7) 13.5 (37)
Middle 12.5 (16) 7.9 (38)
Poor 0 (15) 7.4 (27)
All 10.5 (38) 9.8 (102)
Source-: Kauga/Ngogwe survey
Although there is little difference at the aggregate level between rural and 
urban prevention rates, these figures hide wider variations in rural areas. 
Due to the greater poverty, none of the rural poor husbands prevents his 
wife from working. But rural husbands that can afford to keep their wives at 
home are twice as likely to do so than their urban counterparts (28% 
compared to 13%). Perhaps due to the influence of a more diverse environment 
and more opportunities, urban women from wealthy households are able to 
assert their independence to a greater degree than rural women. 6
If the correlation between the level of prevention and the husband's
education level is examined, the data show that more 
'autocratic/patriarchal' views are more predominant in men with no
education. Men with the lower level of income are also more likely to 
prevent their wives from working, even though the household would benefit
considerably from an extra income (Table 6.2).
Table 6.2: Percentage of women prevented from earning by husband's education 
and income level
Husband's education 
level
Percentage of 
women prevented 
from earning
Husband's income 
level
Percentage of women 
prevented from 
earning
Secondary education 6.7 Wealthy 7.1
Primary education 9.9 Middle 9.3
No education 16.7 Poor 10.8
Source: Kauga/Ngogwe survey.
It is not the case that poorly educated necessarily implies poor in terms of 
income. (For example, 39% of men with no education fall into the high income
The literature on Asia documents similar differences between wealthy and poorer households (Afshar and Agarwal 1989, 
Ram 1989, Lessinger 1989). ’Upper-class women, for instance, may on the one hand be more strictly bound by the dictates of 
certain types of representations and cultural practices; on the other hand, their class position and /or higher education may 
enable them individually to challenge these dictates and bypass conventions from which women living under poverty conditions 
may have no easy escape' (Afshar and Agarwal 1989:1)
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group, but only 28% of men with primary education are the high income 
group.) Where the characteristics do coincide, it would appear that gender 
ideologies are perpetuating poverty, due to men's attempts to limit women's 
economic activities. The correlation between the husband's income level and 
prevention could reflect the impact of education, and associated values, or 
there could be a more direct link. Husbands with low incomes may feel more 
threatened by a working wife, who is more likely to be able to match her 
husband's low income; or the authoritarian relationship involved in 
preventing a spouse from working minimises any returns that can arise from 
cooperation and mutual assistance, and as such reduces income levels. 7
This last table appears to contradict the previous one - men with a low 
income have a high prevention rate, but men in households with a poor socio­
economic status have a lower prevention rate. This reveals the different 
nature of the two variables - the housing index is related to wealth over a 
long period of time, whereas income is a current variable. It may be that a 
relatively wealthy husband, who, for some reason, has a low current income, 
may still prevent a wife from working.
It would appear that the younger a wife, is the more likely she will be 
prevented from working (Table 6.3). It may be believed that younger women 
are more likely to form relationships with other men. Older couples are 
more likely to have developed a greater degree of trust and understanding, 
and a husband's need to control his wife's activities may have reduced.
Table 6.3: Percentage of women prevented from working by their husbands by 
age of wife (sample size)
Age of wife 
(years)
Percentage of women who are 
prevented from working
Up to 19 22.2 (9)
20-29 12.5 (64)
30-39 7.0 (43)
40-49 0 (15)
50-59 0 (4)
60-70 33.3 (2)
Sourcer Kauga/Ngogwe survey.
Arvanitaki and Stratigaki (1994) argue that the less power a man has outside the home, the more he is likely to 
restrict his wife's freedom and control household expenditure.
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* To what extent do married women own assets?
Married women own/have purchased fewer assets than either men or single 
women (Table 6.4). There also appears to be a form of hierarchy of assets. 
Men are more likely to own items such as cattle, radio, tape cassette, 
bicycle, motorcycle or vehicle, followed by single women and then married 
women. Items such as hens, sheep, goats and pigs are predominately owned by 
single women, followed by married women and then men. Chapter 4 provided 
data showing that single women have a lower income than married women. Yet 
despite this they have been able to accumulate a greater number of assets. 8 
These data suggest that married women are discouraged from owning assets, 
whereas single women have a greater discretion over their income. It also 
substantiates the claim made in the group discussions that there is a 
hierarchy of assets, in which women are able to own the less important ones.
Table 6.4: Percentage of respondents owning particular assets (sample size)
Asset Percentage of 
men (178)
Percentage of 
married women (178)
Percentage of 
single women (79)
Hen 30.9 37.6 46.7
Goat 11.8 10.7 21 .3
Sheep 0.6 1 .2 6.7
Pig 14.6 20.8 24.0
Cattle 14.6 2.3 6.6
Radio 21 . 3 3.4 16.0
Tape cassette 49.4 9.0 12.2
Bicycle 59.6 2.8 13.5
Motorcycle 1 .7 0 0
Vehicle 1 .7 0 0
Source: Kauga/Ngogwe
* Given the assumption that men are the main providers and controllers of 
the household monetary income, how important is women's contribution to the 
household?
28% of working women earn more than their husbands. (Or 13.7% of all women 
earn a higher income than their husbands.) This is a surprising result,
Without a husband, single women may have had to purchase necessary items for the household. This could be the case 
with the consumer durables, but it is less likely with agricultural assets.
1 1 7
given both men and women's comments on the importance of income as a source 
of authority. Either a third of men with working wives are happy to earn 
less than their wife, or, more likely, they are unaware of the amount their 
wives are earning. 75% of women earn less than 20% of household income, with 
50% of women earning no income directly (Table 6.5). 9
Table 6.5: Distribution of households by percentage of total household cash 
income earned by wife (sample size)
Percentage of total 
household income earned by 
wife
Percentage of households 
that fall into each 
percentile (160)
0 % 50.0 %
1-20 % 24.4 %
20-40 % 8.1 %
40-60 % 5.0 %
60-80 % 7.5 %
80-100 % 5.0 %
Source: Kauga/Ngogwe survey.
The importance of the wife1s financial contribution varies with the wealth 
of the household (as defined by the housing index) (Table 6.6). At 28%
women's contribution in the middle group is lower than both the poorer and 
wealthier groups. Perhaps the combination of neither the desperate need of 
the poorer households for an extra income, nor the better opportunities in 
the wealthier households due to access to capital and education, has led to 
'middle class' women earning a lower level of income. (This is supported by 
evidence given on income levels in chapter 7).
Table 6.6: Average share of income earned by wife by socio-economic status 
(based on housing index) (sample size)
Socio-economic
status
Average share of income earned 
by wife
Wealthy 33.7 (28)
Middle 28.5 (33)
Poor 39.5 (18)
bource: Kauga/Ngogwe survey.
9
Women may be earning indirectly through labouring in their husband's crops.
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6.4 Female participation rates
Within the framework of orthodox economics, material factors are seen as the 
main determinants of female labour supply - wage levels, education, number 
and age of children, ratio of wife’s potential wage to husband's 
(Killingsworth and Heckman 1986). From this theoretical perspective, it is 
human capital and productivity (which both depend on education) that 
determine the wage level. Alternative economic theories turn to 
institutional characteristics that create a segmented labour market - men 
employed in the highly paid, secure primary sector, women employed in the 
poorly paid, part-time or temporary secondary sector (Cain 1976, Taubman and 
Wachter 1986). Institutional factors can be the role played by trade unions, 
pay bargaining procedures, and/or the perceptions of employers that men are 
likely to show a greater attachment to the organisation (Hamermesh and Rees 
1988). Others turn to women's role within both biological and social 
reproduction as not only a material constraint, but as a source of gender 
identities that constrain women's choices (Harris and Young 1981, Mackintosh 
1981) .
Any explanation of female participation rates has to look at all of these 
issues - material, institutional as well as ideological. The previous 
section has shown that Bugandan gender ideologies discourage women from 
earning an income or accumulating assets. The following section will show 
that material factors such as the number and age of children, education, and 
potential wages have an effect. It will also show that economic activities 
(self-employment rather than employment due to the predominance of the 
informal sector) are segmented, not due to the employer preferences, or the 
behaviour of trade unions, but due to different access to capital. 10
In the Kauga/Ngogwe survey only 49% of married women were earning an income. 
In comparison, 82% of single women and nearly all men (97%) earn a cash 
income. The Kauga/Ngogwe participation rate for all women was 61.7% (Sample 
size: 243) . (The problems of collecting accurate female participation rates
are discussed in chapter 4, where these results are compared with data from 
other sources.)
Education
Table 6.7 suggests that there is a correlation between the education and 
wage/profit rates, indicating that education is a determinant of income.
10
Given the emphasis in this thesis on the interaction between spouses, it is married women’s participation rate that 
is examined and not that of single women. The lower level of financial support received by single women means that the two
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Table 6.7: Married women's average wage/profit rate by education (sample
size)
Education Married women's wage/profit 
rate (Ush per hour)
Secondary 900 (14)
Primary 690 (42)
None 580 (5)
Sourced Kauga/Ngogwe survey.
Higher education levels are associated with a greater proportion of women 
choosing to work (Table 6.8). A greater range of income-earning 
opportunities are open to educated women. They are also able to earn a 
higher hourly rate, raising the incentive to participate.
Table 6.8: Percentage of married women earning an income by education level 
(sample size)
Married women's 
education level
Percentage of women 
working
Secondary 64.7 (29)
Primary 57.6 (85)
None 17.2 (17)
Source: Kauga/Ngogwe survey.
Household wealth, husband's Income and women's control over household assets
The relationship between total household wealth and a woman's decision to 
work is multifaceted, and it can contain a number of opposing elements: i/ a 
wealthy household may reduce the need for a woman to work; ii/ a household 
may be wealthy because the wife is working; iii/ an educated, high earning 
man is likely to marry a similarly educated wife, who has a high earning 
potential and is more likely to want to work; 11 iv/ as table 6.2 shows, men 
with low incomes are marginally more likely to prevent their wives from 
working. Table 6.9 shows the percentage of married working women
increasing with household wealth, suggesting that in this situation a 
wealthy households encourages and facilitates a married woman to work, and
groups my^t be considered separately.
Haakanssan (1988) noted that the educated elite, among the Gusii in Kenya, are choosing spouses from a similar 
social strata, irrespective of their ethnic origin. In contrast among the less well-educated spouses are more likely to be 
from the same ethnic group, and often from families of different social standing and wealth. Similar changes may be occurring 
in the peri-urban area of Kauga.
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may be the result of her working, rather than deterring her from finding 
work.
Table 6.9: Percentage of married women who are earning cash by class and
rural/urban divide (sample size)
Class
(Housing index)
Percentage of women working
All Urban Rural
Wealthy (41) 53.7 55.9 (34) 42.9 (7)
Middle (50) 50.0 52.9 (34) 43.8 (16)
Poor (41) 43.9 42.3 (26) 46.7 (15)
Source': Kauga/xNgogwe survey.
However, this picture hides rural and urban differences, and appears to be 
valid for urban but not for rural areas. It appears that in rural areas, 
wealth slightly reduces the need for a married woman to earn an income, and 
poverty increases the need. Perhaps the difference between the two areas is 
the level of opportunity for earning an income. In rural areas the 
opportunities are small, and poorly paid and are therefore taken up out of 
necessity. In urban areas the opportunities are greater and better paid for 
those with the capital/education to take advantage of them - encouraging 
wealthier (and better educated) women to participate.
As might be expected, the effect of the level of a husband's income is 
similar to that of socio-economic class. In the urban area, husbands in the 
low income group are more likely to have a working wife than those in the 
middle income group - 54% and 45% respectively - due to poverty (Table
6.10). In the wealthiest income group the factors encouraging wives to work 
seem to predominate, as 69% are working. A comparison of tables 6.9 and 6.10 
seems to show that low current male income, rather than low socio-economic 
status, appears to lead to higher female participation rates. This would 
suggest that poor housing (low socio-economic status) does not necessarily 
imply low current income. 12
A relatively recent increase in income may not necessarily be invested in housing, or a previously wealthy man who 
invested in housing may now be earning a lower income.
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Table 6.10: Percentage of married women who are earning cash by husband's
income level (sample size)
Husband's income 
level (pm)
Percentage of women working
All Urban Rural
75,000 & above 60.4 (48) 68.6 (35) 38.5 (13)
25-75,000 44.2 (52) 45.7 (35) 41.2 (17)
0-25,000 56.0 (49) 53.8 (39) 60.0 (10)
Source: Kauga/Ngogwe survey.
Faphounda (1978) notes that any discussion of the association between 
husband's income and a woman's decision to work assumes a correlation, if 
not equality, between his income and contribution to household expenses. Yet 
this need not be the case. Unfortunately data on contribution levels to 
recurrent expenditure in the Kauga/Ngogwe survey were only collected in 
terms of shares or percentages rather than levels. (If the husband's share 
of recurrent expenditure is 100%, the wife is unlikely to be earning - and 
therefore it is not possible to compare participation rates with changing 
contribution levels. The data are discussed in more detail in Chapter 7.)
In a discussion of UK female labour supply, Morris (1989) argues that a lack 
of control over household spending, as well as a low level of household 
income, may encourage a wife to enter the labour market. This is likely to 
be the case in Uganda, but it is counteracted by the fear that a woman may 
not be able to retain control over her income, and that it may simply be 
confiscated by her husband. (The extent to which this acts as a disincentive 
may be dependent on a woman's ability to keep her activities secret). If the 
percentage of total household goods that a woman expects to take on divorce, 
(over and above those purchased), is taken as proxy for control over 
household income/assets, table 6.11 shows the percentage of working women 
rising with control over household assets. This suggests that the greater a 
woman's control over household income and assets, the more likely she is to 
work and therefore perhaps to contribute. (The construction of this score is 
discussed in detail in chapter 3).
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Table 6.11: Percentage of married women earning an income according to
percentage of total goods expect to take on divorce (sample size)
Household goods married 
women expect to take on 
divorce (a)
Percentage of 
married women who 
are working
More than purchased 67.4 (43)
Less than purchased 45.7 (35)
Note: (a) Calculated from total replacement value of household goods that women expect to take on divorce.
Number of children under five years
The number of children under five years that a woman is caring for also has
an impact on involvement in cash activities - participation rates fall as
the number of children rises (Table 6.12),
Table 6.12: Percentage of married women earning an income by number of
children under 5 years (sample size)
Number of children 
under 5 years
Percentage of married 
women who are working
0 (no data)
1 53.7 (67)
2 45.3 (53)
3 and above 41.6 (12)
Source: Kauga/Ngogwe survey.
Yet the above table hides the different patterns that occur due to the 
wealth of the household. For example, this pattern does not hold amongst the 
poorest women, where those with 3 or more children under 5 appear to be more 
likely to earn an income than those with fewer children - presumably due to 
desperate need (Table 6.13). In comparison, neither of the two wealthy women 
with 3 children under 5 earn an income. (The sample sizes are too small to 
be confident about these results.)
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Table 6.13: Percentage of married women earning an income by number of
children under 5 and household status (sample size)
Housing Index Number of children under 5 years
One Two Three or more
Wealthy 54.5 (22) 58.8 (17) 0 (2)
Middle 51.9 (27) 50.0 (18) 40.0 (5)
Poor 55.S (18) 27.8 (18) 60.0 (5)
Source: Kauga/Ngogwe survey.
On the other hand, wealthy women with two children are more likely to go out 
to work than women from poorer households. Perhaps with two children a 
wealthy woman may pay for some form of child care, but with three the 
domestic load is such that the woman wishes to remain at home. Women with 
two children from poorer household perhaps cannot afford to child care, or
the potential income is not sufficiently greater than the cost of child
care.
It would appear that if a woman is caring for only one child under 5, the 
wealth status of the household has a small impact on her decision to work. 
(Both the poor (due to need) and the wealthy (due to opportunity) are more 
likely to earn an income.)
Women's age
Married women's involvement in income generating activities increases with 
age (Table 6.14). There are several possible explanations. Firstly, younger 
women are more likely to have young children to look after. Secondly, there 
may be a proportion of women who are not directly prevented from working,
but whose husbands would disapprove and discourage their wives. This
proportion is presumably higher amongst the younger age groups, given the 
evidence in table 6.3.
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Table 6.14: Percentage of women working by age of woman (sample size)13
Age of wife 
(years)
Percentage of married 
women who are working
Up to 19 33.3 (9)
20-29 42.9 (63)
30-39 56.8 (37)
40-49 71.4 (14)
50-59 50.0 (4)
60-70 33.3 (3)
bounce: Kauga/Ngogwe survey.
The results of a logistic regression examining the determinants of the 
female participation rate are set out in table 6.15. The results confirm the 
significance of both women's education level, their age and husbands' income 
but not socio-economic class, number of children under 5 or expected divorce 
score.
Female participation rises significantly with education, except at the
tertiary level. This result may be due either small sample bias at the
tertiary level, or because tertiary educated women are likely to be married 
to men with high incomes and therefore do not need to go to work. Socio­
economic status is positively associated with the participation rate, 
suggesting that higher socio-economic status is associated with better 
education, which in turn encourages participation because of the higher 
rewards. The fact that the socio-economic coefficients are insignificant 
further suggests that education is the main motivating force.
The coefficient associated with the number of children under 5 years is 
insignificant, which is expected since the effect of this variable depends 
on socio-economic status (See table 6.13 above). As it is positive it would 
appear that need for another income due to more children dominates the 
greater need for child care.
Husbands' income is negatively associated with female participation - as
husbands' income falls, women's involvement rises due to poverty. It is only
the contrast between low and middle income that is significant, confirming 
that there is a lower level of participation in the middle class.
Participation rises with women's age, again confirming the discussion above.
For a discussion of possible age bias, see chapter 3.
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It also rises with women's expected divorce score, except this variable is
not significant.
Table 6.15: Logistic regression results, where dependant variable is Female 
Participation (0 or 1)
Independent Variables (n=137)
(Model Chi-squared: 26.148, df: 10, sig:0.0035)
Coefficient (Sig)
Woman's education level Primary education wrt no education 1.67 (0.0010)
Secondary education wrt no education 2.59 (0.0018)
Tertiary education wrt no education -4.90 (0.8255)
Socio-economic class Middle socio-economic class wrt poor 0.375 (0.4677)
Wealthy socio-economic class wrt poor 0.351 (0.4486)
Number of children under 5 yrs 0.071 (0.7701)
Husband's income Middle wrt poor -0.995 (0.043)
Wealthy wrt poor -0.473 (0.383)
Woman's age 0.038 (0.0366)
Woman's expected divorce score over and above items purchased 0.014 (0.3478)
Constant -2.521 (0.6525)
Source: kauga/wgogwe survey.
6.5 Segmented and unequal opportunities
One important indicator of unequal opportunities is the gap between hourly 
rates for similar activities. There is an apparent hierarchy, with men 
having a higher hourly rate than married women, who in turn earn more than 
single women (Table 6.16). There are a range of possible explanations for 
the gender-based wage gap - differing levels of education, access to 
capital, market opportunities, and simple discrimination. As Lee and Hudson 
point out a lower wage rate 'bolsters justifications, material and 
ideological, for the particular immutability of women's domestic priorities' 
(Lee and Hudson 1990).
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Table 6.16: Average wage/profit rate by gender and marital status (sample 
size)
Gender and 
marital status
Average wage/profit 
rate (Ush per hour)’4
Men 820 (152)
Married women 730 (61)
Single women 540 (38)
Source : itauga/ iigogwe survey.
Perhaps more interesting is the difference between single and married women. 
Again there is a range of interconnected explanations. Single women do not 
have the advantage of another earning adult who can help to relieve cash 
flow problems. Any attempt to maintain household savings in order to make a 
capital investment during a period of cash shortage is likely to be more 
difficult. Returns to self-employment activities are likely to be lower 
without any capital equipment. Married women may benefit from a capital 
investment made by their husbands - either an item that he has purchased for 
his own use, but which can also be used by the wife, for example a bicycle, 
or items that he may purchase for his wife.
Another indicator of a segmented market is the types of activities that men 
and women are involved in. For the purposes of clarification, activities 
were classified into groups according to whether they were wage work or 
self-employment (artisanal, or agricultural). The groups were further 
divided according to whether the wage work was casual or not, and the level 
of capital required for the particular type of self-employment. Table 6.17 
displays the classification.
Data were collected on the hours spent on each cash-generating activity. There is a difficulty in separating the 
time spent on home production for sale from that for consumption, particularly when only the surplus is sold. As a result, 
all data on home production are excluded from the discussion of wage rates.
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Table 6.17: Categorization of activities common in Kauga and Ngogwe
Wage work
Casual wage 
worker
Permanent wage worker Skilled wage worker
Fetching water 
Slashing 
Digging 
Laundry
Birth attendant
Construction worker 
Stone quarrier
Tax collector 
Teaching 
Driver 
Nurse
Self-employment
Artisan/
Little capital
Artisan/
More capital
Agricultural 
/No capital
Agricultural/
Capital
Trader
Food manufacture (pancakes, 
cooked maize & groundnuts) 
Mechanic
Charcoal production 
Brewing
Brick production 
Crafts (Mats & baskets)
Baker
Shop
Video Shack
Carpenter
Butcher
Tailor
Saloon
Restaurant
Maize
Bananas
Cassava
Coffee
Potatoes
Sugar cane
Goats
Poultry
Pigs
Cattle
Greens
Tomatoes
Passion fruit
Hawker 
Road stall
Table 6.18 examines the percentage of men, married and single women involved 
in particular activities. A greater percentage of women, particularly
single women, are involved in casual wage labour {8% of married women and 
10% of single women as supposed to 6% of men) . There is a similar pattern 
for trading at makeshift road-side stalls (13% of married women, 17% of 
single women in comparison to 6% of men). It is predominantly men who have 
the permanent and skilled waged jobs. 32% of married women are involved in 
artisanal self-employment with little capital. The number of single women 
is much lower at 11%, presumably because they don't have access to the 
little capital required. If the artisanal self-employment requires a higher 
level of capital, men are more likely to be involved (15% in comparison with 
6% for married women and 4% for single women) . 50% of single women are
involved in agricultural production with no capital - crops where the seeds 
or tubers can be obtained free from neighbours and do not require 
fertilizers or pesticides. Both men and married women are less dependent on 
this form of agriculture. No single woman grows a crop that requires
capital investment, but 10% of men and 7% of married women do.
These statistics indicate that married women have better access to capital 
than single women, presumably through their husbands. Single women have to 
rely on non-capitalised agriculture, trading at makeshift roadside stalls
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and casual wage work. Married women are more likely to be involved in 
artisanal work with or without capital, and in capitalised agriculture. The 
implication is that even artisanal work with low capital requirements 
(cooked food production and sale, brewing, crafts) requires cash resources 
that some single women (and some married women) do not have. (A study by 
Unni (1992) lends support to this thesis. Using data from rural India, she 
finds that a married woman's decision to become self-employed is dependent 
on her access to capital.) Single women's poor access to capital may in turn 
be the cause of their low income level discussed in chapter 4.
Table 6.18: Percentage of individuals involved in particular activities
(sample size)
Type of activity Men
(169)
Married 
women (169)
Single 
women (71)
Casual worker 6.2 8.8 10.3
Permanent wage worker 4.5 0 0
Skilled wage worker 6.2 0.7 0
Artisan/little capital 21 .5 32.4 11.5
Artisan/more capital 14.9 6.8 4.6
Agriculture/no capital 29.1 31 .1 56.3
Agriculture/capital 9.3 6.8 0
Small-scale trading 6.9 13.5 17.2
Source: Kauga/Ngogwe survey.
The data on average profit/wage rates for different types of activity, 
unfortunately suffer due to small sample bias. The rates for agricultural
self-employment are unlikely to be accurate given the problem of obtaining
good data on the number of hours spent on the produce that is sold, as
opposed to that which is for domestic consumption. Despite these
weaknesses, as might be expetrted, capital-intensive activities and skilled 
wage work generally offer higher rates per hour than uncapitalised 
activities or casual wage labour (Table 6.19).
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Table 6.19: Average profit/wage rate per hoar from particular category of 
activity by gender and marital status
Category Men (169) Married women 
(169)
Single women 
(71)
Casual wage worker 310 840 460
Skilled wage worker 680 (3,300) -
Permanent wage worker 360 - -
Artisan/Little capital 860 790 540
Artisan/More capital 1 ,320 440 190
Agriculture/No capital 740 2530 1 ,890
Agriculture/Capital 900 2550 -
Trader 830 520 180
Average total hours per 
month
199.7 93.6 72.9
Source: Kauga/Ngogwe survey.
In rural areas, there is a much greater reliance on activities with no cash 
inputs. In urban area, greater opportunities and higher returns enable 
higher levels of capitalization. There is also a greater demand for casual 
labourers and more opportunities for trading, as might be expected. Tables 
6.20 and 6.21 look at the involvement of married women and men according to 
the area.
Table 6.20: Percentage of married women involved in particular work category 
by area (sample size)
Work Category Rural
(46)
Urban
(123)
Casual wage labour 6.9 13.3
Skilled wage labour 0 1 .2
Artisan/little capital 44.8 28.9
Artisan/more capital 0 7.2
Agriculture/no capital 37.9 24.1
Agriculture/capital 0 9.6
Trader 10.3 15.7
AVERAGE WAGE RATE 1 .22 1 .34
Source: Kauga/Ngogwe
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Table 6.21: Percentage of men involved in particular activity by area
Work Category Rural Urban
Casual wage labour 7.9 13.5
Permanent wage labour 2.6 11 .4
Skilled wage labour 5.2 10.4
Artisan/little capital 63.2 31 .3
Artisan/more capital 13.2 30.2
Agriculture/no capital 81 .6 36.5
Agriculture/capital 7.9 13.5
Trader 18.4 13.5
source ": Kauga/Ngogwe ' surveyT
6.6 Conclusion
To what extent do the data substantiate the claims made by respondents in 
the first part of this chapter? 10% of men do prevent their wives from
working - in the wealthier sections of the sample it was nearly as high as
30%. Preventing a wife from working can be interpreted as clear attempt to 
restrict a woman's access to money and the ability to accumulate assets. 
Married women do own fewer assets, fewer than even single women who do earn
a lower level of income. It would appear that for a married woman, earning
money for the household and children is more acceptable than accumulating 
assets.
A married woman with assets and therefore independent economic means is an 
affront to her husband's honour. Even with their husband's approval, once 
participating in the cash economy, women face further obstacles - a lower 
wage/profit rate, poorer access to capital and fewer opportunities. They are 
more likely to involved in casual labour, non-capitalised agriculture, low 
capitalised artisanal work and roadside trading than men.
Both social attitudes towards women, their potential wealth and economic 
activity, and the market segmentation affect women's access to resources, 
and therefore determine intra-household allocation and household outcomes.
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7RENEGOTIATING THE CONJUGAL CONTRACT: 
HOUSEHOLD EXPENSES, CONTRIBUTION AND CONTROL
Guyer (1988) outlines the history of budget studies in Africa, showing how 
the initial preoccupation with documenting the wages of men in the formal 
sector and their household expenditures ignored the majority without formal 
jobs and other sources of household income. Many writers have now documented 
the marginalisation of women and their economic activities. However, the 
inclusion of women does create a methodological problem. The acceptable 
approach has become to collect data from both spouses (unfortunately rarely 
carried out because of the expense), assuming that resources are 
individually controlled. Men and women often have separate economic 
activities, both of which have to be accounted for. They also have 
different priorities and agendas for the purposes of expenditure, yet their 
expenditure patterns are interrelated (Guyer 1988). The division of labour 
between home production, domestic work and cash-generating activities are by 
definition interdependent. Changing circumstances can lead to a redefining 
of the conjugal contract - of rights and obligations to one another. Budget 
studies are rarely able to capture the shifting interrelationships.
The original aim of budget studies, conducted by the colonial authorities in 
the 40s and 50s, was to document the absolute levels of living at the bottom 
of the wage scale as a basis for commentary and reform, with the purpose of 
highlighting the wage/price relationship. The subjects of such studies were 
working-class men with dependent families. Out of this research grew the 
image of the 'breadwinning' man handing over his wage packet to his 
dependent wife who was responsible for household management. Such a unit was 
seen as completely interdependent - individual priorities were submerged in 
the greater whole. It is the interest in feminism that has led to the 
dismantling of this image.
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the extent to which women's 
increasing involvement in economic activities has led to the renegotiation 
of men and women's rights and obligations to one another. The particular
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area of the conjugal contract under the spotlight is the organisation of 
household finances - what are the contribution shares, and who has control 
of the income? The first section will outline the research on allocation of 
household finance from developed countries. Numerous studies have been done 
in developing countries using the theory developed in the first world as 
framework, and they reveal the extent of applicability of such an exercise.
The second section will look at the type of budget systems used by the 
respondents in the fieldwork area. The third part will examine evidence 
from focus group discussions about the social norms that surround the 
decision to contribute to the household in Uganda. The fourth part will 
discuss the data collected in the Kauga/Ngogwe survey on the percentage 
shares of spousal contribution and their determinants.
7.1 Household Budget management
In the 1970's a considerable body of UK research established the association 
between money and power in marriage (Blood and Wolfe 1960, Safilios- 
Rothschild 1970, Gillespie 1971, Cromwell and Olson 1975). The attention 
shifted in the 1980s to examine in more detail the financial arrangements 
used to manage the household income. Pahl (1983) suggests a classification 
consisting of four different possibilities: whole wage system (husband gives 
wage to wife who makes the decisions about household needs); allowance 
(husband gives wife an allowance for household expenses); shared management 
(common or partial pool); and independent management (separate income and 
budgets). There are problems in using any classification system. Each of 
these 'systems' is only a one point on a continuum. Campbell et al (1995) 
argue that the use of typologies can lead to assumptions of homogeneity of 
custom and practice across the community. Often a change in the household 
structure - for example the addition of a new member - can lead to changes 
in the negotiating process. Careful research is required to deal sensitively 
with the complexity of the situation.
From the UK research, Pahl highlights three factors that can affect which 
general type of system is used within a household: the level of household
income, source of income (who is the earner), and normative expectations 
about the allocation of income. The whole wage system is common among poor 
households, but as household income rises other practices are used. The 
level of income operates in conjunction with the identity of the earner. If 
the wife earns and the household income is low, the funds are either managed 
by the wife or jointly by both husband and wife. If the wife is earning and 
the household income is high the management of the funds tends to be either 
joint or independent with each managing her/his own income. If the wife does 
not work and the income level is high, the husband may organise the
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household budget alone. There appear to be two trends operating here - if 
a wife earns she is likely to have more control over the household budget, 
and as total income rises the husband is playing a greater role. Several 
writers have pointed out that if managing money is a question of allocating 
shortages and making ends meet, it is often a chore that is allotted to the 
wife. (Given the fact that women are normally concerned with the day-to-day 
running the household, this is probably the most' efficient solution.) 
Purchasing extra-budgetary items is the responsibility of the husband. A 
third determinant is the normative views that shape the individual1s 
expectations. In Pahl1s research husbands were viewed as rightfully in 
control of family finances and wives subordinate because of this. This view 
may be held by a working woman. A wife's inclination towards deference may 
not necessarily be affected by the experience of work and earning an income.
Campbell et al (1995) examine the relevance of this typology for an urban 
community in Dar es Salaam. Their results show neither the whole wage nor 
the common pooling system being used. The allowance system is very common, 
and independent management occurs when the wife has her own income and is 
relatively independent. Partial pooling is used if partners are of a similar 
social status.
Munachonga (1988), working in Zambia, again did not report households using 
a whole wage system. The allowance is most common, with husbands retaining 
their own spending money and providing an allowance that, according to the 
wives was inadequate. Working wives are able to reduce the level of 
conflict over money by being able to use their own income to buy extra items 
without having to ask their husband. However, Munachonga raises the issue of 
whether husbands reduce the allowance once their wives are working, 
expecting her to make up the shortfall. Both separate budgets and pooling 
arrangements were used by wealthy households, as in Pahl's results. A 
fourth arrangement not mentioned by Pahl is much more autocratic - the 
husband retains his income and gives out small amounts for specific 
purchases. The wife has to request each payment, presumably explaining what 
each sum is for. The wife cannot choose how to allocate the money, nor does 
she have any personal spending money, and as a result her activities are 
severely limited by her husband.
Much of this discussion assumes that there is a link between the budget 
systems and the level of control exercised by each spouse. This can probably 
be deduced under the autocratic system and perhaps the whole wage system, 
but rarely for the others. Under the allowance, separate and joint budget 
systems the level of control can vary. It is the actual contribution shares 
that determine financial power - the size of the allowance and the 
proportion that the husband retains, the proportion of total income that the
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wife earns, the proportion of the pool that the wife spends. The pooling or 
joint system implies some level of equality simply by the choice of
terminology, rather than proof of its existence. Work by Pahl and Vogler
(1994), supported by evidence given by Munachonga (1988) suggests that the
control over the pool is unlikely to be equal.
The link between women earning an income and their control over the 
household budget is problematic and complex. Engels was perhaps the first to 
point to this link in a broader sense by suggesting that as women enter the 
productive economy their status is likely to rise. Peters (1995) makes the 
point that it was in response to such claims that much of the literature on 
women's double burden (domestic and paid work), segmented labour markets and 
persistent ideologies emerged, suggesting that there are many obstacles that 
women face. Yet there are numerous examples that provide evidence that 
women's power/control does increase with earning an income. Ako (1995) notes 
an increase in women's participation in decision-making as a result of the 
seaweed project in Zanzibar, Tripp (1989) documents how the economic crisis 
in Tanzania forced women to find alternative sources of income, which has 
led to a higher level of independence and autonomy. Caplan (1995) shows 
the weakness of women who have no independent income. 1 Using data from 
Thailand, Shultz (1990) shows that women's unearned income, but not men's 
unearned income, is associated with women's fertility levels. Doss (1996) 
suggests that this can be interpreted as women's unearned income shifting 
their bargaining power - that women's contribution to household wealth can 
effect negotiations in other spheres such as fertility.
However, there are examples of husbands appropriating wives' income. For 
instance, Blumberg discusses the impact of a project in Guatemala involving 
women where payment is made on a monthly basis only to the husband (Blumberg 
1988). There is evidence that in some cases husbands will reduce the level 
of the allowance, once a wife is working (Munachonga 1988, Hoodfar 1988).
Vogler and Pahl's 1993 article tackles the question of whether women's 
increasing participation in the labour market has led to a greater equality 
in household financial arrangements directly. The study compares the 
financial arrangements used by different age groups, and examines the change 
in financial arrangements when there is a change in work status. The 
results suggested that there was a shift away from the allowance system to 
some form of pooling of income, both amongst the younger generation and when 
an individual woman starts work. However, only a small proportion of the 
pooling systems used were egalitarian. The majority were controlled by one 
or other spouse. The authors argue that the wife-managed pool and the
1
(Also see Obbo 1980, Oppong 1981, Fapohunda 1978, Roldan 1988).
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allowance system represent systems of inequality because the wife is having
to meet her own needs and those of the household out of a limited budget,
whereas the husband is controlling the extra-budgetary items. They conclude 
that for greater equality the stereotypical roles of husband as the 
'breadwinner' and wife as 'housekeeper' need to be challenged.
This conclusion is supported by Engle's observations from the perspective of 
psychology (Engle 1990). She states that psychologists have been concerned 
about the effects of the role and status changes associated with women 
becoming major contributors, and possibly the main providers to the 
household budget. It may be so difficult to assimilate these changes that 
women may cease to earn an income. 2 This suggests that a renegotiation of 
the conjugal contract is necessary to enable a woman to continue earning an 
income without destabilizing the current identities, rights and obligations. 
This renegotiation may in itself be an important factor that allows a shift 
in the power balance.
As suggested above, research that examines the actual contribution to 
household income appears to establish a closer link with control over 
income, than does the budget systems literature. Campbell argues for the 
need to move away from typologies of budget systems to the specific details 
of actual contribution to household expenditure, but is unable to provide
such data within his study (Campbell 1995).
Roldan (1988) categorises the subjects of her study according to their
contributions to the household, and makes some general points about 
similarities in the spousal relationships of those households within the 
same contribution group. Where the wife is contributing less than 40%, and 
the husband is fulfilling his obligations, the wife appears to be in a
weaker position. This group of women are conscious of their low earnings 
that prevent them from assuming a more dominant economic position. They tend 
to be unable to insist that the husband disclose information about his 
earnings, nor to influence the level of his personal spending. The husband
has control over her activities - whether she can work outside the home, or
visit friends and relatives.
On the other hand, women who contribute more than 40% appear able to escape 
their husbands' strict control. Husbands are less likely to control their 
activities, and women are more likely to decide about contraception, the 
number of children the couple will have, and when they will have sex. The 
husband will not necessarily know her whereabouts when she is working, and 
she is able to make her views known even if this involves 'answering back'.
This was the case amongst some of the miners' families during the 1964-5 miner's strike in the north of England.
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This level of autonomy may create some conflict, with husbands threatening 
to withdraw economic support, and may lead to violence.
Wives who contribute over 40% and whose husbands are no longer fulfilling 
their financial obligations assume nearly complete independence. They no 
longer respect their husbands and will go out without asking permission. 
They may not wash, iron and cook for him, and may be willing to resort to 
foul language and violence in conflicts. This group contrasts with 
relatively high earning women whose husbands are fulfilling their 
obligations, who remain submissive in order not to challenge the husbands' 
role/identity. These husbands may attempt to control a wife's income, or at 
least insist that the wife does not 'show off her economic independence, 
forcing him to lose face. It is this kind of information that gives a clear 
picture of the 'balance of power' in a relationship, rather than a 
categorisation of the different type of budget systems. The following 
section will discuss the budget systems used by the respondents - their 
description of household financial arrangements portrays a vivid picture of 
the decision-making process. The last section will look at the actual 
contributions.
7.2 Budget management in Uganda
During the focus group discussions in Kauga/Ngogwe three general types of 
'budget systems' were described: 'autocratic management' with or without
discussion, 'allowance system1 and the 'independent management'. The 
respondents' attitudes, revealed in the descriptions of each system given 
below, provide an indication of the distribution of decision-making control 
within each budgetary system. It is argued that these attitudes suggest 
that greater equality exists when a woman has (is allowed to have) her own 
source of income.
In an ’autocratic management1 system the husband retains his income, not 
revealing to his wife the amount he has earned. When something needs to be 
purchased, the wife informs him, and he gives her the specific amount 
required or purchases it himself (or simply refuses).
Respondent 1 : "Some husbands, we (wives) have not known the
arrangements of money in the home. Because when he gets his money, it 
is here (in his pocket). When you tell him that there is no salt, he 
gets 200 Ush for salt and gives it to you, or he buys it."
Respondent 2: "You can tell him, and he decides not to buy and he says 
that he does not have money, and he keeps quiet. You have told him, 
but he has refused to buy." (Zitwe Women's FGD)
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The following respondent gives a colourful description of the frustration 
she feels.
"The men, in our homes, know that a woman from time immemorial is the 
one who is supposed to tell him that there is no salt. We are the 
ones who humble ourselves before them. "Please there is no salt". He 
responds: "Why do not you go to the neighbour and ask for some. Mrs So 
and So came here to ask for salt last time." (All respondents laugh).
Then you go when you are annoyed to Mrs So and So to ask for salt. 
How long will the process continue? Just because you are the one who 
has the responsibility of telling him that your 'kadde' 3 is too old, 
you have to make sure it is gets very old and in rags and your breasts 
move out, then he realises that you need 'kaade'." (Zitwe Women's FGD)
It is only when he becomes embarrassed, that the husband feels the need to 
spend money on his wife's clothes. Inter-household exchanges-in-kind are a 
means of coping with an irregular household income. But it can create 
conflict between husbands and wives. When a husband has purchased a can of 
paraffin, a wife may 'lend out1 a substantial proportion of it in order to 
maintain reciprocal links with other women. The husband may simply see the 
household's store of paraffin disappear at an unusual rate, without being 
aware of the small 'loans' that come back in return.
Several respondents argued that it was necessary for the husband and wife to 
come to some agreement on which items should be bought. Some informants felt 
that the husband should still retain control of the money, but discussion 
was necessary to decide what should be bought. The following comments are 
in response to the question: 'Do husbands and wives share money?'
"You sit down and discuss your budget: 'What would you like?' 'I
would like a pair of shoes.' 'How is this child's position?' 'He 
owes this much in school fees.' 'Do we have sugar, etc.' You make a 
budget and take the money you have got and go and buy things. So that 
is how we share money. It (sharing) does not mean that if we get 
50, 000 Ush, he will say: 'Here, wife, have 25,000 Ush and I'll keep
25,000 Ush.' It does not happen that way, because the wife will not 
have to buy anything (it is not her responsibility) , unless you tell 
her to go and buy herself a dress. If you give her the money she will 
take all of it and put it away or use it for something else, yet you 
have to look for this and that to maintain the home." (Kirangira Men's 
FGD)
Every day dress; literal meaning: old or worn out.
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The implication is the husband is responsible for consumption decisions. 
The second part of the quotation is open to two interpretations. If the 
wife is given money she will spend it on her own personal needs or save it, 
either because that is her allotted role, or she is unwilling to contribute 
her share of the income to the household. The latter explanation implies 
that there is not much of a consensus, despite the discussion.
The following respondent describes the 'allowance system'. The husband hands 
over a portion of his income to the wife. The wife is then responsible for 
the majority of household expenditures- The respondent argues this is 
favourable to the husband retaining control, where the wife cannot plan 
consumption effectively. Disputes are less likely to occur if both husband 
and wife know how much income there is available.
"My wife, she is the one to clear matters at home as long as we 
understand each other. She also has the responsibility to 
handle the money as she sees fit, because, if I handle it she 
will hear that ah Waiswa (respondent) has already gone to
Sekandi's to drink. So I give her a chance so she can handle 
that cash. I can also say to her: 'My friend, give me SOOUSh so
I can go to Mr Sekandi's So when she says: 'The money is
spent', I know the money is actually spent. Rather than it
being that I go and sell and put the money in my pocket. She
tells me: 'We have no match box'. I touch into my pocket and
give her 50Ush. If I say later on: 'I do not have any money',
she will say: 'But when I asked you for 50 USh you gave me. So
you should still be having money.'" (Namubiru Men's FGD)
The phrase 'as long as we understand each other' indicates the agreement and 
co-operation required for this arrangement to work. The husband needs to be 
confident that his wife is going to use the money on items he believes to be 
necessary.
Other respondents argue for an 1 independent management' system. The husband 
and wife both earn their own income over which they have control. The
following respondent argues that allowing your wife to have her own spending 
money will relieve the tension and may reduce the wife's need to use
underhand ways of obtaining money.
"What I think about the home, is we both should be equal. Let the 
wife have her side which she controls as she has a little money, which 
will prevent her from selling things you have worked on together. And 
you, the husband, also have some money; both of you have money and a
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bag in which you each put your money. If you (the husband) are 
responsible for everything, it encourages the wife to want to 'steal' 
your coffee and sell it. But if you discuss things together, there is 
no reason why the wife won't run things well in the home." (Kirangira 
Men's FGD)
This respondent has a much clearer sense of the importance of discussion, 
and of reaching some mutual agreement. If a husband imposes his will, the 
wife may attempt to achieve her objectives in a devious manner.
There was no evidence to suggest that spouses pooled their income in an 
egalitarian manner. There appeared to be nearly a unanimous response of 'No1 
in the focus group discussions to the question whether spouses knew one 
another's earnings. Division of responsibility for certain items of 
expenditure appeared to the main means of sharing responsibility and 
control.
The difference between these systems is the degree to which women are 
involved in both household cash management and the wider cash economy. 
Differing levels of incentives to encourage accountability and co-operation 
exist in each of the budget management systems. In the ' autocratic 
management1 system, the husband is the sole earner, and the wife's 
involvement in household decision making is to .inform the husband that 
certain items need to be bought. There is no incentive for the husband to 
account for his consumption decisions to his wife. Without resorting to 
theft or other devious means, the wife has to abide by the husband's 
decisions. The 'allowance' system requires more cooperation. The husband is 
still the main income earner, but he has decided to make his wife 
responsible for the majority of expenditure decisions. If a wife cannot 
provide the husband with some spending money, presumably she would have to 
explain why. Or if she should run out of money without meeting all the 
expected household needs, the husband may want to know where it has gone 
before he provides any more. But she is able to manage the household budget.
In the 'independent management' system both spouses are earning and are able 
to make their expenditure decisions independently. If the benefits of 
living together are not to be lost, some degree of negotiation and 
compromise will have to occur. This is particularly true with public 
household goods. Each spouse can either spend on public or private 
consumption.4 One spouse can precommit to private expenditure, in an attempt 
to force the other to spend more on public goods. Without some agreement on 
how the responsibility should be shared, insufficient funds may be left for
Public household goods are those that are used jointly by household members, eg pans, jerry cans, tables, chairs* 
Private goods are those that are only used by an individual, eg clothes, shoes, hairdressing, beer.
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public goods.
This evidence supports Pahl's claim that the source of household income (who 
is the earner) affects the budget system used. It also suggests that the 
level of contribution may be important for determining the balance of power. 
If, as was argued in chapter 4, female participation rates are increasing, 
it is likely that their control over domestic finances is rising.
7.3 The social norms of contributing to household expenditure
Much of the discussion above relies on men's description of how the 
household finances are organised. There was an assumption by the 
respondents that men had a duty to contribute financially to the household.
But this was not the case for women. The extracts below recount women's 
attitudes towards contributing their own income to household expenses.
One female informant recalled a time when it was a husband's responsibility 
to earn the income and the wife could expect him to provide all cash 
purchases.
"The past times, the times I remember, the law (right) of the woman 
was to be looked after like a child. You would look to the man for 
everything that he would give you. From shoes up to everything. But 
today, it seems that to buy household goods, a man touches himself 
(buys), and I also touch myself." (Llwanyonyi Women's FGD)
Approximately half of the married women, who do not earn any income, are
still dependent on their husbands for all cash purchases. The following 
exchange reveals how who meets necessary household expenditure has become an 
issue for debate. The second respondent felt strongly that a woman should
share the responsibility with her husband.
Respondent 1 : "He must buy things. It is his responsibility to buy
things in the home."
Respondent 2: "Also the woman has responsibilities. You can also buy 
such things for the home. Let me say we buy them for the home and we 
use them together." (Zitwe Women's FGD)
Some women expressed resentment that a husband should force a wife to spend 
her income on household items. The following respondent claims that men do 
not want women to 'develop1.
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"Most men especially from this way, they have to peep around, even 
though what you are doing is as small as a needle. He may not want 
you to develop, so he will tell you that: "Get some of your money,
and also buy." " (Zitwe Women FGD)
This respondent clearly believes it is not her responsibility to purchase 
household items.
Others are critical of women who, once they are earning, do not contribute 
to the home. Instead she invests her money in property 'outside' - normally 
at her parental home - and neglects her children and household 
responsibilities. Saving outside the marital home can provide security on 
divorce. This respondent feels that it is important for women to do both - 
save money for their own use and contribute to the home.
"The man might allow the woman, let me say, to do business. But when 
she feels that she has got money, she does not look after her home. 
She arranges outside (setting aside property) that is why most men 
get annoyed. Yet at home the man may not have money. The woman does 
not look after the home. The children are not given things. Yet he 
allows her to do all the business. For me I say, if a man has given
you money you can arrange outside while you also look after the home."
(Llwanyonyi Women’s FGD)
Obbo (1980) in her study of Bugandan women shows that a majority of women 
save separately from their husbands. One of her informants states that it is 
only educated women who save jointly. 5 Ako examined the impact of a seaweed 
project on Zanzibar and states that 'women claim that they build houses as 
assets and security against divorce, and also for their children' 
(1995:171). Guyer cites two examples of studies that document women saving 
for divorce. Akan women may set up cocoa farms to provide economic security 
(Hill 1975:131, cited in Guyer 1988). Hausa women purchase small livestock
that is safe from confiscation by husbands (Hill 1972:317, cited in Guyer
1988). Fapohunda (1988) also cites two examples of studies that suggest that 
a wife's decision not to pool her resources is a rational decision to avert 
risks or to invest in indigenous insurance (Lewis 1977, Karanja-Diejomaoh 
1978, cited in Fapohunda 1988).
Other women argued that it was not possible for women to neglect their 
children while accumulating wealth elsewhere.
"You go and work so that you can have something. But when he sees
Apparently there was a sarcastic edge to her voice implying that the husbands of educated women are spending their 
^aint savings, perhaps on other women.
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that you have done something, eeeh, even an older person will be the 
one who will give him these thoughts. 'Do not allow her to work.
She will take it to her father's home. ' . . (But ) that cannot happen.
For example, when you have your brother's child and your own child, 
whose fees do you first pay at school? You first pay your child's 
fees. But some men do not understand that. Yet it helps (for a woman 
to earn) because it helps the home." (Zitwe Women's FGD)
Women's ability and willingness to contribute to the household appears to be 
determined by a delicate balance of trust on both sides. The husband will 
allow her to earn income if he is sure she will contribute to the home, and 
not store items she has bought at her parental home. The wife will 
contribute if she is sure she will not lose control and will therefore 
benefit from her income, either through confiscation or on divorce. It 
would appear that this trust is essential for the household to prosper.
In a discussion with an urban Ugandan (who worked as a researcher at Kampala 
University and whose wife was a telephonist at a polytechnic) he revealed 
that his wife refused to contribute to household expenditure. According to 
him, she reserved her income for her clothes and hair. She was unwilling to 
contribute something to starting a small business. He expressed frustration 
at his wife's unwillingness to combine their resources for, as he saw it, 
the benefit of the whole household. She may have felt that in combining 
their resources she would lose some control over her income. The couple had 
two children but were not married. She wished to get married but only if 
the husband could provide a European-style wedding dress, a Mercedes Benz to 
travel to the church and a wedding cake. It was a source of great pride that 
her husband should be able to provide all the necessary regalia, and perhaps 
a sign of his commitment to her. He saw such an expense as a waste, and 
refused. Since the conversation the couple have separated.
In this particular example there seems to have been a mismatch of 
expectations as to the roles each spouse would play. The husband perceived 
it to be the responsibility of both spouses to contribute financially to all 
areas of expenditure; the wife preferred to retain the gendered allocation 
of responsibility. To sustain co-operation, there has to be agreement about 
who should play which role to prevent misunderstandings, and this is 
particularly difficult when the social norms are undergoing change.
The extent to which a husband contributes to the household is a matter of 
great pride to the wife. This is especially true for women of polygamous 
households. There is an enormous amount of jealousy expressed in terms of 
what the husband has brought home, whether it be a new dress or meat, and 
whether one wife is being favoured above another.
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The following respondent describes how his wife threw away the vegetables
that he had brought home for supper one night, because she felt these were
not good enough. She knew he had received his salary and was angry that he 
had not brought meat.
"Perhaps what I would say is that our women have not got to the
standard where we can show them where we put our money, because if she
sees money she desires meat. When I was still in the forces (army) I 
bought a basket of bitter tomatoes, but my wife threw them away
because she knew we had got our salary. In other words she refused to
eat or cook them because in the barracks she had heard that we had
got our salary and the other soldiers were having a good time. She
thought I had just refused although I had got money. From that time, 
I learnt, and I had my way of confusing her so that even if I had got 
money or not, I would buy things." (Ttakkajjunge Men's FGD)
Women's involvement in the cash economy has led to greater incentives for 
men to reach some degree of consensus with their wives. In order to
encourage women to put their income towards household expenditure, husbands 
have to be prepared, firstly, to allow the decision-making process to be a 
more joint affair and, secondly, to convince her that should the marriage 
end in divorce, she will not leave empty-handed. But both men and women 
have something to lose from reaching an equitable compromise. As was shown
in the last chapter, being in control of the household income is seen by men
as being the source of their authority. By sharing that control, they lose 
some of that authority. For women, on the other hand, with increased
economic freedom comes increased responsibility for household expenditure.
It is 'traditionally' the man's responsibility to make all cash purchases, 
and it is in women's interest to maintain this gendered allocation of 
responsibility so that she is free to spend her income on private 
consumption. As a result both men and women face incentives to keep their 
income secret. The remainder of this chapter will look firstly at secrecy, 
and secondly, at the actual level of women's contribution to recurrent 
expenditure and consumer durables, as given by the data.
7.4 Secrecy
There are substantial incentives, particularly for women, to be secretive 
about their income and assets, given the sanctions against women earning 
'too much' money or owning assets. The following respondent admits that she 
and her husband hide their income from one another. This situation appears 
to be very common.
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Respondent 1 : "It is hard for me to know what is in his pocket
(income) . Even at times when he gets money, I do not know where he 
keeps it. He does not show you, he hides it."
Moderator: "Does he know your earnings?"
Respondent 1 : "I also have to hide it, because when he knows that I
have a certain amount of money in my pocket, he will ask me for the 
money, so that I have to spend it on household items and finish it." 
(Zitwe Women's FGD)
Secrecy about income is frequently reported in the literature. In a study 
based in Lagos, Nigeria, Fapohunda finds 80% of wives do not know their
husband's income (Faphohunda 1988). Engle (1990) reports that in a 
Guatemalan town, from a sample of 300 women, 41% reported that their
husbands did not know how much they earned. In study of Mexico city, Roldan 
reports that 45% of women do not know what their husband earn (Roldan 1988).
By being secretive about their income, spouses do not have be accountable to 
one another for their consumption decisions. If a husband or wife reveals 
his/her income, their spouse may lay claim to that money. If a wife knows 
her husband has a certain amount of money, but does not know how the money 
has been used, she may assume that her husband has another woman.
"If you tell the wife how much you have, and if it gets finished
without her knowing how it was used, (there will be problems) . You 
may lend your friend 100,000 Ush. She no longer can see the capital 
of 1 00,000 and she thinks you have another woman. This brings the
wife to leave the home. That is why, for our business here in the
village, it is not necessary to let the woman know the money you have.
That ended because we no longer have women of good hearts. We no
longer understand each other. You will have a wife who looks that way 
and you look this way." (Ttakkajjunge Men's FGD)
It would appear that the above respondent is not prepared to tell his wife 
he has lent the money to a friend, because there is insufficient trust, and 
his wife will not believe him. Secrecy removes the need to discuss his
decision or be accountable for his actions, or admit that she may have a
greater claim than the friend. Trust is required to come to a mutual
understanding, and secrecy can sometimes be an easier option.
This respondent believes the degree of understanding between husband and 
wife has decreased due to their diverging agendas. But presumably,
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differing objectives have always existed, but until the wife had access to 
cash she had only limited means of pursuing her objectives. As many of the 
respondents argued in the last chapter, money is the source of power. If 
the wife is dependent on the husband to meet all her cash needs, she is less 
likely to challenge his decisions. The increased discord this respondent is 
referring to is the result of greater equality in access to cash, and 
therefore in the balance of power.
Both evidence from the focus group discussions and data collected during the
survey show that, as well as not revealing their income, women are also
buying household goods and land secretly.
Respondent 1: "The women usually buy property in secret."
Moderator: "Why?"
Respondent 1 : "Because if he knows, he will allow you. They (women)
buy them (property) little by little."
Respondent 2: "When I have money I can have them."
Moderator: "Do you buy it openly, and does you husband know?"
Respondent 2: "Aaah (no), he would not know."
Moderator: "Why?"
Respondent 2: "Because if he knows he will take them from me." (All
respondents laugh). (Zitwe Women's FGD)
During the survey, information was collected on two separate cases where 
female respondents had bought land without their husband's knowledge. The 
reason in both cases was that the husband had married a second wife. One 
woman sold beer brewed from the banana plants on her husband's land, saved
sufficient money, and only informed her husband when she moved out. The
second woman had a clerical job and was able to save sufficient funds. In 
both of these cases, the women lived in the wealthier area. Very few women 
have such possibilities open to them.
The survey results show that all women who currently own land in their own 
name also inherited land, and that 5% of husbands did not know that their
wives owned land. (Women were asked whether they currently owned land, and
whether they inherited land. Because of the problems of measurement, data on 
plot sizes were not collected, and therefore it was not possible to tell
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whether any women had increased their land holdings through purchase.) 20% 
of women owned moveable assets (either consumer durables or agricultural 
assets), that were kept outside the marital household. These assets on 
average amounted to a third of the woman's total asset score. And on average 
husbands did not know about 60% of these assets (in terms of value).
To summarise, secrecy occurs for a variety of reasons: a) because of
sanctions against women owning assets; b) to avoid confiscation; c) to avoid 
being accountable for consumption decisions; d) to avoid contributing to 
household expenses. But, in turn, the decision to be secretive about income 
pre-determines the type of possible household budgeting systems. Pooling is 
obviously out of the question in such a situation, and single/autocratic or 
independent management are the only options.
7.5 Contribution shares to household expenditure and assets, and
accumulation outside the marital home
The Kauga/Ngogwe household survey collected data on earnings, contributions 
to recurrent expenditure and household consumer durables. The data are 
examined to see the extent to which men arid women contribute to household 
public goods. It is argued that three factors - the level of education of 
both husband and wife, household wealth and the rural/urban divide - affect 
the extent to which women contribute to household expenses. Attitudes vary 
according to these household characteristics. For example, a more educated, 
urban husband may have more 'liberal' views on whether his wife should be
allowed to earn money and control the income. A wealthy husband may be able
to afford to insist that his wife stay at home. A poorer man may be forced
to allow his wife to earn money in order to meet household needs. Women's
level of education is likely to affect the way they respond. It will affect 
their ability to retain control over assets and their bargaining ability in 
any conflict situation.
This section will first examine the behaviour of three variables: a) the
share of household income earned by the wife; b) the percentage of consumer 
durables that women expect to be able to take with them should the marriage 
end in divorce. This is taken to be an indicator over control of resources; 
c) the ratio of the value of the wife's assets accumulated outside the home
to those inside the home. An understanding of these three variables lays
the groundwork for the rest of the analysis. Secondly, the relationship 
between women's share of income, recurrent expenditure, consumer durables 
and proportion of assets that women have accumulated outside the marital
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home is examined in relation to socio-economic status and education.
Income
The income data collected in the survey includes wage employment, self- 
employment and rental income. The percentage earned by the wife does not 
represent a contribution to the household per se, as it does not convey how 
the income is divided between public and private goods, but it does give an 
indication of the extent to which the wife is able to contribute and 
therefore is an important basis for the following discussion.
As shown in chapter 6 the level of a woman's income is related to the 
husband's attitude to women earning wealth, her access to capital, education 
and location. The following table looks at how the percentage of total 
household income earned by the wife changes according to these and other 
socio-economic variables (Table 7.1).
Table 7.1: Percentage of total household income earned by wife according to 
socio-economic characteristics
Household characteristics Percentage earned by 
'cash earning1 wife
Location Rural (22) 6.6
Semi-urban (74) 19.9
Socio-economic status 
(Housing Index)
Poor (19) 18.8
Middle (40) 14.3
Wealthy (37) 18.7
Husband's education No education (9) 23.4
Primary education (52) 17.5
Secondary education (35) 13.8
Wife's education No education (20) 7.0
Primary education (61) 16.2
Secondary education (14) 34.0
Source: Kauga/Ngogwe survey.
Rural women earn a lower proportion due to fewer opportunities (6% as 
opposed to 20%). Women from the middle ranking households earn a lower 
proportion of household income in comparison with both the poorest and 
wealthiest groups (14% in comparison with 18%). Women from wealthy and from 
poor households earn a similar proportion of household income - the former 
due to the need to supplement household income, the latter due to the
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ability to earn reasonable returns. As male education rises, presumably 
along with their earning power, the women's contribution becomes less 
significant. As might be expected, women's education has a positive effect 
on the their share of household income.
Assets expected to take on divorce
Two measures of assets expected to be taken on divorce are examined in table 
7.2: a) percentage of total household assets6; b) percentage of total
household assets over and above those purchased7. (A negative score indicates 
a wife expects to take less than she purchased, a positive score indicates 
she expects to take more than she purchased where the range is -40% to 
+60%.) Both of these scores only relate to consumer durables and not to 
wealth-generating assets. It is assumed that women contribute to the
household through domestic production to a greater extent than husbands, 
while husbands earn a greater proportion of the cash. An equal division of 
the household assets would result in the wife taking some of those purchased 
with income earned by the husband. This statistic is an indication of how 
confident women feel about their rights over assets within the household. It 
is assumed to represent women's disposal rights over household assets, and 
therefore in some sense is a measure of control over household assets. 8 The 
following table examines how the separation scores changes with other socio­
economic variables.
6
(Value of consumer durables expected to be taken on divorce/value of total household consumer durables)xl00
7
t(Value of consumer durables expected to take - value of those purchased by wife)/Total household consumer durables
A fuller discussion of the construction of this statistic, its interpretation and problems is given in chapter 3.
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Table 7.2: Estimated disposal rights over household assets by socio­
economic variables (sample size)
Household characteristics Percentage of 
total households 
assets expected 
to be taken on 
divorce
Percentage of goods 
above those purchased 
expected to be taken on 
divorce by wife
Location Rural (22) 5.7 0.6
Semi-urban (74) 21 .9 2.8
Socio-economic status 
(Housing index)
Poor (19) 22.6 2.5
Middle (40) 17.3 0.9
Wealthy (37) 16.9 3.8
Husband's education No education (9) 8.5 - 0.6
Primary education (52) 16.5 2.6
Secondary education (35) 23.9 2.9
Wife's education No education (20) 10.2 -1 .8
Primary education 61) 17.9 2.7
Secondary education (14) 31 .5 6.8
Female participation Not earning (42) 12.8 1 .7
Earning (54) 22.4 2.8
Source: Kauga/Ngogwe survey.
Semi-urban women feel able to assert their rights over household assets more 
effectively than rural women. They have disposal rights over a larger 
percentage (22% in comparison with 6%) , and they are also able to take a 
slightly larger proportion of assets purchased by the husband (2.8% and 0.6% 
respectively). Similarly, women who are earning appear to be in a better 
position than those who are not (22% compared to 13%). Higher education of 
both men and women is associated with women having better control over 
resources - women having greater confidence and negotiating abilities, and 
husbands perhaps being more 'liberal'. Women from the poorest and the 
wealthiest households appear to be able to assert their rights over items 
purchased by the husband (2.5% and 3.8%), but those from the middle ranking 
household seem to be in a weaker position (0.9%) . Maybe they are neither 
forced into earning due to the lack of contribution by their husband, nor do 
they have higher expectations of wage/profit levels that result from high 
education that would encourage them to earn. As the household is less 
dependent on the wife's income, she has a lower level of bargaining power. 
(This is corroborated by their lower level of income shown in table 7.1 
above.) It would appear that the Kauga/Ngogwe data supports the claim made 
in the first part of this chapter that contributing to household income can
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affect women's power within the household.
Independently owned assets outside the marital household
These are assets owned by the wife that are kept outside the marital home. 
In the tables below, their value is expressed relative to the value of the 
woman's assets within the home. This ratio is interpreted as the extent to 
which a woman feels the need to keep her assets away from the household, 
possibly away from the control of her husband. 9
Table 7.3: Ratio of value of assets owned by the wife outside the marital 
home to those inside
Household Characteristics Ratio of value of assets 
outside the marital home 
to those inside
Location Rural 24.2
Semi-urban 34.0
Socio-economic status 
(Housing index)
Poor IS.6
Middle 20.0
Wealthy 50.6
Husband1s education No education 23.9
Primary education 53.3
Secondary education 3.8
Wife's education No education 34.1
Primary education 36.5
Secondary education 12.5
Source: Kauga/Ngogwe survey.
Semi-urban residence and higher socio-economic status provide women with 
greater opportunities to accumulate assets outside the household (34% and 
50% respectively) (Table 7.3). Primary education also increases women's 
ability to fund the purchase of such assets (53%) , yet it would appear that 
secondary education reduces the need to accumulate outside, despite the 
probable ability to do so (3.8%). Perhaps with education comes greater 
capacity to discuss and rationalize conflicting views, a more equal balance 
of bargaining power, and as a result a greater level of cooperation. With 
greater confidence in their rights to dispose of household assets, women
9
A fuller discussion of the construction of this variable is given in Chapter 3.
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with secondary education (or women with husbands who have secondary 
education) , feel less in need of the additional security of assets outside 
the home. In contrast, living in a household with low socio-economic status 
means that although women have a higher income share (table 7.1), and as a 
result have better disposal rights over household assets, they have fewer 
opportunities to accumulate assets outside the home (16%).
Public household consumer durables
Public household consumer durables are those items that are used jointly, 
for example, tables, chairs, jerry cans, basins, pans, paraffin or charcoal 
stoves, cupboards, beds, mattresses. A woman's contribution to household 
durables is to some extent dependent on her income level, but it is also 
dependent on the level of the husband's contribution. 10 A woman who earns 
very little may find that because her husband does not provide cash for 
household needs, she has to spend what little money she has on basins, pans 
and jerry cans. A woman with a wealthy husband may have a lower consumer 
durable score than a woman with a poorer husband, despite a higher personal 
income. The consumer durable score also represents the degree to which a 
wife is willing to contribute to the household's assets. It will be argued 
below that this depends on her likely ability to assert her rights over 
assets should the couple part, which in turn, as argued above, is dependent 
on education, household wealth and location.
Recurrent expenditure
In order to obtain an estimate of who contributes to recurrent expenditure, 
female respondents were asked:
*' Whose money normally pays for...food, paraffin, charcoal, school 
fees etc?'11
In the National Household Budget Survey (1989-90) data were collected on 
monthly household expenditure by item. It is presented as the average 
percentage that each household spends on a particular item. Combining these 
percentages with the Kauga/Ngogwe data, the percentage of the household 
recurrent expenditure met by the wife, husband, both spouses, and other
i o
T h e  c o n s t r u c t i o n  o f  s c o r e s  i n d i c a t i n g  t h e  c o n t r i b u t i o n  t o  t h e s e  c o n s u m e r  d u r a b l e s  i s  d i s c u s s e d  i n  c h a p t e r  3 .
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The full list of items was: food, charcoal, woodfuel, paraffin, water, your clothes, husband's clothes, children's 
clothes, school fees, school uniform, school books, school lunch, your transport costs, husband's transport costs, clinic 
bills, hospital bills, rent and electricity.
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individuals was calculated. 12 A score of 50% implies that the wife meets 
50% of the total household recurrent expenditure. (Many households do not 
buy food, but for those that do it is a major expenditure. The sample was 
split into two groups - those that purchased food and those that did not - 
and the scores were calculated separately for the two groups.)
On average, women contribute more to recurrent expenditure (26%), but less 
to consumer durables (15%) than their income share (17%) (Table 7.4). This 
suggests that contribution to recurrent expenditure may be in response to an 
immediate or daily need, whereas the decision to purchase a consumer durable 
is more of a long-term issue and more dependent on likely disposal rights 
over assets.
Table 7.4: Married women's average percentage share of income, recurrent
expenditure, consumer durables and ratio of assets outside the marital home 
(sample size)
Average 
percent 
income share
Average percent 
contribution to 
recurrent expenditure
Average percent 
contribution to 
consumer durables
Average ratio of assets 
outside marital home to 
inside
All women (95) 16.9 26.6 14.9 31 .8
Source : Kauga./'i-igogwe survey.
Table 7.5 examines the impact of socio-economic status on women's 
contributions to recurrent expenditure, consumer durables and assets outside 
the household. It would appear that women's percentage share of contribution 
to both recurrent expenditure and consumer durables falls as the wealth of 
the household rises, despite the same income share in both the wealthier and 
poorer groups. In richer households men are able to meet a larger share, 
and there is less need for woman to contribute. Women in the poorer group 
contribute double their income share to recurrent expenditure (37%), 
probably due to a greater level of household poverty.
Women from the wealthier groups have amassed a significant proportion of 
their assets outside the marital home (50%) - possibly because of their
lower share of household expenses and greater earning potential. Women in 
the poorer households have a lower level of assets (17%), because of their 
higher contributions to the household expenses.
If, in response to the question above, a respondant answered that the wife normally pays for the food, and in the 
BHS food purchases, on average, account for 40% of recurrent expenditure - then, in this case, the wife is responsible for 
40% of recurrent expenditure.
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Table 7.5: Married women's average percentage of total household income 
earned, recurrent expenditure, consumer durables and ratio of assets outside 
the marital home, by socio-economic status of household (sample size)
House index Percentage of 
hh income 
earned by 
wife
Percentage 
contributed 
to recurrent 
expenditure
Percentage 
contributed 
to consumer 
durables
Ratio of value of 
assets outside 
marital home to 
those inside
Poor (19) 18.8 37.1 19.6 16.6
Middle (40) 14.3 24.7 15.9 20.0
Wealthy (37) 18.7 23.5 11 .4 50.6
Source: Kauga/Ngogwe survey.'
Higher levels of female education are associated with higher levels of 
contribution (20% of recurrent expenditure with no education and 30% with 
secondary education) (Table 7.6). There are two possible explanations, which 
may operate concurrently: a) higher education associated with higher incomes 
enables greater contributions; b) as argued above, better education may 
encourage greater cooperation and a more equitable balance of bargaining 
power, so that women are more willing to contribute to household expenses. 
Better education and higher contributions are also associated with fewer 
assets outside the home (2% compared to 34% and 35%).
Table 7.6: Married women's average percentage of total household income
earned, recurrent expenditure, consumer durables and ratio of assets outside 
the marital home, by her education level (sample size)
Women's
education
level
Percentage 
of income 
earned by 
wife
Percentage of 
total 
recurrent 
expenditure
Percentage 
contribution 
of consumer 
durables
Ratio of value of 
assets owned by 
wife outside to 
inside marital hh
None (20) 7.9 20.1 11 .4 34.1
Primary (61) 16.2 27.6 14.3 36.5
Secondary (14) 34.0 30.2 22.9 1 .5
Source: Kauga/Ngogwe""survey.
Women's share of consumer durables also rises with men's education, despite
their falling share in household income (23% to 15%) (Table 7.7). Again the
explanation is probably that wives of educated men may feel able to assert 
their rights over household assets, and are therefore more willing to
contribute and accumulate fewer assets outside.
Women married to husbands with no education appear to make lower
contributions to both recurrent expenditure and consumer durables (17% and 
5%), despite a high income share, and presumably a greater level of poverty
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associated with the lack of education. Perhaps this is due to uncertainty 
about whether they will be able to retain control over assets either during 
the marriage or on divorce.
Table 7.7: Married women's average percentage of total household income 
earned, recurrent expenditure, consumer durables and ratio of assets outside 
the marital home, by the husband's education level (sample size)
Husband's 
education
Percentage of 
hh income 
earned by wife
Percentage 
contribution 
to recurrent 
expenditure
Percentage 
contribution 
to consumer 
durables
Ratio of value of 
assets owned by 
wife outside to 
inside marital hh
None (9) 23.4 17.0 5.2 23.9
Primary (52) 17.5 28.3 13.5 53.3
Secondary (35) 14.8 26.7 19.5 3.8
source r Kauga/Ngogwe survey.
7.6 Conclusion
From this discussion 3 or 4 themes emerge. High socio-economic status is 
associated with women having similar income shares to the poorer group, 
lower contributions but slightly better disposal rights, and a greater 
number of assets outside. Women in households with poor socio-economic 
status make larger contributions and have reasonable disposal rights, but do 
not have the opportunity to accumulate assets outside. The distribution of 
responsibility for meeting household expenditure appears to affect control 
over household assets. Better education of both men and women is associated 
with larger contribution shares from women, better disposal rights and fewer 
assets outside. It would appear that education (of both men and women) 
improves women's economic security so that they do not need to prepare for 
the possibility of being destitute on divorce or losing control of assets 
during marriage, and encourages them to contribute more to the household. 
The need to contribute due to poverty also improves women's position within 
the marriage, despite low education, but it does not allow women to secure 
their own economic future should they need to do so.
This chapter has shown that the approach of bargaining models to use the 
level of income as an indicator of resource control is insufficient. Income 
shares, contribution shares as well as education are all factors that 
determine the balance of power, and the decision-making process.
One final issue should, perhaps, be touched on in this chapter. Do the
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conclusions, from the evidence presented here, lead to broader conclusions 
about the impact of commercialisation/capitalism on women's lives?13 It has 
been suggested here that women's increasing engagement with the market has 
improved their situation by leading to an increase in the proportion of
household income under their control. However, this does not mean that their 
economic future is secure. It would appear that commercialisation on its 
own is insufficient - education is also necessary.
This chapter has not dealt with women's double burden. Commercialisation can 
increase women's work loads considerably. Earning an income does not 
necessarily imply that a woman's domestic chores will be reduced. As
suggested in chapter 2, substitutability of labour within the household does 
not occur easily. Much of the evidence from time use studies indicates that 
if domestic work is included, women work longer hours than men. (The World's 
Women 1995: Trends and Statistics quotes figures for three countries. In
India women work on average 69 hours per week to men's 57 hours, in
Bangladesh women work on average 53 hours a week to men's 46 hours, and in 
Nepal 77 hours and 56 hours respectively (United Nations 1996).) Weatherall 
et al have examined evidence from England and Wales on whether combining 
employment with caring for children had any impact on female mortality 
(Weatherall et al 1994). Their results suggested that mortality had not 
increased, but Higgins and Alderman's results using Ghanaian data show that 
women's nutritional status is affected by long hours of physical labour 
(Higgins and Alderman 1992). It could be argued that the burden of being 
both a major financial contributor to the household, ensuring personal 
economic security should the marriage end as well as being the main provider 
of child care, may have detrimental effects on women's health. Yet the 
evidence presented in chapter 4 indicates that in the Kauga/Ngogwe sample, 
it is single women, with little financial support, who are affected 
nutritionally.
13
Although national census figures quoted above include an increase in female waged employment, few respondents in 
the survey are wage labourers, and therefore cannot be said to be involved in a growing capitalist economy. Many, however, 
are involved in the increasing commercialisation of household production.
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8WOMEN'S DILEMMA: 
CHILD NUTRITION OR ECONOMIC SECURITY
One of the main motivating themes of this thesis is the importance of intra­
household resource allocation for determining welfare outcomes. This chapter 
will discuss how the issues explored in previous chapters impact on child 
nutrition.
The competing priorities that married women face affect the extent to which 
they are able to care for their children. Given paternal custody and that 
most future benefits may accrue to the father, women may be forced to 
consider their own economic security before their childrens1. Particular 
circumstances in Buganda may lead married mothers to have varying levels of 
commitment to children they may see as belonging to the father. There is 
considerable evidence in the literature that women's income has a greater 
impact on child welfare than men's. Explanations that rely simply on the 
universal assumption of maternal altruism are inadequate and are liable to 
miss the cases where women are forced to make children a second rather than 
first priority. Much of the literature suggests that parents discriminate 
between children on the basis of investment decisions for their future 
security. If spouses face different economic futures, do they not 
discriminate between children differently?
The chapter is organised in the following way. The first part will look at 
the evidence from the focus group discussions on how parents view their 
responsibility towards their children. -A variety of issues emerged as 
important: a) how the rights and responsibilities are shared (or not)
between spouses; b) what are the social customs concerning custody of 
children, and does this match reality, and c) women's need to ensure their 
own economic security. The second section will examine the nutritional 
status data collected in the Kauga/Ngogwe survey.
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8.1 Parental rights and responsibilities over children
It has been documented in the anthropological literature that in southern 
and eastern Africa the payment of bridewealth assures paternal rights over 
children. In a survey of marriage customs of the Bantu groups in Southern 
Africa, Kuper recounts the proverb 'Cattle beget children' meaning that it 
is the payment of cattle as a form of bridewealth that gives a husband legal 
right to children (Kuper 1980). Haakansson, in his study of the Gusii in
Kenya, states: 'According to the cultural definition of fatherhood, his
biological children can never be his unless he pays bridewealth.1
(Haakanssan 1988: 141)
A husband is entitled to divorce a barren wife, because her part of the 
bargain has not been fulfilled. In response to the question of what
issues lead to separation, one respondent gave the following answer.
"Not producing (children) . When a woman does not produce, the man 
will chase you away, and he will say he cannot remain with you. 'You 
are eating my food for nothing. You are just filling the toilet.1' 
(Zitwe Women's FGD)
Kisekka (1973) quotes a proverb from Buganda: 'Losing all the way, like
paying for a barren and lazy wife. 1 A wife has two functions - producing
children and working. If a man pays for a wife who does neither, he has
'lost out.1
There is another Bugandan saying: 'Women do not have children' implying
that women are effectively purchased to give birth to children for men, not 
themselves.
"If you are taking them, are they yours? We just give birth."
(Kirangira Women's FGD)
A discussion between informants revealed both an acute sense of the
injustice of this situation, along with the belief that men have 'paid' for 
their children and are therefore entitled to custody.
Respondent 1: "[It] is ... oppression. I call it oppression because 
in most cases children should belong to the wife. From the day you 
conceive, your husband has the time to sleep when you are not
i
Digging a pit latrine is a major task.
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sleeping. Your husband has the time to eat. He eats well and drinks 
well,, while you are vomiting [due to morning sickness] . Later, when it 
is time to give birth, you can leave him in the bed asleep, and you go 
to hospital. If he has helped you and taken you to Berna's place [to
deliver] , he leaves you there and he comes back to enjoy himself, or
if he wants to sleep, he sleeps. You might spend the night awake [!] 
until the time God helps you and you deliver. 2 Just imagine [what you 
have done for the child] from the time you have given birth up to the 
time he is a fully grown up person. And when he is at the stage when
you can send him to fetch water, that is when your husband says
that:'Leave my son behind.' That is when ownership begins."
This respondent has pointed out that women provide the care that young 
children need, yet when the child is of an age that s/he is useful within 
the household the father claims his offspring. It is also likely that the
other benefits that arise from having children - bridewealth from daughters,
and income from sons - accrue to the father rather than the mother.
Respondent 2: "Where ownership comes in, we [women] do not have legs.
The legs are for the men, our counterparts. [Women are not able to
support themselves financially.] Once you conceive, you say: ' Give
me money so that I go to the hospital' . He takes care of the 
pregnancy. When it comes to giving birth you say: 'Can I have the
hospital dues. ' He is also the one who gives it to you. After 
delivery: 'Can I have the child's clothes.1 All this means that the
child is not yours. You don't have power over the child. When it 
comes to naming the child: 'Here is the child.' You cannot [even]
give it a name. It is similar to when you buy a dress from a shop. 
You have bought a dress, but it was not you who made it. If you buy 
that dress, it is yours. Therefore, the man also in that sense, will 
have bought the child. That is why the child is not regarded as 
belonging to the mother. When the child goes to school, it is the 
husband who pays the school fees. We can take that man to prison when 
he refuses to pay school fees. In that case, hasn't he bought his 
child? If the child is yours, why don't you have them on your own?" 
(Kirangira Women's FGD)
It is the father's financial contribution, both in the form of bridewealth 
and payment of the children's expenses, that entitle him to custody of the 
children. Little importance is given to the physical care and nurturing 
provided by the mother. This illustrates the differing values that Bugandan 
society places on different types of work. Work that generates cash is
The phrase 'until the time God helps you, and you deliver' conveys something of the dangers of child birth in rural 
areas. The respondent believes that it is only with God's help that you will give birth. Without the benefits of modern 
medicine, mortality rates in childbirth are high.
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perceived to have a greater value than work that does not. 3 This evidence 
suggests that Bugandan women do not consider children as belonging to them.
Custodial rights in reality
The practical implication of strong paternal rights is that on divorce it is 
the father who has custody of the children. 'It is very unusual that men do 
not keep their children after a divorce.1 (Haakanssan 1988:152). 
Respondents in Kauga/Ngogwe expressed the view that the general rule is that 
young children would stay with the mother, but then go to live with the 
father when old enough.
"The children stay with the man, except if a child is still being 
breast fed, and when it is weaned it is taken back to the man." 
(Llwanyonyi Women's FGD.)
In reality the situation seemed to vary considerably. The following 
respondent describes how her husband would respond.
"The children are not mine, they belong to my husband. He can
tell me: "Leave my children and go. Do not go with my
children. ' He can even remove the young child from you: 'Did
you come with these children? The children are mine.'" (Zitwe
Women's FGD)
During a survey interview, one female respondent was in tears. She 
recounted the following tale. Her husband had left her a while ago, and she 
was living in the village with her young son. One of the local council 
officials had told her that day that her son was due for immunisation, and 
that he would take him to the clinic. In fact the official took the child 
to his own house, from where the father collected the child, while the 
survey interviews were being carried out. The official had deceived the 
woman in order to assist the husband to assert his legal right over the 
child. In this case and many others, women are dependent on the support of 
the local community to assert their rights. Without such support women may 
have little control over the situation.
However, one or two men did admit to the amount of work involved in looking 
after a young child.
This respondent has also raised the issue of new legislation that requires the father to pay school fees, even if 
the parents are divorced. It is unlikely that many mothers are able to ensure that the judicial system takes up the case of 
their children. In conversation with the women's secretary (Mary Adugo) on a nearby sugar estate, it was learnt that she had 
been able to do so. Her husband was now living with another woman. She was left with the three children. In order to 
persuade her ex-husband to pay the school fees for her children, she went to the district welfare officer in Mukono. A 
letter was sent threatening jail, should he not pay. The two girls are now at one of the better schools in the area.
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"Most times women do not accept to walk off with the children, even 
there is one who is just sitting. She wants to leave it there. 
Because when she gets there (to where ever she is going) she has a 
plan to get married again. She leaves it and you stay with it; you
will have to find a way to cope. You pick it and take it to your 
sister, or grandparent. When you realise how much work there is, you 
say: 'Eehl this wife truly should not be demeaned.'" (Zitwe Men's FGD)
Another expresses pride in the fact that he has successfully cared for his 
children on his own.
"My wife left me. She left me the children and I have brought them up. 
They have even given me grandchildren. Let that man ask me. There 
they are, standing there. Haven't I brought them up?" (Llwanyonyi 
Men's FGD)
It would appear that in some cases women decide to take their children. The 
female respondents had very differing views as to whether women should, or 
are in a position, to take the children. One respondent expressed the view 
that her own family would not assist her in looking after a child, whom they 
perceived as belonging to another family. Women clearly face major problems 
in taking their children with them.
"It is hard to take those children, whether you go to your brother's 
place or father's place. If the child gets a slight sickness, they 
tell you to take the child to its home. Therefore you are without
peace. The child belongs to the husband, the child is not yours."
(Zitwe Women's FGD)
Another woman argued that because single women are often in economically 
precarious circumstances, the children are better off with their father.
"But how is it possible when you are going from home to home, looking 
for refuge? If you have three or four children, would you take them 
when you have no where to go? Why do you not leave them with the man 
and walk alone." (Llwanyonyi Women's FGD)
Another expressed the concern that if a woman leaves with her children, but 
finds she cannot manage on her own, her husband may refuse to help later on.
"You may want to take them, but when you do not have any support !
And you may decide to go back for help and he refuses. You therefore 
say: 'Let me leave them behind and they stay with their father.'"
1 61
(Kirangira Women's FGD)
An additional concern was if the child should die while living at the 
maternal grandparents, the husband may refuse to allow the child to be 
buried at the paternal homestead.
"They belong to the man. Your husband can tell you: 'You leave my
children behind when you go. ' This is the power we talked of before. 
'If you have gone, and you take my children, and you bring one back, 
when he is dead, you should not bring him back! Leave it there, as 
yours.' If you bury that child at your parents' home, it is not good 
in Buganda."4 (Kirangira Women's FGD)
Many expressed misgivings about how their children would fare if they were 
cared for by a stepmother.
"I would take my children, because their stepmother would be harsh 
with them." (Llwnanyonyi Women's FGD)
Another recounted the tale of her own childhood, and how she was deprived of 
an education by her stepmother.
"I would go with my children. Because my mother left us and our 
father told her to take us and she refused. . . . Whenever our maternal 
uncle said he would take us up and pay for our school fees, our
stepmother would say she would not tie goats, so we grew up tying
goats5." (Llwanyonyi Women's FGD)
The following respondent tells the story of her own child who was beaten so 
severely that his back was broken. Because of this particular experience
this respondent argued very strongly that women should take their children,
whatever their financial situation, instead of leaving the children with a 
stepmother.
"I support the woman who takes her children because of the problems 
the children experience, as mine did. When my husband chased me away, 
he stayed with my child. They beat him and broke his back. I have 
suffered with the child for two years. It is only recently that he 
has got life (stabilized and healed). So I aggree that a woman should 
go with her children, if you are someone who can support yourself and 
your children. But there is no-one who cannot support herself if she
4
The reason behind this social custom was unclear.
5
It is normally the task of children to tether the small livestock.
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have hands. You can work for wages with your children. Even the 
government made it clear for us we can go to the government, and the 
man gives you help through the government welfare officer. So the 
other woman also comes into that home, she also produces her
children." (Llwanyonyi Women’s FGD)6
A male respondent put the other side of the argument.
"A woman is free to go and leave my children here. If she has gone, 
she is free to look for a man, to stay/sleep with her. [If she has the 
children] , she may leave my children with the neighbours and go to a 
man. And yet you [the husband] cannot sleep in the village when you 
have a house, in fact you bring the woman to your children here." 
(Llwanyonyi Men's FGD)
"If my wife [leaves and] finds another man, he won't be interested in
my children. Even if she pressured him to look after her children,
the children won't have peace of mind as if they were with their
father. I say: 'If you are leaving, leave my children here, because I 
know they are my property [actual words used] . ' If you take them, 
fine. I leave them to you, because a bean plant germinates from two 
lobes of a bean seed, and not one.' If they fall into wrong ways and 
are wild, they will be her responsibility." (Ttakkajjunge Men's FGD)
Despite his reluctance this respondent agreed that both parents have rights 
and responsibility for children.
A cruel dilemma: Child's welfare or mother's economic security
It was argued in the last chapter that given the tenuous rights that married
women have over household assets, and their likely impoverishment on
divorce, women are compelled to attempt to accumulate sufficient assets to 
provide some economic security.
"You have to work hard so that you get your own land or house.
Because when you realise that things are tending to be bad, if you
have already prepared your place, you can go and stay there. If you
go to your brother's place, it is your child whom they will accuse of 
stealing the sugar. We have to strive hard to put up our own house, 
in case your husband proves himself to be bad." (Ttakkajjunge Women's 
FGD)
Kisekka (1973) quotes the following Bugandan proverb: 'One who is not the parent makes the child carry a big stone.'
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Chapter 7 discusses the evidence in greater detail, both from the 
Kauga/Ngogwe discussions and survey and other sources, that some women feel 
the need to accumulate assets outside the marital household, beyond the 
reach of a husband. The Kauga/Ngogwe survey showed 20% of married women 
accumulating assets outside the household. More women may wish to accumulate 
outside assets, but were unable to do so.
A central theme of Christine Obbo's study of Bugandan women is their 
constant struggle for economic independence. She cites the following 
quotations from her informants:
"It is better to be married to a man with many wives, because it gives 
each woman more control and autonomy since the man cannot control them 
all. In a monogamous marriage the man claims all your labour. 
Sometimes he even brings illegitimate children home." (Obbo 1980:39)
(Owning land) makes life easy for a woman.... (I)n the event of 
separation or divorce (she) can at least be assured of somewhere to 
go. In the past a woman would go and stay with her brother, but 
nowadays it is not so easy to stay in people's homes" (Obbo 1980:44)
Obbo gives accounts of women earning money while visiting relatives and 
investing it in land or a house for future security. She summarises the 
situation of Bugandan women in the following way:
"While some rural women may have been resigned to their station in 
life as producers of children and food, dependent on men for land, 
status in the community and economic distribution of the fruits of 
their labour, others were doing something about it. These women 
either migrated or tried to make rural life viable by exploiting every 
available opportunity to make themselves economically independent of 
men. Accordingly women were constantly devising strategies for 
achieving some degree of economic autonomy." (Obbo 1980:39)
It would appear that some Bugandan women face a cruel dilemma between 
securing their own future and looking after their children's welfare. In the 
following section statistical evidence is given to suggest that this has an 
impact on children's nutritional status.
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8.2 Nutritional status: The evidence
Physical and socio-economic factors are both important in determining 
nutrition. Often the socio-economic factors provide explanations for the 
physical ones - sanitation, quality and availability of water, provision of 
health services, inoculation and breast feeding practices etc. This chapter 
is concerned with socio-economic factors, in particular women's situation - 
marital status, education, income, control over income, contribution to 
household expenses, working hours - and how these factors determine child 
welfare.
As an introduction to the Kauga/Ngogwe data, this section will firstly 
discuss the comparative data from other sources, the effect of location on 
the results and the linkage between nutritional status and health. The main 
part of this section will then examine the link between women's socio­
economic situation and child nutrition.
Comparative Data
The Ugandan Demographic and Health survey (1988/89) was carried out by the 
Ministry of Health and various other Ugandan organisations, with technical 
and financial support provided by the Institute for Resource Development in 
Columbia, US. Table 8.1 makes a comparison between Kauga/Ngogwe data with 
the DHS data. There are two important differences in the methodologies used 
that affect the results. Firstly, the DHS only collected data on sons and 
daughters of the adult women in the household. No information was collected 
on stepchildren, nephews/nieces or grandchildren. Secondly, the children 
were predominately from rural areas, which reflects the distribution of the 
whole population. (The ratio of rural:urban was 11:1 in the DHS survey). In 
comparison, the Kauga/Ngogwe survey put more emphasis on the semi-urban area 
around Mukono. (The ratio of rural:semi-urban was 1:3). The results, 
therefore, reflect the economically active, peri-urban area.
Both surveys show a relatively high level of stunting. The Kauga/Ngogwe 
survey produced a higher stunting rate than the DHS data for the Mukono 
district. DHS data do not reveal where in the district the sampling was 
done. The district itself stretches from the outskirts of the capital city, 
Kampala, to 200km deep into the rural centre of the country (see map on page 
****) . Jinja, the neighbouring district along the lake shore, recorded a 
much higher rate of stunting (47%), despite having the second largest city.
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Table 8.1: Nutritional status of sons and daughters, comparing Kauga/Ngogwe 
and DHS data, using district and national data (sample size)
Country/D
istrict
Data source Percentage of sons and daughters 
who are....
stunted underweight wasted
Uganda DHS (4078) 44.4 23.0 1 .9
Mukono DHS (190) 19.9 15.3 0.9
Kauga/Ngogwe (252) 32.0 16.0 3.6
Jinja DHS (196) 47.0 21 .8 2.3
Kauga/Ngogwe survey data.
Location
As might be expected, the nutritional status is better in the semi-urban 
areas - due to better health facilities and higher incomes (Table 8.2). 
There is also considerable variation within the two locations. The wealthier 
communities with active current and previous local officials (Kirangira, 
Namubiru and Zitwe) have lower rates of malnourishment. Villages where 
alcoholism was a visible problem have higher rates (Llwanyonyi and Ggunda).
Table 8.2: Nutritional status of sons and daughters, comparing DHS and
Kauga/Ngogwe data, by area (sample size)
Area Village Percentage of sons and daughters 
who are
Stunted Underweight Wasted
Urban DHS (335) 25.3 12.6 1 .0
Peri-urban
Kauga
Kirangira (25) 25.0 12.0 0
Namubiru (25) 20.0 24.0 8.0
Ttakkajjunge (59) 30.5 11-9 3.4
Llwanyonyi (71) 37.7 14.5 2.3
Rural DHS (3743) 46.0 24.0 2.0
Rural Ngogwe Zitwe (40) 30.0 15.0 2.5
Ggunda (31) 41 .9 22.6 6.7
Source: Kauga/Ngogwe survey.
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Health
Poor health can lead to low food consumption and mainourishment. Inadequate 
calorie and vitamin intake can lead to poor health. Information on a child's 
recent state of health was used to construct a health score. If the child 
has had a cough in the last week s/he was given a score of 3, past month a 
score of 2, past two months a score of 1 , or if the child had no cough for 
the past two months a score of 0. Similarly scores are calculated for fever 
and diarrhoea. The total health score is the sum of the three scores 
relating to the three types of illness (cough score + fever score + 
diarrhoea score). Table 8.3 shows a significant association between health 
and nutrition in the Kauga/Ngogwe sample, suggesting there are feedback 
linkages between the two.
Table 8.3: Percentage of children with poor nutritional status by state of 
health (sample size)
Health score of children Percentage of 
malnourished children
Good health 9.6 (52)
Medium health 30.5 (210)
Poor health 36.9 (65)
Chi-squared prob. 0.0028
Source: Kauga/Ngogwe survey.
8.4 Intra-household resource allocation and nutrition
Previous chapters have been concerned with the extent of gender imbalance 
between spouses - control of income and assets, contributions to household 
expenses and division of assets on divorce. This chapter has already shown 
that spouses view their responsibility and rights over children differently, 
partly because of differential control over household resources. The 
following discussion examines the impact on child nutrition. Firstly, the 
link established in the literature between women's income and child welfare 
is discussed, and it is argued that women's control over income and their 
contribution to household expenditure are important parts of this 
relationship.
Secondly, the assumption of maternal altruism in explaining this link is 
questioned. It is argued that women face a variety of competing priorities - 
between different child-related needs (nutrition & education, time & 
income); between different children (sons & daughters, their own children & 
other resident children); between their own economic security and child 
welfare. These competing priorities ensure that the link between women's
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income and nutrition is more complex than is assumed in the literature - 
that child nutrition is not necessarily a first priority.
Women's income and nutrition
There are numerous studies that provide evidence that women's income level 
has a greater impact on child welfare than household income (Engle 1983 - 
Guatemala, Kumar 1978 - India, Mencher 1987 - India, Roldan 1987 - Mexico,
Guyer 1980, 1987, 1988 - Cameroon, Tripp 1981 - Ghana, Thomas 1990 - Brazil.
See Blumberg 1988 for a review). Various explanations have been suggested. 
Blumberg argues that Engel ’ s law is more likely to play a part - the lower 
the income, the greater the proportion spent on food. Given that women's 
income is generally lower than men's, perhaps this induces a different 
expenditure pattern. But the original motivation for Engel's law was that 
each individual needs certain basic necessities to survive, and those items 
will be purchased first and other items with the remaining income. Engel's 
law refers to the proportion that is spent on food, not the actual amount. 
The thesis requires an explanation of why women are prepared to spend a 
higher level of income (and not simply a higher proportion) on life's
necessities than men. His suggestion is that children are a better
investment for women, who have a lower earning potential and are less likely 
to be able to accumulate assets than men.
Engle (1990) turns to psychological theory for an explanation. She argues 
that 'differential spending patterns could depend on differences of 
attachment between the parents and children, on mother's and father's 
proscribed roles (in child care), or on differences in each parent's ability 
to perceive the needs of a child.' This has been called the 'good mother, 
bad father' theory, which Engle claims is an unfortunate misunderstanding. 
Yet this theory does need to be counterbalanced by acknowledging that women 
may face other priorities, or that maternal altruism is not a universal 
constant. For example, Engle discusses evidence from Guatemala that women 
weave mats in order to earn a very small amount of money each day, which 
they use immediately to purchase milk, suggesting that women will go to 
considerable lengths to meet the needs of their children. Yet there may be 
other factors at work as well. If a woman's income is liable to be 
confiscated by a husband, making a purchase immediately may pre-empt loss of 
control of the cash. Women may prefer to engage in an activity that provides 
a small amount on a daily basis, rather than an infrequent/monthly lump sum 
due to the pressures of household daily requirements, and because large sums 
are more likely to attract the attention of a husband.
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In discussing the evidence from India, Harriss (1990) outlines a "general 
thesis that has been borrowed from the female mortality literature - that 
nutritional neglect, leading to mortality, is greatest not amongst the poor 
but those with assets where women are banned from participation in 
productive agricultural work" (Harriss 1990:372). This would suggest that 
women's control over household resources and freedom and ability to meet 
their children's needs as they see fit, rather than any particular link 
between mother and child, is important for nutrition. Evidence from the
northern areas of the Indian continent refutes this thesis. Sen and
Sengupta's study (1983) reveals that gender differences are greatest in 
landless labouring households.
The Kauga/Ngogwe evidence suggests that women's income does have a greater 
impact on child welfare than household income has. But it also suggests 
that women's ability to use their income on children's needs depends on: a) 
whether the time spent working is acting as a negative factor on child care; 
b) the extent to which a husband is meeting other household needs; and c) 
whether women have control over the income they earn. The following 
discussion examines the Kauga/Ngogwe evidence on the effect of these 
factors. Other literature has shown that provision of medical services, 
sanitation, inoculation and breast-feeding practices are crucial to 
nutrition (Alderman 1990, Strauss 1988, Jitta et al 1988). Data were not
collected on these factors, and therefore they do not form part of the
discussion.
Table 8.4 compares the degree of mainourishment in different strata of 
household wealth (housing index), household income and women's income level. 
Only women's income level shows a positive association with nutrition. In an 
overview of the effects of commercialisation of agriculture on nutrition, 
Kennedy (1995) finds that increases in household income are not associated 
with any decrease in child morbidity.7 Her explanation is that wealthier 
households tend to spend a higher proportion of their income on non-food 
items - education, improved housing. Secondly, malnutrition may be endemic - 
wealthier parents may not perceive that there is a problem if their children 
look like everyone else's. And thirdly, parents may not be able to improve 
their children's health significantly with income alone - provision of 
health services and sanitation in rural areas may also have to be improved.8 
In a review of the literature, Casterline et al (1989) come to a similar 
conclusion as regards the weak link between household income and child 
survival.
7
The countries included in the study are the Gambia, Rwandan, Kenya, Malawi, Philippines and Guatemala.
8
The aggregate data may hide an age difference. Evidence from the Gambia suggests that higher income has little 
impact on 0-5 year olds, but a positive impact on 6-10 year olds. In answer to the question - why the younger children are 
not benefiting ? - Kennedy suggests that "because of a generalised anorexia, preschoolers feel satiated before their 'true’ 
calorific needs have been met. It is also not surprising that parents would not assume that children need more food if the 
children have indicated that they have had enough food." (Kennedy 1995:98)
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Table 8.4: Percentage of children with poor nutritional status by socio­
economic status of household, household income and women's income (sample 
size)
Socio­
economic
status
Percentage of 
malnourished 
sons and 
daughters
Household income 
per month (Ush )
Percentage of 
malnourished sons 
and daughters
Women's income 
per month
Percentage of
malnourished
S&D
Healthy 23.9 (67) 100,000 & above 37.2 (43) 10,000 & above 21.4 (42)
Middle 27.6 (87) 20,000 - 100,000 22.2 (72) 100-10,000 24.6 (65)
Poor 25.0 (92) 0-20,000 20.6 (68) No income 26.9 (93)
Source! Kauga/Ngogwe survey.
The negative association between household income and nutritional status in 
the Kauga/Ngogwe results needs discussion. If the households with under­
nourished children are examined separately within each income class, a 
possible explanation emerges. In the high household income class, mothers of 
the poorly nourished children contribute 42% of recurrent expenditure in 
comparison with 20% for the better nourished group, when the average 
percentage of household income earned by the wife is 6% and 23% 
respectively. Despite having a high household income, mainourishment appears 
to be related to the fact that the wife is having to meet a large proportion 
of the household expenses out of a very low proportion of the income. (This 
is confirmed by table 8.5 below.)
Kennedy argues that "female-controlled income has a positive and significant 
effect on household food intake in many cases. Female-controlled income is 
more likely than male-controlled income to be spent on food." 9 Data 
discussed in chapter 7 suggest this last statement may be true for 
respondents in Kauga/Ngogwe. On average women's share of the expenditure on 
recurrent items, including food, was higher than both their income share and 
their share of expenditure on consumer durables.
Table 8.5 examines women's contribution in terms of percentage of total 
household income, recurrent expenditure and consumer durables, controlling 
for any effects due to the level of income. The level of nutrition is 
slightly worse if a woman has no income and presumably has little say in how 
her children's needs are met (26.7%) . At the other end of the scale, if a 
woman has to earn a considerable percentage of total household income, which 
suggests that she is meeting most of the costs, mainour ishment also rises 
(25%). If her contribution is between 1-30% of total income, malnourishment 
is marginally lower at 23.8%.
This conclusion is based on three studies looking at the impact of commerialisation in agriculture on nutrition - in 
Kenya (where the percentage of income controlled by women is a significant determinant of daily household calorie intake), 
the Gambia (where a reduced share of cereal production by women lowered calorie consumption significantly), and Rwanda (where 
female headed households consumed higher levels of the staple food per capita).
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Table 8.5: Nutritional status of children by the contribution of wives to 
household income and recurrent expenditure (sample size)
Percentage of
household
income
Percentage of sons and 
daughters with poor 
nutritional status
Percentage contribution 
of recurrent 
expenditure
Percentage of sons & 
daughters with poor 
nutritional status
0% 26.7 (90) 0 % 33.3 (11)
1 -30% 23.8 (42) 1-48% 12.5 (32)
30-100% 25.0 (24) 49-100% 26.5 (49)
Source: Kauga/Ngogwe survey.
A similar pattern exists with differing levels of recurrent expenditure. 
Not contributing limits a woman's impact on nutrition (33.3%), as does
having to meet most of the expenses (26.5%). Better results emerge if the 
woman is meeting between 1-48% of the expenses. By comparing the income and 
recurrent expenditure figures, it is possible to see that contribution to 
recurrent expenditure has a greater impact than income share. It would 
appear that it is important for nutrition that both: a) the husband
contributes financially, and; b) the wife's income is high enough to
contribute a significant proportion to the household income, and that she is 
therefore able to meet a significant proportion of household expenditure. 
Children may be at risk if either of these is not the case.
Education versus nutrition
Malnourishment is also affected by the particular items of recurrent
expenditure which the woman is paying for. The following two tables look at 
the effect of who pays the school fees and food (Tables 8.6 and 8.7).
Table 8.6: Percentage of malnourished sons & daughters by person responsible 
for paying school fees (sample size)
Who pays the school 
fees
Percentage of malnourished 
sons & daughters
Wife 29.2 (24)
Husband 24.3 (107)
Both 16.7 (6)
Other 14.3 (7)
Source: Kauga/iJgogwe survey.
If a woman has to meet school fees, this appears to reduce her income 
available for the children's other needs and therefore lowers their 
nutritional status (29.2%). 10 If both husband and wife are contributing to
i o
In a study on intra-household resource allocation in Zambia, wang (1997) finds a similar result. Although she does
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school fees the rate of mainourishment is low (16.7%). Perhaps this latter 
category consists of households where the degree of cooperation is 
relatively high, with less secrecy about income and better use of resources.
However, if the woman is purchasing the food, this appears to have a 
positive effect on nutrition (15.8%) (Table 8.7). If the household does not 
buy food, nutritional levels are low. Most households experience a shortage 
of food from the garden at some point in the season, and being unable to 
purchase food to make up the shortfall may result in lower nutrition levels.
Table 8.7: Percentage of malnourished sons and daughters by person
responsible for buying food (sample size)
Who normally buys 
food
Percentage of 
malnourished sons 
and daughters
Wife 15.8 (19)
Husband 25.0 (68)
Don't buy 27.9 (104)
source: Kauga/tlgogwe survey.
Women 's income versus infrastructure
Women's control over income and whether it is diverted towards other 
expenses appears to be important for nutrition. But are these factors more 
or less important than the availability of health infrastructure, such as 
accessible clinics stocked with the necessary drugs ? The following table 
shows the effect of location on nutrition. Living in an urban area with 
better health services reduces malnourishment to 24%, but from table 8.5 
contributing between 1-48% of recurrent expenditure reduces malnourishment 
down to 12.5% - women1s contribution to recurrent expenditure appears to be 
more important than infrastructure.
Table 8.8: Percentage of malnourised sons and daughters by place of
residence (sample size)
Location Percentage of malnourished sons 
and daughters
Urban 24.4 (176)
Rural 28.6 (70)
Source: Kauga/Ngogwe survey.
not isolate the effect of one spouse paying for school fees as opposed to the other, she does find that the price of a 
school uniform has a negative effect on child health, indicating that children's nutritional and educational needs are 
competing for scarce resources.
172
Working long hours to earn an income versus child care
A closer examination of mothers who are working reveals that there is a 
trade-off between the negative effect on children of working long hours, and 
the positive effect of the income gained (Table 8.9). This trade-off exists 
only amongst married women. Children with mothers who either earn a low 
income and work few hours, or those that work long hours and earn a higher 
income, have a lower nutritional status than those whose mothers fall in the 
middle category. The results are statistically significant, suggesting that 
long working hours are marginally better than a low income (assuming that 
those who work longer hours earn more money).
Amongst single women the extra income is put to good use without the extra 
hours spent working having a detrimental effect. This difference between 
married and single women implies there is some other factor at work. 
Perhaps when married, time becomes more of a crucial issue, as a woman has 
to provide for her husband's needs as well as her children's. 11
Table 8.9: Percentage of sons and daughters with poor nutritional status by
marital status of mother and hours spent earning cash (sample size)
Number of hours 
per month
Married Single
0-20 25.0 (112) 45.5 (11)
20-70 21 .4 (14) 33.3 (6)
70+ 24.1 (29) 5.7 (15)
Source: Kauga/Ngogwe survey.
Discrimination between children: Gender bias
The literature on intra-household allocation has examined the ways in which 
parents allocate resources between children. Behrman (1990) outlines 
possible allocation rules, asking whether parents reinforce or compensate 
inequalities. Parents can either provide maximum resources for the child 
that is likely to yield the most benefit to his/her parents in the future. 
Or parents can maximise each child's return, reducing the inequality 
between children. Alternatively, a middle road is possible, where parents 
are neutral to the differences between children and allocate resources 
equally. Behrman asks whether these rules lead parents to favour one type 
of child above others due to gender or age. The evidence that he quotes 
suggests that parents in the United States are neutral. Similarly in India,
1 1
Seventy hours per month in itself is not a large proportion of women's time, yet it is an added burden on top of 
the time spent on food production for domestic consumption and on domestic work.
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but only in the surplus season. In the lean season parents use an 
investment strategy and favour boys.
Other research in India has produced different results. In Gujarat, 
Pushpamma found no gender differences in adolescents in Andhra Pradesh 
(Pushpamma, Geervanni and Lakshmi Devi 1982). In Tamil Nadu, Pereira found 
that girls were better nourished than boys (Pereira et al 1979). Sen found 
that in West Bengal girls bore the brunt of growth retardation in children 
under 6 years (Sen 1981). Bangladeshi evidence in a study by Khan (1984) 
shows boys and young men (5-19yrs) were not affected by household energy 
supplies, whereas girls were. Perhaps the time-consuming work of collecting 
firewood or providing other forms of fuel is detrimental to the nutrition 
of girls.
This evidence suggests that it is difficult to make general statements 
about gender bias - it is more complex than Behrman's typology would allow. 
Nutrition is not simply the result of pre-meditated choices by parents.
Gender ideologies can determine the type of work that boys and girls do,
their presence in the household at certain times of the day as well as the 
amount and type of food that they eat.
The evidence for sub-saharan Africa is also controversial. Svedberg argues 
that in the majority of countries there is no bias, but where there is a 
bias it is in favour of girls (Svedberg 1 996:937 Table 3) . The evidence he 
uses to support his claim is nutritional status data showing that boys 
suffer from a greater level of stunting than girls. Svedberg's explanation 
for this pro-girl bias is rather general, suggesting that female labour 
participation is high and parents are likely to benefit from their 
daughters' income. He claims that the prevalent polygamy leads to a demand 
for wives, so that marriage occurs early and parents receive bridewealth 
without having to support unmarried daughters for too long.
Klasen disputes the existence of a pro-girl bias, arguing that broader 
indicators such as mortality and population statistics have to be examined 
in addition to nutrition to see how resource allocation impacts on
survival. He argues that there is a rising anti-girl bias, due to the
deteriorating economic position of women (Klasen 1996:928). Again this is a 
difficult claim to make across a whole continent. But Haakanssan's work 
discussed in chapter 5 would offer some support to Klasen's argument due to 
the changes in marriage customs, Haakanssan shows that polygamy has 
declined, and as men's social status is becoming more dependent on income 
and wealth rather than marriage, there is a greater time lag between 
cohabiting and payment of bridewealth.
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Thomas (1992) pointed out that the anthropometric standards from the 
reference population used by Svedberg differ for male and female children, 
and therefore 'gender differences can only be identified relative to the 
standards.' (Thomas 1992:2 cited in Haddad and Reardon 1993:261). The 
outlay equivalent approach used by Haddad and Reardon (1993 - Burkino
Faso), Deaton (1989 - Burkino Faso) and Haddad and Hoddinot (1990 - Cote 
d'Ivoire) avoids this problem by assessing econometrically whether 'parents 
alter their expenditures on adult goods differently for boys and girls.' 
(Haddad and Reardon 1993:261). The results from all three studies show no 
compelling evidence of either a pro-girl or pro-boy bias.
Haddad and Reardon (1993) go on to stratify their sample according to agro- 
ecological zones and household income to test Svedberg's thesis that gender 
discrimination may be due to the respective value of male and female 
labour. The assumption is that in different agro-ecological zones men and 
women's labour contributions vary, and gender differences in child 
nutrition also differ. But their results do not support this thesis, and 
therefore suggest that Svedberg's explanation is also problematic.
In the Kauga/Ngogwe data from Uganda there is a pro-girl bias in nutrition 
status data that is statistically significant (Table 8.10). 12
Table 8.10: Percentage of boys and girls who are malnourished (sample
size)13
Gender All children (a) Sons and Daughters only
Girls 22.9 (179) 20.S (132)
Boys 34.2 (149) 31 .6 (114)
Source: Kauga/Ngogwe survey.
Note: (a) Includes nephews and neices, stepchildren and grandchildren as well as S O U S  a n d
daughters.
Svedberg's explanation may be relevant here, but there is evidence that the 
bias is the result of women's particular preference for girls. Caplan cites 
the following quotation.
"it is better to have girls. A girl will pound for you, she'll fetch 
water for you, she'll go for firewood for you, and when you die she'll 
wash your body. But a boy doesn't pound, he doesn't fetch water, he 
doesn't do anything - maybe he'll dig your grave !" (Caplan 1989:205
This apparent discrimination does not occur in the DHS data.
13
The table in Appendix G shows how the gender difference varies according to the particular measure used. Boys 
appear to suffer more from stunting/long-term malnourishment (height-for-age) that girls. With a lower rate of stunting, 
wasting (recent malnourishment / weight-for-height) is more visible amongst girls.
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cited in Bryceson 1995)
In a study of the World Bank Living standard survey data from the US, Brazil 
and Ghana, Thomas finds evidence suggesting a similar preference (Thomas 
1991). His results show that a mother's education has a bigger impact on her 
daughter's height than on her son's, and similarly the father's education 
has a bigger impact on his son's height than on his daughter's. 14 Thomas' 
explanation is that the parent of the same gender is more important for a 
child's development - a sexual division of labour in child-rearing. He 
offers evidence from research by psychologists to support this claim (Thomas 
1991:24). He also examines the birth interval after the first child. In the 
US, amongst Caucasian women the birth interval is independent of the gender 
of the first child. Amongst Afro-American women, the birth interval is 
shorter if the first child is a son, suggesting that this group of women 
prefer daughters.
In Buganda there is reason to believe their parents show a similar 
preference. The incentive to discriminate may arise due to the different 
inheritance lines for sons and daughters. Boys inherit from their father, 
and daughters from their maternal aunt. A daughter cannot be named as her 
father's heir. In addition, sons may require assistance with paying 
bridewealth, while girls will bring in the equivalent payment. For these two 
reasons, daughters and mothers have mutual incentives to maintain close 
ties. Sons on the other hand often wish to remain in close contact with 
their father to ensure their inheritance. This may lead married mothers to 
conclude daughters are a better investment than sons - that she is more 
likely to see the benefits. Research on street children in Kampala by 
Kenneth Khana showed boys are more likely to be abandoned than girls. The 
female respondents stated that there were more problems involved in 
'bringing up' boys than girls (personal communication 1996).
This theory is supported by the fact that in female-headed households in 
semi-urban areas the pro-girl bias disappears (Table 8.11), and boys are 
likely to be slightly better nourished than girls. (This does not appear to 
be the case in the rural areas, though the small number of single women in 
the rural area makes any conclusion tentative.) If a woman has been able to 
set up house on her own, which is more feasible in semi-urban areas, and 
been able to take her children with her, the incentive to discriminate 
between boys and girls may disappear. Perhaps due to the non-payment of 
bridewealth, the mother has custody over the children and is confident of 
her son's future loyalty. The implication is that the different kinship 
ties, and resulting economic connections of married and single women lead to
14 . . .Wang Mei (1997) finds a similar result with parents income - an increase in the mother s income havxng greater
impact on the nutritional status of her daughter than that of her son, and the reverse for an increase in the father's 
income»
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different preferences in children. Perhaps in addition to this, once a 
woman is single, the workloads of her children change. It is possible that 
single women rely heavily on their daughters to do some of the chores that 
they not longer have the time to do because of the need to earn an income - 
for example, fetching firewood and water, and child care. This extra labour 
may lead to poorer female nutritional status.
Table 8.11: Percentage of sons and daughters with poor nutritional status
by area, marital status of mother and gender of child (sample size)
Semi-urban Rural
Girls Boys Girls Boys
Married 22.3 (94) 31.3 (60) 26.1 (46) 42.4 (33)
Single 27.6 (29) 24.0 (25) 0.0 (8) 60.0 (10)
Source: Kauga/Ngogwe survey .
Discrimination between children: Offspring/Foster child bias
Evidence was found in the Kauga/Ngogwe survey that parents discriminate 
between children in their care according to whether they are biological 
offspring or not. Data were collected on all children living in the 
household, irrespective of their relationship to the adult woman of the 
household. Sons and daughters of the adult woman do better than any other 
group - 25% were malnourished (Table 8.12). Of children living with their 
father but not their mother (stepchildren), 30% are malnourished. The common 
concern expressed above that step-parents are particularly harsh would 
support this result.
With neither natural parent present in the household, nephews/nieces have a 
higher rate of malnourishment (35%) . 15 This may be the result of neglect on 
the part of their 'foster' parents, or that this group of children, whose 
parents for some reason are unable to look after them, may tend to come from 
poorer backgrounds. There is a Bugandan custom where nephews must call their 
paternal uncles 'father', and nieces their maternal aunts 'mother'. 
Similarly for a woman to distinguish between her children and her sister's 
children would cause offence. Given the extent of fostering, the purpose of 
this social custom may be to limit the level of discrimination that the data 
show exists.
Ester Goody's work examines the impact of fostering on success in later 
adult life (measured by social position and marital stability), and finds no
No data were collected on whether the nephews/nieces were related to the husband or wife, but it probably safe to 
assume that in most cases they would be relatives of the husband.
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evidence of detrimental effect (Goody 1982). Yet the explanation given by 
respondents in her study of fostering is that foster parents can act as 
firmer and better teachers than biological parents. She does not mention 
poverty - sending a child to a better placed family, or the need to take in 
kin who have been orphaned due to aids, where the fostering family has 
little to spare.15 Nor does she examine the nutritional impact.
Grandchildren appear to suffer most (38%). Elderly grandparents may not have 
the energy for the frequent and time consuming process of feeding a young 
infant adequately. This problem would be compounded if the household is 
getting no financial support from the parents, and the grandparents are 
having to earn cash to support their grandchildren. (It is often the middle 
generation who are afflicted with aids, leaving only grandparents to care 
for young children.)
Table 8.12: Percentage of children with poor nutritional status by
relationship with adult female (sample size)
Relation of child to adult woman Percentage of 
malnourished children
Son/Daughter 25.4 (248)
Stepchild (child of current husband) 30.0 (10)
Niece/nephew 35.3 (17)
Grandchild 38.0 (50)
There is evidence to suggest that spouses discriminate differentially 
against foster or step-children (Table 8.13). If the husband is resident 
part-time, this seems to have a positive effect on the sons and daughters. 
This may well be because households with part-time husbands tend to be 
wealthier than those where the husband is a full-time resident. (Some 
activities that require travel (fishing, trading) are comparatively 
profitable (see chapter 6)). But this effect does not seem to carry through 
to 'other' children - they appear to be more malnourished. These 'other' 
children may be the relatives of the husband, and without the husband 
present to 'guard their interests', they may be discriminated against more 
than they would be otherwise.
Informal conversation suggests that the latter situation is common in Uganda, where at the funeral of the deceased 
parents, the children are divided up amongst the relatives.
1 78
Table 8.13: Percentage of children with poor nutritional status by residency
of husband (sample size)
Relationship of child 
to adult female
Full-time 
resident husband
Part-time resident 
husband
Son/Daughter 27.5 (193) 18.2 (55)
Other (a) 34.3 (67) 41.2 (17)
Source: Kauga/Ngogwe survey data.
Note: (a) Refers to nephews, nieces, stepchildren and grandchildren.
A similar pattern appears when the marital status of the husband is 
examined. Sons and daughters of polygamous husbands do better than those 
with monogamous husbands - polygamous household tend to be wealthier in this 
sample. But this positive effect does not seem to have affected 'other' 
children (Table 8.14). These results suggest that parents/adults do not 
share the same preferences for allocating resources to children.
Table 8.14: Percentage of children with poor nutritional status by marital 
status of husband (sample size)
Relationship of child to 
adult female
Monogamous husband Polygamous
husband
Son/Daughter 27.4 (168) 21.3 (80)
Other (a) 35.6 (45) 35.9 (39)
Source: Kauga/Ngogwe survey.
Note: (a) Refers to nephews, nieces, stepchildren and grandchildren.
Rather peculiarly, much of the literature on intra-household allocation of 
resources has assumed that parents share preferences about how to allocate 
resources between children. Explanations of discrimination have been based 
on the premise that parents make joint investment decisions on their 
children. This may be the case, but it should not be assumed, given the 
unequal control and access to resources that occurs between spouses. 
Explanations of child bias are more convincing if the preferences ‘of the 
parents are examined separately.
Women's economic security versus child welfare
In the previous chapter the extent to which the wife chooses to contribute 
her income to the household was discussed. Women contribute different levels 
to the household, not simply because of the different levels of their 
income, but because they face different situations. It was shown that the 
level of a wife's contribution is affected by both spouses' education, 
income level and location. These factors are indicators of the
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household/gender relations and therefore influence the 1 incentives' to 
invest in the household. Some of the literature assumes that men face 
pressures to direct resources away from the household (such as expenditure 
on alcohol, or other wives), but there is little acknowledgement that women 
may face a similar range of pressures.
One area of the literature that adds support to the thesis that women are 
more able/willing to meet the needs of children, is the evidence that some 
children with single mothers fare better than those with married (or 
cohabiting) mothers. It is as if women are able to use resources more 
efficiently without the interference of a spouse. This is despite greater 
levels of poverty often recorded for female-headed households (Handa 1996, 
Kennedy 1994, Barros et al 1997, Johnson 1 993 et al) . Buvinic and Gupta 
(1997) review the literature and conclude that approximately half of the 
studies reported positive and half reported negative effects of female- 
headship.
The Kauga/Ngogwe data show slight positive effects of female headship. 
Although the result is not significant, children with a single mother appear 
to do better than children with a married mother, even if the husband is the 
child's father (Table 8.15). This is despite the evidence that on average 
a female-headed household is likely to be poorer than a married household 
(see chapter 4).
Table 8.15: Percentage of children with poor nutritional status by marital 
status of mother female (sample size)
Marital status of mother Percentage of 
malnourished S&D
No resident man 23.7 (38)
Resident father 25.9 (201)
Other resident man 28.6 (7)
Source: Kauga/Ngogwe survey:
If the data are split according to area, this appears to be a semi-urban 
phenomena - it is only in semi-urban areas that single mothers have better 
nourished children (Table 8.16).
Table 8.16: Percentage of sons and daughters with poor nutritional status by 
area and marital status of mother (sample size)
Area Semi-urban Rural
Married mother 25.0 (148) 28.3 (60)
Single mother 21.4 (28) 30.0 (10)
Source: Kauga/Ngogwe survey.
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The DHS data also show a similar result, again insignificant (Table 8.17). 17 
This is within a predominately rural sample. Given evidence that this is a 
peri-urban phenomenon, the DHS result may have been significant if it were 
possible to separate the rural and urban respondents.
Table 8.17: Percentage of sons and daughters that have poor nutritional
status according to marital status of mother (sample size)
Marital status of adult 
female
Stunted Underweight Wasted
Married (3438) 44.7 23.4 2.0
Single (507) 42.4 20.4 1 .9
Source: Jitta et a l , D H S survey.
There are two possible explanations. The implication is that single women 
themselves fare better in urban areas, perhaps because they face less 
prejudice, and because there are more opportunities for generating cash open 
to them in urban areas (see chapter 6) . They are therefore better able to 
look after their children. Single mothers may be able to use their scare 
resources more effectively towards the nutrition of their children when she 
can develop a survival strategy that does not have to meet, or comply with, 
needs/demands made by her spouse. 18
There may also be a second explanation. As well as resources being diverted 
towards the husband's needs, perhaps married women embedded in different 
social relations (or incentive structures) that lead them to consider their 
children as sunk costs rather than investment. Given financial inequality 
within the household, discussed in chapters 5 & 6, future benefits that come 
from investing in children may well not accrue to the mother. The evidence 
from the focus group discussions shows many fathers claim custodial rights 
over their children, and that some women are concerned about their future 
economic security, and therefore accumulate assets outside the home. This 
may mean that women's need to ensure their own long-term economic security 
conflicts with the immediate welfare needs of their children 19.
The question used to determine marital status in the DHS survey was: "Who spent the night here last night ? " As a 
result women with either part-time or polygamous husbands may well have been classified as single women (See chapter 3).
18
Buvinic and Gupta (1997) make a similar argument.
19
It would be interesting to examine the counterfactual argument: do single women who have brought up their children 
on their own obtain greater support from their children than married women? Unfortunately it was not possible with the 
Kauga/Ngogwe survey data.
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Parental education
Table 8.18 examines the relationship between parental education and 
nutrition. The effect of paternal education and that of single mothers 
appears to be what would be expected - nutritional status improves the 
better educated the parent. This relationship does not hold when examining 
the effect of married maternal education - the relationship is reversed. 
This is a peculiar result, and may indicate that there are sampling errors.
Yet why should sampling errors exist for married women, and not for fathers 
or single women? It would also appear that this unusual result is only 
true for urban women (Table 8.19). Amongst married rural women the 
relationship between parental education and nutrition is positive.
Table 8.18: Percentage of poorly nourished children according to parental
education level (sample size)
Education level Single women Husband Harried women
All children (a) All children All children Sons and daughters only
None 3 8 . 9  ( 18 ) 4 1 . 2  ( 17) 2 0 . 0  ( 45) 2 3 . 1 ( 39 )
Primary 2 5 . 0  ( 44 ) 3 1 . 3  ( 128) 2 9 . 9  ( 1 3 4 )  - 2 5 . 2 ( 1 0 7 )
Secondary 1 1 . 1  ( 9 ) 1 6 . 1  ( 62) 3 6 . 7  ( 30) 3 4 . 6 ( 26 )
Source: Kauga/Ngogwe survey.
Note: (a) Includes nephews, nieces, stepchildren, and grandchildren as well as sons and daughters.
Table 8.19: Percentage of children with poor nutritional status by area
(sample size)
Married women's 
education level
Urban Rural
None 1 3 . 5  ( 37 ) 5 0 . 0  (8)
Primary 2 7 . 6  ( 87) 3 4 . 0  ( 47)
Secondary to 3 0 . 0  ( 10 )
source: nauga/Ngogwe "survey.
Using data presented by Hobcraft (1991) the United Nations publication 
'Population and Women' (1995) discusses the impact of maternal education on 
child survival. The results find that the majority of 25 countries show a 
statistically significant improvement in child survival with maternal 
education. In 6 countries the relationship is not significant, and five of 
those 6 are in sub-saharan Africa (Botswana, Ghana, Mali, Uganda and 
Zimbabwe). 20 The study acknowledges that 'this result is not due to the 
lower penetration of education in African countries, because several of the
Earlier studies have also suggested a weak link between maternal education and child survival - Hobcraft, McDonald 
and Rutstein 1984, and United Nations 1985).
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countries where the link is weak have quite advanced educational systems'. 
(United Nations 1996:261). The study also rejects Caldwell's suggestion 
that the weak connection may be due to a greater level of autonomy of many 
women in sub-saharan Africa, so that rising education does not make that 
much difference, in comparison with Asian and Muslim societies. This 
argument does not take account of Latin America and the Caribbean, where 
women also have considerable autonomy and the link between maternal 
education and nutrition is nevertheless more significant. The study examines 
the possibility that the cause may be weaker health infrastructures, 
inhibiting women from making use of their education. Yet Botswana and 
Zimbabwe have relatively low levels of child mortality by African standards, 
due to relatively good infrastructure. The study concludes that, despite 
its various suggestions, it has been unable to find a convincing 
explanation.
Closer analysis of the Kauga/Ngogwe data suggests an explanation that may be 
relevant. Firstly, table 8.18 shows that the 'negative' factor appears to be 
greater amongst non-biological children, than amongst biological children, 
even if they are living in the same household. This suggests that 
allocation decisions within the household are important, rather than simply 
a factor exogenous to the household. Secondly, if the data relating to women 
with secondary education and malnourished children is analyzed as a group 
that is distinct from the others in the sample, it would appear that this 
group of women are more likely to have polygamous or part-time resident 
husband; more likely to have to pay for the school fees (18% as supposed to 
14%); none of them purchases food; and the average wife's share of recurrent 
expenditure is higher than the sample as a whole (41% in comparison with 
27%) . 93% of school age-children are still at school as opposed to 68% in
the sample as a whole. (All the girls are still at school, whereas only 66% 
are still at school in the main sample. The equivalent figures for boys are 
85% and 71%). It would appear that educated women's desperate attempt to 
ensure that their children are able to obtain the same level of schooling as 
they themselves did (particularly girls as well as boys), with little 
support from husbands, is resulting in resources being directed towards 
school fees rather than to the nutrition of the younger children. Parents 
have to balance the different needs of children - limited resources may not 
meet all the nutritional needs of younger children as well as the 
educational needs of the older siblings.
(The Ugandan Government has recently introduced user charges for education. 
It would be interesting to know whether there are similar changes in the 
other countries in the United Nations study discussed above. Perhaps the 
removal of state provision has caused families to stretch meagre resources 
further to pay for school fees to the extent that the nutritional status of
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younger children is being affected.)
Conclusion
The evidence presented here suggests that the level of household income is 
less important than women's income. Contribution shares to recurrent 
expenditure also appear important - children seem to be more at risk if the 
mother is making no contribution, or is responsible for most of the 
expenses, than if the spouses are sharing the financial burden.
Education appears to have a series of cross-cutting effects - it improves 
women's earning potential, but may increase their desire to educate their 
children. The decision to allocate resources to education or nutrition may 
differ according to socio-economic status, parental education, and according 
to the resources of the spouse responsible for the necessary expenses. The 
result may be relatively wealthy households, with low-earning but well- 
educated women, that contain poorly nourished children, with older siblings 
who are still in school.
The answer to the question posed at the beginning of this section is that 
maternal altruism probably is a cultural universal, but it has to be set in 
the context of women's lives. The short-term needs of children may conflict 
with their mothers' long-term needs for economic security (without which 
they will be unable to assist their children) and with educational needs of 
older siblings.
9CONCLUSION
At the beginning of the thesis, the current state of theory on the 
bargaining models was reviewed, and several points were raised: the
inadequate analysis of power, the endogenity of preferences, the 
unsuitability of a separate spheres formulation. It was argued that any 
analysis of the bargaining process must include a full analysis of the 
workings of power - the importance of gender identities in defining needs 
and rights, and whether they are met. Without such an analysis power 
becomes detached from its social context, and is purely a characteristic 
determined by economic wealth that does not acknowledge the social relations 
and structures that delimit individual activity.
The imperative behind formal modelling is to statistically identify the 
determinants of a particular outcome for the purposes of policy and to 
improve our understanding of the processes concerned. Its apparent 
ideological neutrality is deceptive, given its neglect of the workings of 
power in social interaction. This is particularly true for household 
bargaining models that claim to deal with relationship between men and 
women.
However, it is untrue to say that the bargaining models do not acknowledge 
the unequal balance of power between men and women. They do - in a variety 
of ways: through including variables that determine an individual's
bargaining power (such as income and assets), through the notion of separate 
spheres, and through the unquantified/unquantifiable concept of 'voice'.
The concept of separate spheres does incorporate the influence of social 
structures in determining the division of labour. Yet it is as if a layer in 
each sphere is missing - that of the gender ideologies leading to the 
construction of different identities. There is a similar problem with the 
theory of the conjugal contract - it allows for transfers in labour and 
money, but does not allow for a 'contract of identity', based on the 
assumption that men are responsible for income, from which they derive 
authority, and women are responsible for domestic work. Neither the
spheres nor conjugal contract theory deals with the problem of change - how
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and under what circumstances the contract or the spheres are renegotiated, 
and what the likely impact is.
It is only Behrman and Sen that acknowledge the endogenity of preferences - 
that an individual can have influence over another1 s view of what is in the 
own latter's interest. Sen develops his model on the basis of perceptions of 
contribution and on perceptions and legitimisation of needs and deserts. 
When he suggests that the informational base be widened to encompass these 
factors, he is attempting to strike a middle path, acknowledging the 
importance of formal modelling, and of power in social interaction. A 
simpler middle path is attempted here - using qualitative methodology to 
examine the social relations and structures that govern gender relations; 
utilising the understanding gained to choose certain pieces of information 
that reflect the balance of power/control over resources in a particular 
cultural context and are relevant to the welfare outcome being considered; 
and statistical analysis of the chosen indicators of power and the welfare 
outcomes. Hopefully, the result is an analysis of spousal relations in 
Bugandan society that reveals the importance of gender identities in 
determining the balance of power.
Lessons from Mukono for theoretical formulations
A discussion of marriage in Buganda highlighted four particular aspects of 
the conjugal contract that are neglected by the theoretical formulations: 
firstly, the symbolic and economic importance of bridewealth in subjecting 
women to men's authority and yet conveying honour; secondly, men and women's 
unequal dependence on marriage as a source of wealth. Thirdly, evidence was 
given on the unequal division of household assets on death or divorce, and 
on the importance of violence in prejudicing any outcome of marital 
negotiations. Notions of gender identity enable the perpetuation of such 
particular forms of social relations and their influence on household 
outcomes - for example the acceptability of male-on-female violence, or 
divorced or widowed women being left destitute. Without an understanding of 
the social relations that constitute the environment in which ’bargaining' 
takes place, data used in a theoretical model become 'detached from their 
roots'.
The importance of gender identities in perpetuating unequal relations 
becomes explicit in the discussion of women's involvement in income 
generation. The evidence from the focus groups showed how male identity and 
male authority, are closely aligned with control over income. A proportion 
of men prevent their wives from working in order to limit their access to 
income, women with an independent source of income are thought to cause 
marital instability, and accepting financial assistance from a woman is
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thought to compromise a man's position. Yet, despite these notions of 
acceptable behaviour associated with gender, women's financial contribution 
was significant, despite lower incomes and a poorer asset position. Secrecy 
about income was found to be 1 important for both men and women, either to 
reduce accountability for personal consumption decisions, prevent 
confiscation, or to avoid contribution to household goods - despite the 
disadvantages of non-co-operation. Rights over household assets were found 
to differ according to the socio-economic status of the household, male and 
female education and female contribution to household income.
It was argued that this situation not only affects women's ability to 
improve their economic situation, it also affects outcomes within the 
household. The distribution of household income and disposal rights over 
household assets have an impact on spousal contributions to household 
expenditure. A proportion of women were found to accumulate assets secretly
outside the marital home - presumably with income that could have been
contributed to household expenses - in an attempt to ensure their own
economic security.
The debate as to whether participation, in the economy improves women's
control over resources does not capture the complexity of the situation in 
Buganda. Participation may be prevented by a husband because it represents 
a challenge to his authority and control over household finances. 
Participation does not ensure control over income or resources. Poverty may 
force a woman to participate in the economy in order to meet a large 
proportion of household expenses. But it is education that enables a woman 
to ensure her own economic security and control over household assets. A 
renegotiation of the conjugal contract is necessary to challenge the 
stereotypical roles of a husband who controls household assets and income 
and provides the 'sauce/meat', and those of a dependent wife who cares for 
the children and produces the 'food'1. It is such a renegotiation that 
improves women's position within the household.
Intra-household resource allocations are an important determinant of child 
nutrition. In answer to the question that originally motivated this 
research, the Kauga/Ngogwe data suggests that the share of recurrent 
expenditure met by the mother, and the level of income that she has 
available to meet those household needs are more important than household 
income. Her control over food purchases improves nutrition, but if a mother 
has to meet educational costs as well it appears to be detrimental. The 
data show that these effects are more important that location and the 
accessibility of health infrastructure. Given women's insecure economic 
position, and the strong paternal rights over children, women appear to show
1
’Food' and 'sauce/meat' are the literal translations of the Luganda words used, where food refers to a starch food - 
bananas, potatoes or cassava.
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a preference for allocating resources towards their daughters. This apparent 
bias disappears once a woman is single, and has presumably established
custody over her children. When examining the determinants of nutrition, a 
universal maternal altruism cannot be assumed when women have other, 
conflicting priorities such as education of older siblings and their own
long-term economic security.
This thesis has attempted to build a picture of the distribution of rights, 
responsibilities and power between spouses in Bugandan semi-urban and rural 
households. It has argued that the marriage contract - which is symbolised 
by the bridewealth - sanctions men's control over household income, their 
ability to forbid their wives from participating in the economy, and their 
claim over the majority of household assets and children on divorce. Faced 
with the possibility of economic impoverishment on divorce, some women are 
faced with the cruel choice between their own children's welfare and their 
own economic security. It is only education that ensures women's future
security within marriage and enables them to increase contributions to 
household expenses.
This study of Uganda has shown the necessity of obtaining qualitative, as 
well as quantitative data on gender relations in order understand the
process of intra-household allocation and the resulting outcomes. Women's 
own economic security as a marriage partner, attitudes towards 
responsibility for household expenditure, and rights over household assets 
and children and women's earnings all affect household outcomes as well as 
more readily quantifiable data such as income and education levels. An 
understanding of the relevant social relations can lead to appropriate data 
being collected to illustrate the balance of power and how it affects intra­
household allocation.
The resulting statistical findings central to this study are:
* 10% of husbands refused to allow their wives to earn an income. 
(This figure rises to 28% amongst the wealthier households.)
* Married women are more likely to be involved in capitalised 
activities than single women, presumably because they were able to 
obtain access to capital through their husbands.
* 20% of women accumulate assets that are stored outside the marital 
home. In terms of value, 60% of these assets are stored without the 
knowledge of the husband.
* Most women contribute a greater proportion of recurrent expenditure 
than the proportion of 'household' income that they earn. (On average
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women earn 17% of 'household' income, contribute 27% of household 
recurrent expenditure and 15% of consumer durables.)
* Women's income has a greater impact on child nutrition than 
household income.
* If women pay school fees, it has a negative effect on child 
nutrition; if women pay for food (as opposed to the husband, or 
household not purchasing food) it has a positive effect on nutrition.
* Parents do not have the same allocation preferences towards 
children.
* Married women appear to favour girls, whereas single women appear to 
marginally favour boys, because future inter-generational transfers in 
favour of the mother are more certain.
Implications
Gender relations (or rather feminism) has begun to make in-roads into 
economics. This study shows, at a micro level, the importance of gender 
relations and its impact on the female participation rate, the type of work 
women do, management of household finances, contribution to household 
finances and child welfare. Gender relations can determine a household's 
socio-economic status, whether a household is able to improve its situation, 
and whether women can improve their own situation and that of their 
children.
An adequate legal system is necessary to ensure equitable settlements on 
death and divorce in order to encourage pooling of resources. Unequal rights 
over household assets encourages secrecy, and the need to ensure 
independent, personal economic security. The result is the loss of the 
benefits of co-operation within the household and the diversion of resources 
away from the household.
Women's involvement in the predominant informal sector in Uganda appears to 
be determined by their access to capital through their husbands. Alternative 
sources of finance capital for women may increase participation rates and 
women's income.
Projects that attempt to improve child nutrition must take account of 
dynamics within the household. A woman may face obstacles to improving her 
economic situation from within the household, as well as competing
1 89
priorities for the few resources that she has.
Future research
One area that has been neglected in this study is the sexual division of 
labour - how spouses allocated housework, child care and household 
production. Although evidence was collected in the group discussions, in 
essence this would require a time use study - a major research project in 
itself. Yet such data would enable further exploration of the importance of 
gender identities, and how the division of labour and therefore identities 
are changing with women's increasing participation in the market economy.
Only a limited amount of multivariate analysis was carried out on the 
Kauga/Ngogwe data, primarily because of the small sample size. One 
possibility would be to use the methods tested in this study in a larger 
research project that would enable more sophisticated statistical analysis.
This would be of particular interest in assessing the determinants of child 
nutritional status. Further examination of intra-household dynamics will 
assist in building a more complete picture of the causes of malnutrition.
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APPENDIX A
INITIAL CENSUS C D A T E ____/ ______/
RESPONDANTS SHOULD BE EITHER MARRIED OR CO-HABITING COUPLES WITH CHILDREN
OR SEPARATED OR WIDOWED FEMALES WITH CHILDREN.
SINGLE MALES SHOULD NOT BE INTERVIEWED
First two digits: Village or RC1 number. CHOUSNO______
Second three digits: House number
1 . Name ............................ ..................................
2. Village/RC1 ............................................................
3. Location of House............................................ ........................................
4. Male/Female respondant (1=female, 2=male) CSEX
5. Are you currently married=1, separated=2, widowed=3, co-habiting=4, not married=0 CMARITAL
IF MARRIED AND FEMALE GO TO 15
IF SINGLE FEMALE GO TO 24 
IF MARRIED AND MALE
6. Do you live here; CHUSRES
1=fulltime 2=once a week 3=once a month
4=several times a year 5=does not live here
7. Do you have any other wives or regular partners ? (Total quantity of wives) CWIVES
8. Do you do any work for wages ? (Yes=1, No=0) CHUSWORK
9. Type of work     CHUSTYPE __
10. Is this work regular (=1) or casual (=0) ? CHUSREG
11. Does your wife do any work for wages ? (Yes=1, No=0) CWIFWORK
12. Type of work      CWIFTYPE __
13. Is this work regular (=1) or casual (=0) ? CWIFREG
14. Do you or your wife have the use of any land ? (Yes=1, No=) CHSHAMBA
IF MARRIED AND FEMALE
15. Does your husband live here; CHUSRES
1=fulltime, 2=once a week, 3=once a month, or
4=several times a year ?
16. Does you husband have any other wives or regular partners ? (Total quantity of wives,
incl respondant) CWIVES
17. Do you do any work for wages ?(Yes=1, No=0) CWIFWORK
18. Type of work   CWIFTYPE __
19. Is this work regular (=1) or casual (=0) ? CWIFREG
20. Does your husband do any work for wages ?(Yes=l, No=0) CHUSWORK
21 . Type of work .................    CHUSWORK
22. Is this work regular (=1) or casual (=0) ? CHUSREG
23. Does you or your husband have the use of any land ? (Yes=1,No=0) CWSHAMBA
IF SINGLE FEMALE
24. Did your husband live here; CHUSRES
1=fulltime 2=once a week 3=once a month
4=several times a year
25. Did you husband have any other wives or regular partners ? (Total quantity of wives) CWIVES
26. Do you do any work for wages ?(Yes=1, No=0) CWIFWORK
27. Type of work   CWIFTYPE __
28. Is this work regular (=1) or casual (=0) ? CWIFREG
ALL RESPONDENTS
29. How many children are living in the household ? (Number of children) CCHILD___
30. How many of them are under 5 years ? CUNDER5___
BY OBSERVATION
31. Material of walls of house: CWALLMAT
1=Plaster over brick 
2=Plain brick 
3=Mud
32. State of repair of walls CWALLQU
1=Good
2=Medium (Wind and water proof, but in disrepair)
3=Poor (Barely wind and water proof)
33. Material of roof; CROOFMAT
1=Tiles
2=Tin sheeting 
3=Grass thatch
34. State of repair of roof CROOFQU
1=Good
2=Medium (Wind and water proof, but in disrepair)
3=Poor (Barely wind and water proof)
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APPENDIX B
SUBJECT LIST FOR FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSIONS
Work
WHAT WORK DO MEN DO, WHAT WORK DO WOMEN DO ?
Which farming tasks do men do, which farming tasks do women do ?
Which crops do men look after, which crops do women look after?
Who makes decisions about work to be done in the garden
Who sells which crops ?
Which household chores do men do, what household chores do women do ?
Decisions within the household
IS MONEY SHARED, DO HUSBANDS AND WIVES KNOW WHAT THE OTHER EARN ?
DOES A WIFE HAVE TO ASK PERMISSION ABOUT CERTAIN THINGS. WHAT THINGS ? 
Who decides which household goods should be bought
Women's economic security/independance
DO WOMEN OWN THEIR OWN LAND OR PROPERTY IN THEIR OWN RIGHT?
Is it necessary ? Why ? Are they buying it secretly ?
DO MEN FEEL COMFORTABLE WITH A WIFE WHO IS WEALTHY, OR IN A BETTER 
PAID JOB ? WHY ?
What do men inherit, what do women inherit from their parents ?
What happens to the household goods/property when a husband dies ?
Bride price
IS BRIDE WEALTH A GOOD THING OR A BAD THING ?
Does it affect the woman's position in household/in society?
Polygamous marriages/Other partners
WHAT ARE THE GOOD THINGS ABOUT BEING IN A POLYGAMOUS MARRRIAGE, WHAT 
ARE THE BAD THINGS ?
How is the household organised in a polygamous household
Separation/Divorce
WHAT DO HUSBANDS AND WIVES ARGUE ABOUT THAT LEADS TO 
DIVORCE/SEPARATION ?
Custody over children
Who takes the household belongings
The role that in-laws play in one's marriage
Violence (Wife beating)
DOES IT OCCUR
ARE THERE CIRCUMSTANCES UNDER WHICH IT IS JUSTIFIED OR IS IT NEVER 
JUSTIFIED ?
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APPENDIX C
OWNERSHIP QUESTIONNAIRE Z ONE WIFE HOUSEHOLD OOWDATE____/____ / ____
Female respondant in a monogamous family, or polygamous where one wife in the household.
Name of interviewer  .....................................................................  OOWASST
FILL IN QUESTIONS BEFORE THE INTERVIEW
***First two digits: 01=Luwala, 02=Kusaku, 03=Nakalasa, 04=Wagala, 05=Mulange, 06=Kanyogoga, 7=Mukono DFI, 
08=Sebule Cocoa Estate, 09=Nkokonjeru, 10=Casual employers, 20=Namubiru, 3Q=Zitwe, 40=Kirangira,
50=Ttakkajjunge, 60=Ggunda, 70= Lwanyonyi.
***Second three digits: House no. OOWHOUSNO
***1. Name of respondant ........................................     OOWPERSONO
2. Name of husband ....................................................
3- Age OOWAGE _____
4. Sex (1=female, 2=male) SHOULD HE FEMALE ! OOWSEX_ _
QUESTIONS ABOUT YOUR EDUCATION 
We wish to talk about your education.
5. Have you attended school? (Yes=1;No=0) OOWEDUC 
IF NO, GO TO Q10:
6. How many years were you at school? OOWEDYRS   (yrs)
7. What level did you reach? (1=P1-P4, 2=P5-P7/P5-J1, 3=S1-S4/J2-J3, 4=S5-S6, 5=Tertiary) OOWLEVEL
IF REACHED SECONDARY EDUCATION GO TO Q1 0
8. Literacy test: proves ability to read (No difficulty=2;Some difficulty=1; Cannot=0) TURN TO LAST PAGE
9. Literacy test: proves ability to write (No difficulty=2;Some difficulty=1; Cannot=0) TURN TO LAST PAGE
10. Have ever had any other type of education, training or adult education? (Yes=1;No=0) OOWTRAIN
IF NO GO Q12: '
11 . Type of education;
Agricultural seminars? (Yes=1;No=0) (Specify  ) OOWTYPE1 __
For how long did this education last? (Delete as appropriate) OOWUNIT1 Year/Month/week/Dav OOWTIME1 _____
Particular trade skills? (Yes=1;No=0) (Specify...... ............................................ ) OOWTYPE2 ___
For how long did this education last? (Delete as appropriate) OOWUNIT2 Year/Month/Week/Dav OOWTIME2 _____
Religious Training? (Yes=1;No=0); (Specify  ) OOWTYPE3 __
For how long did this education last? (Delete as appropriate) OOWUNIT3 Year/Month/Week/Dav OOWTIME3 _____
College or professional? (Yes=1;No=0) Specify   ) OOWTYPE4 ___
For how long did this education last? (Delete as appropriate) OOWUNIT4 Year/Month/Week/Dav_OOWTIME4 _
Other ? (Yes=1;No=0) Specify  ) 00WTYPE5 __
For how long did this education last? (Delete as appropriate) OOWUNIT5 Year/Month/Week/Dav 00WTIME5 _____
12. Did your mother go to school ? (Yes=1;No=0) OOWMEDUC
IF NO GO TO 14:
13. What level of education did your mother reach?
(1=P1-P4, 2=P5-P7/P5-J1, 3=S1-S4/J2-J3, 4=S5-S6, 5=Tertiary) OOWMLEVEL__
14. Did you father go to school? (Yes=1;No=0) OOWFEDUC 
IF NO GO TO 16:
15. What level of education did your father reach?
(1=P1-P4, 2=P5-P7/PS-J1, 3=S1-S4, 4=S5-S6, 5=Tertiary) OOWFLEVEL__
17. Have you ever held any position of responsibility within the community? (Yes=1;No=0) OOWRESPON___
IF NO GO TO 19:
18. Have you ever been or are you a ...,.?
LC1 official ? (Yes=1, No=0) OWWPOSIT1___
For how many years has/was this position held? 00WYRS1 _____
LC2 official ? (Yes=1, No=0) 0WWP0SIT2___
For how many years has/was this position held? OOWYRS2 _____
LC3 official ? (Yes=1, No=0) OWWPOSIT3___
For how many years has/was this position held? 00WYRS3 _____
an official at church/mosoue ? (Yes=1, No=0) OWWPOSIT4 ___
For how many years has/was this position held? OOWYRS4 _____
an official in the 'Traditional' authorities ? (Yes=1 , No=0) (Specify } OWWPOSIT5 __
For how many years has/was this position held? OOWYRS5 _____
'Traditional'healer/health worker ? (Yes=1, No=0) OWWPOSIT6___
For how many years has/was this position held? QOWYRS6______
Group or Project leader ? (Yes=1, No=0) (Specify ..........................................)OWWPOSIT7
For how many years has/was this position held? OOWYRS7______
QUESTIONS ABOUT HOUSEHOLD PROPERTY AND EXPENSES
We wish to talk to you about property owned by either you or your husband. One of the purposes of this 
study is compare property owned by the husband with that owned by the wife. It is often said that although 
women contribute towards a household, that if the husband and wife separate, or the husband dies, the woman 
is chased away with nothing. We wish to learn about what women contribute to the household, what property 
they purchase and what women are able to keep if they should separate from their husband. This is why I 
wish to ask you property in your household. What you tell me will be COMPLETELY CONFIDENTIAL. The 
information will NOT be passed on to your husband, any LC official, any government official, or anybody in 
your community.
***19.Does this household have any land where you can grow crops or graze animals?(Yes=1, No=0) OOWHLAN1 ___
IF NO, GO TO 22:
20. Do you own this land (=1), does you husband own it ( = 2), or is it owned by somebody else ( = 3) ?OOWHLAN2
21. Which crops do you or husband cultivate on this land ? (Yes=1, No=0)
coffee OOWCOFF_ _
matooke for eating 00WMAT001_ _
matooke for beer OOWMAT002_ _
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beans 
g 1 nuts 
cassava 
maize
sweet potato 
tomatoes 
greens 
cabbage 
vanilla 
sorghum 
finger millet 
sugar cane 
other Specify
22. Who owns the house where you live: you (=1), your husband (=2), or somebodyelse (=3)
23. Whose money normally oavs for the following items:
You can choose from the following answers: You=1;Husband=2;Both=3; Other=4, Don't buy=9 ?
Food ? (If Other, Specify...........................................)
Charcoal ?(If Other, Specify........................................... )
Woodfuel ?(If Other, Specify........................................... )
Parafin? (If Other, Specify........................................... }
Water ? (If Other, Specify........................................... )
Your clothes? (If Other, Specify .................................. )
Your husbands clothes? (If other. Specify .......................... )
Childrens' clothes? (If Other, Specify .......................... )
Do you have any children living with you who are at school (Quantity or No=Q) i
IF NOT, go to transport costs.
School uniform ? (If Other, Specify .......................... )
School books ? (If Other, Specify ......................... )
School lunch ? (If Other, Specify ......................... )
School fees ? (If Other, Specify  ................... ..)
Your transport costs ? (If Other, Specify .......................... )
Your husbands transport costs? (If Other, Specify  .....................)
Clinic bills? (If Other, Specify .......................... )
Hospital bills? (If Other, Specify ......................... )
Rent ?(If Other, Specify .........    )
Electricity ?(If Other, Specify .......................... )
OOWBEAN
OOWGNUTS
OOWCASS
OOWMAIZE
OOWPOTAT
OOWTOMAT
OOWGREEN
OOWCABB
OOWVANIL
OOWSORG
OOWMILL
OOWSUGAR
OOWCROP
OOWHOUSE
OOWFOOD
OOWCHAR
OOWWOOD
OOWPARAF
OOWWATER
OOWWCLOT
OOWHCLOT
OOWCCLOT
OOWSCHU
OOWSCHB
OOWSCHL
OOWSCHF
OOWWTRAN
OOWHTRAN
OOWCLIN
OOWHOSP
OOWRENT
OOWELEC
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ITEM 24. How many of 
the following 
are there in 
this household 
? (Quantity)
25. Who purchased
these items ?
W=wife
H=Husband
B=Both
0=0ther
(Quantity)
26. If you and your 
husband were to 
separate which of the 
following items would 
you be able to take 
with you ? (Quantity)
W H B 0
Hoes
Panga
Wheelbarrow
Charcoal stove
Parafin stove
Jerry cans
Basins
Saucepans
Chairs
Benches
Table
Cupboard
Sleeping mats
Mattresses
Beds
Hens
Goats
Sheep
Pigs
Cattle
Bicycle
Radio
Radio/Tapecasette
Sewing machine
TV
Motorcyle
Vehicle
Other
QUESTIONS ABOUT ITEMS THAT YOU OWN INDEPENDANTLV OF YOUR HUSBAND
We wish to talk you about items that you own independantly of your husband that are not part of this 
household. Because this study is about equality between husbands and wives, it is important for us to know
whether women are beginning to own property independently in order to provide themselves with some
financial security. This is why we wish to ask you questions about the property that you own. As I said
before, what you tell me will be COMPLETELY CONFIDENTIAL. The information will NOT be passed on to your
husband, any LC official, any government official, or anybody in your community.
27. Did you personally inherit any of the following:
land ? (0=No; or number of acres)
buildings ? (No=0, or number) 
cattle ? (0=No; or quantity) 
goats ? (0=No; or quantity) 
coffee trees ? (0=No or number of acres) 
banana trees ? (0=No; or number of acres)
28. Can you tell me what has happened to that/those..... 7.
Do you still own them/it{=1),
They are/it is in your husband's name (=2) 
have you sold them/it (=3), 
your husband has sold them/it (=4),
or has somethingelse happened (=5) ? Specify ............................
OOWINHL ______ (Acres)
OOWINHB __
OWWINHCA ___
OOWINHG __ _
OOWINHCO______(Arces)
OOWINHBA (Arces)
2 0 6
Land
Buildings
Cattle
Goats
coffee trees 
banana trees
ITEM 29. Which of the 
following do you 
own, independantly 
of your husband, 
that are not used 
in this household? 
(Quantity)
30. (IF OWNS SOME 
ITEMS)
Does you husband 
know about these 
items ?
(Quantity)
31. (FOR THOSE ITEMS 
THAT THE HUSBAND 
KNOWS ABOUT)
If you separate, 
which will you be 
able to keep ? 
(Quantity)
Hoes
Pangas
Wheelbarrow
Charcoal stove
Parafin stove
Jerry can
Saucepans
Chairs
Benches
Table
Cupboard
Sleeping mats
Mattresses
Beds
Hens/Ducks
Goats
Sheep
Pigs
Cattle
Land
Buildings
Bicycle
Radio
Radio/Tapecasette
Sewing Machine
TV
Motorcycle
Vehicle
Other
QUESTIONS ABOUT YOUR WORK
We would like to ask you questions about your work and income. We wish to compare the wives income with 
the husbands. As I said before, what you tell me will be COMPLETELY CONFIDENTIAL.
***32. Do you earn any money by selling your labour ? (Yes=1;No=0) (SEE CENSUS FORM)
IF NO:
33. Does your husband forbid you from working ? (Yes=1, No=0)
NOW GO TO Q45
IF YES:
***34. Employer 1 ......................................................................  OOWEMPL1
(Type of business/organisation)
35. Type of work (See codes)...............................................................  OOWWORK1
36. How much are you paid per month/week/dav (Delete as appropriate )? 00WWAGE1___________,
OOWWAGE
OOWPREVEN
OOWLAND __
OOWBUILD __
OOWCATTLE __
OOWGOAT __
OOWCOFF __
OOWBANA
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37. How many hours do you work per day ?
38. How many days do you work a week ?
39. Are you currently doing any other work for wages ?; (Yes=1;No=0)
IF NO, GO TO 45:
40. Employer 2 (Type of business/organisation).........................................
41. Type of work .......................................................... ..........
42. How much are you paid per month/week/day ? OOWWAGE2
43. How many hours do you work per day?
44. How many days do you work per week?
***4 5 . d0 you earn cash by doing business, or selling things ? (Yes=1, No=0) (SEE CENSUS FORM) OOWCASH
46. What type of work do you do ? (Use work codes, or specify)
WORK 1 Specify  ..................................................................  OOWTYPE1 __
WORK 2 Specify ................................................................. OOWTYPE2 __
WORK 3 Specify ...................................................................  OOWTYPE3
OOWHOURS1 __
OOWDAYS1
OOWOTHERW
OOWEMPL2 _____
00WW0RK2 __
~  OOWHOURS2
OOWWDAYS2
WORK 1
47. How many days do you work per week/month?
48. How many hours do you do per day ?
49. What are the costs you have to pay daily/weekly/monthly for your business 
What is the revenue you get daily/weekly/monthly from your business ?
OOWDAYS1 
OOWHOURS1
Ush Item and Frequency Ush per week/day/month TOTALS
Cost 1 j Total cost
Cost 2
Cost 3 Total revenue
Revenue 1
Revenue 2 I Net profit
Revenue 3 |
WORK 2
50. How many days do you work per week/month? OOWDAYS2
51. How many hours do you do per day ? OOWHOURS2
52. What are the costs you have to pay daily/weekly/monthly for your business ?
What is the revenue you get daily/weekly/monthly from your business ?
Ush Item and Frequency Ush per week/day/month TOTALS
Cost 1 Total cost
Cost 2
Cost 3 Total revenue
Revenue 1
Revenue 2 Net profit
Revenue 3
WORK 3
53. How many days do you work per week/month? OOWDAYS3
54. How many hours do you do per day ? OOWHOURS3 __
55. What are the costs you have to pay daily/weekly/monthly for your business ?
What is the revenue you get daily/weekly/monthly from your business ?
Ush Item and Frequency Ush per week/day/month TOTALS
Cost 1 Total cost
Cost 2
Cost 3 Total revenue
Revenue 1
Revenue 2 Net profit
Revenue 3
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56. Do you own any buildings, or land that other people are using ? (Yes=1, No=0) OOWLANDLORD
57. Do they pay you something for using that building/land ?
BUILDING 1/PLOT 1 per week/month OOWRENT1_________ ,_____
BUILDING 1/PLOT 1 per week/month OOWRENT2_________ ,_____
BUILDING 1/PLOT 1 per week/month 00WRENT3
58. Do you own:
dresses for special occasions? (No=0, or quantity) OOWDRESS __
shoes for special occasions? (No=0, or quantity) OOWSHOES __
a watch ? (No=0, Yes=1) OOWWATCH
***59. Which is your home district ? .....   OOWDIST
Does this person have difficulty in speaking luganda/swahili ? OOWLANG___
No difficulty=1, some difficulty=2, considerable difficulty=3, cannot speak it=4 
If YES:
Which language would they rather use ? .....................................................
ARE YOU CONFIDENT THAT THE QUESTIONS HAVE BEEN FULLY UNDERSTOOD ? (Yes=1, No=0) OOWCOMPR
COMMENTS.............................................................................................................
Literacy Test:
For those who only have primary education.
7. Please can you read to me this sentence ? (No difficulty=2;Some difficulty=1; Cannot=0)
Luganda: Webale nnyo obuyambi bw'otuwadde 00WREAD1
swahili: Asante sana kwa wusaidizi wako 00WREAD2
English: thank you for your help 00WREAD3
8. Please can you write any sentence for me here ? (No 
difficulty-2;Some difficulty=1; Cannot=0) OOWWRITE___
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APPENDIX D
OWNERSHIP QUESTIONNAIRE:SEPARATED OR WIDOWED WOMEN
OSFDATE /____/ ____
Name of interviewer .................. ...................................................... O SFASST_____
FILL IN *** QUESTIONS BEFORE THE INTERVIEW
***First two digits: 01=Luwala, 02=Kusaku, 03=Nakalasa, 04=Wagala,05=Mulange,06=Kawolo Hosopital, 7=Mukono 
DFI, 08=Sebule Cocoa Estate, 09=Nkokonjeru, 10=Casual employers, 20=Namubiru, 30=Zitwe, 40=Kirangira, 
50=Ttakkajjunge. 60=Ggunda, 70=Lwanyonyi.
***Second three digits: House no. OSFHOUSNO_________________
***1. Name of respondant ...........................
2. Age
3. Sex (1=Female, 2=Male) SHOULD BE FEMALE !
***4. Is this woman separate(=2) or widowed (=3) ?
QUESTIONS ABOUT YOUR EDUCATION
5. Have you attended school? (Yes=1;No=0) OSFEDUC __
IF NO, GO TO Q9:
6. How many years were you at school? OSFEDYRS   (yrs)
7. What level did you reach? (1=P1-P4, 2=P5-P7/P5-J1, 3=S1-S4/J2-J3, 4=S5-S6, 5=Teritary) OSFLEVEL __
IF REACHED SECONDARY EDUCATION GO TO Q9
8. Literacy test: proves ability to read (No difficulty=2;Some difficulty=1; Cannot=0) TURN TO LAST PAGE
9. Literacy test: proves ability to write (No difficulty=2;Some difficulty=l; Cannot=0) TURN TO LAST PAGE
10. Have ever had any other type of education, training or adult education? (Yes=1;No=0) OOWTRAIN __
IF NO GO Q12:
11. Type of education;
Agricultural seminars? (Yes=l;No=0) (Specify  ) OOWTYPE1
For how long did this education last? (Delete as appropriate) OOWUNIT1 Year/Month/Week/Dav OOWTIME1 _____
Particular trade skills? (Yes=1;No=0) (Specify ................................................ ) OOWTYPE2 ___
For how long did this education last? (Delete as appropriate) OOWUNIT2 Year/Month/Week/Dav OOWTIME2 _____
Religious Training? (Yes=1;No=0); (Specify  ) OOWTYPE3 ___
For how long did this education last? (Delete as appropriate) OOWUNIT3 Year/Month/Week/Dav OOWTIME3 _____
College or professional? (Yes=1;No=0) Specify  ) OOWTYPE4 ___
For how long did this education last? (Delete as appropriate) OOWUNIT4 Year/Month/Week/Dav OOWTIME4 _____
Other ? (Yes=1;No=0) Specify .............................................................  OOWTYPE5 _
For how long did this education last? (Delete as appropriate) OOWUNIT5 Year/Month/Week/Dav OOWTIME5 _____
12. Did your mother go to school ? (Yes=l;No=0) OSFMEDUC __
IF NO GO TO 14:
13. What level of education did your mother reach? OSFMLEVEL __
(1 =P1 -P4, 2=P5-P7/P5-J1 , 3=S1 -S4/J2-J3, 4=S5-S6, 5=Teritary)
14. Did you father go to school? (Yes=1;No=0) OSFFEDUC __
IF NO GO TO 16:
15. What level of education did your father reach? OSFFLEVEL __
(1=P1-P4, 2=P5-P7/P5-J1, 3=S1-S4/J2-J3, 4=S5-S6, 5=Teritary)
16. Have you ever held any position of responsibility within the community? (Yes=1;No=0) OOWRESPON __
IF NO GO TO 18:
17. Have you ever been or are you a .... ?
LC1 official ? (Yes=1, No=0) OWWPOSIT1_ _
For how many years has/was this position held? OOWYRS1 _____
LC2 official ? (Yes=1, No=0) OWWPOSIT2_ _
For how many years has/was this position held? OOWYRS2 _____
LC3 official ? (Yessl, No=0) OWWPOSIT3___
For how many years has/was this position held? OOWYRS3 _____
an official at church/moscrne ? (Yes=1, No=0) OWWPOSIT4 __
For how many years has/was this position held? OOWYRS4 _____
an official in the 'Traditional' authorities ? (Yes=1, No=0) (Specify ................) OWWPOSIT5 ___
For how many years has/was this position held? OOWYRSS _____
'Traditional'healer/health worker ? (Yes=1, No=0) OWWPOSIT6 __
For how many years has/was this position held? OOWYRS6 _____
Group or Project leader ? (Yes=1 , No=0) (Specify ...........................  )OWWPOSIT7
For how many years has/was this position held? OOWYRS7
OSFAGE __
OSFSEX
OSFMARITAL
QUESTIONS ABOUT HOUSEHOLD PROPERTY AND EXPENSES
We w i s h  to t a l k  to y o u  a b out y o u r  h o u s e h o l d  p r o p erty. It is often said that although women contribute 
towards a household, that if the husband and wife separate, or the husband dies, the woman is chased away 
with nothing. We wish to learn about what women own after separation or death of the husband, what 
property they purchased and what women are able to keep if they should separate from their husband. This 
is why I wish to ask you property in your household. What you tell me will be COMPLETELY CONFIDENTIAL. 
The information will NOT be passed on to your husband, any LC official, any government official, or anybody 
in your community.
***18.Does this household have any land where you can grow crops or graze animals?(Yes=1, No=0) OOWHLAN1 ___
IF NO, GO TO 21:
19. Do you own this land (=1), (if separated) does you ex-husband own it (=2), or is it owned by 
somebodyelse(=3)? OOWHLAN2 __
20. Which crops do you cultivate on this land ? (Yes=1, No=0)
coffee OOWCOFF __
matooke for eating OOWMATOOI __
matooke for beer O0WMATOO2 __
beans OOWBEAN __
g 1 nuts OOWGNUTS __
cassava OOWCASS __
maize OOWMAIZE __
21 0
sweet potato OOWPOTAT
tomatoes OOWTOMAT
greens OOWGREEN
cabbage OOWCABB
vanilla OOWVANIL
sorghum OOWSORG
finger millet OOWMILL
sugarcane OSFSUGAR
other Specify ..................................................    OOWCROP
21. Who owns the house where you live: you (=1), (if separated) your ex-husband (=2),
or somebodyelse (=3) OOWHOUSE
22. Have you made any improvements to your house in the last 2 years ? (Yes=1, No=0) OOMHOUSE
23. What was the alteration ? OMALTER1
1=new house, 2=kitchen/extension, 3=roof/walls/floor, 4=painting OMALTER2
24. Whose money normally navs for the following items:
You can choose from the following answers : You=1;Relative=4, Don't buy=9
Food ? (If relative. Specify.......................   )
Charcoal ? (If relative. Specify............................................)
Woodfuel ? (If relative, Specify............................................)
Parafin ? (If relative,.Specify......   )
Water ? (If relative. Specify...........................  )
Your clothes? (If relative, Specify ...................................)
Childrens' clothes? (If relative. Specify .......................... )
0MALTER3
OSFFOOD
OSFCHAR
OSFWOOD
OSFPARA
OSFWATER
OSFWCLOT
OSFCCLOT
Do you have any children living with you who are at school ? (Quantity) 
IF NOT, Go to transport costs.
OSFCHILD
School uniform ? (If relative, Specify ...........................)
School books ? (If relative, Specify ...................   )
School lunch ? (If relative, Specify  ........................ )
School fees ? (If relative. Specify ...........................)
Your transport costs ? (If relative, Specify ...........................)
Clinic bills? (If relative, Specify ............................. )
Hospital bills? (If relative, Specify .............   )
Rent ? (If relative, Specify ................   )
Electricity ?(If relative, Specify ...........................)
OSFSCHU
OSFSCHB
OSFSCHL
OSFSCHF
OSFWTRAN
OSFCLIN
OSFHOSP
OSFRENT
OSFELEC
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ITEM 25. How many of 
the following 
are there in 
your household 
now? (Quantity)
26. IF SEPARATED 
/WIDOWED. How many 
items were there in 
the household when 
you separated/your 
husband died ?
27.IF SEPARATED,/IF 
WIDOWED, how many of 
these items were you 
able to keep for 
yourself.
27. Were there any 
items that were 
yours that you were 
not able to keep ?
Hoes
Panga
Charcoal stove
Parafin stove
Jerry cans
Basins
Saucepans
Chairs
Benches
Table
Cupboard
Sleeping mats
Mattresses
Beds
Hens
Goats
Sheep
Pigs
Cattle
Bicycle
Radio
Radio/Tapecasette
TV
Motorcycle
Vehicle
Sewing machine
Other
(Codes tor ' ocher' : b=son, u=Daugnter, P=Fneha, K=Kelative, N=Nepnew/waeceJ
28. Did you personally inherit any of the following:
land ? (0=No; or number of acres) OOWINHL ______  (Acres)
buildings ? (No=0, or number) 00W1NHB____
cattle ? (0=No; or quantity) OWWINHCA______
goats ? (0=No; or quantity) OOWINHG______
coffee trees ? (0=No or number of acres) OOWINHCO  (Arces)
banana trees ? (0=No; or number of acres) OOWINHBA  (Arces)
29. Can you tell me what has happened to that/those ?.
Do you still own them/it(=1),
have you sold them/it (=3),
did your husband sell them/it (=4),
or has somethingelse happened (=5) ? Specify .......................................................
Land OOWLAND __
Buildings OOWBUILD___
Cattle OOWCATTLE_ _
Goats OOWGOAT____
coffee trees OOWCOFF____
banana trees OOWBANA
QUESTIONS ABOUT YOUR WORK
We wish to ask you questions about your work and income. For this study it is important to compare the 
income women who are married, with the income of those who are not. As I said before, everything that you
21 2
tell me Will be COMPLETELY CONFIDENTIAL.
***30. Do you earn any money by selling your labour ? (Yes=1;No=0) (SEE CENSUS FORM) OOWWAGE
IF NO, GO TO Q42
***31. Employer 1..................... .................................................  OOWEMPL1 __
(Type of business/organisation)
32. Type of work ...............    OOWWORK1___
(See over for codes.)
33 . How much are you paid per month/week/day (Delete as appropriate ) ? OOWWAGE1_________ , _______
34. How many hours do you work per day ? OOWHOURS 1
35. How many days do you work a week ? OOWDAYS!
36. Are you currently doing any other work for wages ?; (Yes=1;No=0) OOWOTHERW
IF NO, GO TO 42:
37 . Employer 2 . .  .....    OOWEMPL2___
(Type of business/organisation)
38. Type of work ....................................   OOWWORK2___
39. How much are you paid per month/week/day ? (Delete as appropriate) OOWWAGE2 _  _  _____
40. How many hours do you work per day? OOWHOURS2 __
41. How many days do you work per week? OOWWDAYS2
***42. Do you earn cash by doing business, or selling things ? (Yes=1 , No=0) (SEE CENSUS FORM) OOWCASH
43. What type of work do you do ?
(Use work codes, or specify type of activity not on code list)
WORK 1 Specify ..................................................... .............  OOWTYPE1 __
WORK 2 Specify ...................................................................  OOWTYPE2 __
WORK 3 Specify ................................................................... OOWTYPE3 __
WORK 1
44. How many days do you work per week? OOWDAYS1 __
45. How many hours do you do per day ? OOWHOURS1 __
46. What are the costs you have to pay daily/weekly/monthly for your business ?
What is the revenue you get daily/weekly/monthly from your business ?
Ush Item and Freguency Ush per week/day/month TOTALS
Cost 1 Total cost
Cost 2
Cost 3 Total revenue
Revenue 1
Revenue 2 Net profit
Revenue 3
WORK 2
47. How many days do you work per week?
48. How many hours do you do per day ?
49. What are the costs you have to pay daily/weekly/monthly for your business ?
What is the revenue you get daily/weekly/monthly from your business ?
Ush Item and Frequency Ush per week/day/month TOTALS
Cost 1 Total cost
Cost 2 |
Cost 3 Total revenue
Revenue 1
Revenue 2 Net profit
Revenue 3
WORK 3
50. How many days do you work per week?
51. How many hours do you do per day ?
52. What are the costs you have to pay daily/weekly/monthly for your business ?
What is the revenue you get daily/weekly/monthly from your business ?
Ush Item and Frequency Ush per week/day/month TOTALS
Cost 1 Total cost
Cost 2
Cost 3 Total revenue
Revenue 1
Revenue 2 Net profit
Revenue 3
OOWDAYS3 
OOWHOURS3
OOWDAYS2 
OOWHOURS2
213
53. Do you own any buildings, or land that other people are using ? (Yes=1, No=0) OOWLANDLORD
54. Do they pay you something for using that building/land ?
BUILDING 1/PLOT 1 per week/month OOWRENT3 _________ ,______
55. Do you own:
dresses for special occasions? (No=0, or quantity) OSFDRESS
shoes for special occasions? (No=0, or quantity) OSFSHOES___
a watch ? (No=0, Yes=1) OSFWATCH
QUESTIONS ABOUT HUSBAND 
We wish to ask you questions about your husband
56. Was he older or younger than you ? By how many years ? (Delete as appropriate:YOUNG/OLDER) 0SFAGE _____
57. Did he attend school? (Yes=1;No=0) OSFEDUC 
IF NO, GO TO Q60:
58. How many years was he at school? OSFEDYRS______ (yrs)
59. What level did he reach? (1=P1-P4, 2=P5-P7/P5-J1, 3=S1-S4/J2-J3, 4=S5-S6, 5=Tertiary) OSFLEVEL ___
60. Did he have any other type of education, training or adult education? (Yes=1;No=0) OOWTRAIN 
IF NO GO Q62:
61. Did he attend...
Agricultural seminars? (Yes=1;No=0) (Specify .................................................) OOWTYPE1 ___
For how long did this education last? (Delete as appropriate) OOWUNIT1 Year/Month/Week/Day 00WTIME1 _____
Particular trade skills? (Yes=1;No=0) (Specify  ) 00WTYPE2___
For how long did this education last? (Delete as appropriate) OOWUNIT2 Year/Month/Week/Day OOWTIME2 _____
Religious Training? (Yes=1 ;No=0) ; (Specify .............................................................) OOWTYPE3
For how long did this education last? (Delete as appropriate) OOWUNIT3 Year/Month/Week/Day 00WTIME3 _____
College or professional? (Yes=1;No=0) Specify ................................................... ) 00WTYPE4 ___
For how long did this education last? (Delete as appropriate) OOWUNIT4 Year/Month/Week/Day 00WTIME4 __ __
Other ? (Yes=1;No=0) Specify .............................................................  OOWTYPE5___
For how long did this education last? (Delete as appropriate) OOWUNIT5 Year/Month/Week/Day 00WTIME5 _____
62. Did he ever hold any position of responsibility within the community? (Yes=1;No=0) OOWRESPON___
IF NO GO TO 64:
63. Was he ever or is he a ..... ?
LC1 official ? (Yes=1, No=0) OWWPOSIT1___
For how many years has/was this position held? OOWYRS1______
LC2 official ? (Yes=1, No=0) OWWPOSIT2___
For how many years has/was this position held? 00WYRS2______
LC3 official ? (Yes=1, No=0) OWWPOSIT3___
For how many years has/was this position held? OOWYRS3 ___
an official at church/mosoua ? (Yes=1, No=0) OWWPOSIT4___
For how many years has/was this position held? OOWYRS4______
an official in the 'Traditional' authorities ? (Yes=1, No=0) OWWPOSIT5___
For how many years has/was this position held? 00WYRS5______
'Traditional'healer/health worker ? (Yes=1 , No=0) OWWPOSIT6 __
For how many years has/was this position held? 00WYRS6____ __
Group or Project leader ? (Yes=1, No=0) (Specify ..............................     ) 0WWP0SIT7
For how many years has/was this position held? OOWYRS7___
64. ***Which is your (the respondant's) home district ? .........................................  OSFDIST
Does this person have difficulty in speaking luganda/swahili ? OSFLANG
No difficulty=1, some difficulty=2, considerable difficulty=3, cannot speak it=4 
If YES:
Which language would they rather use ? .... ...... .........................................
ARE YOU CONFIDENT THAT THE QUESTIONS HAVE BEEN FULLY UNDERSTOOD ? (Yes=1, No=0) OOWCOMPR
COMMENTS.............................................................................................................
Literacy Test:
For those who only have primary education.
7. Please can you read to me this sentence ? (No difficulty=2;Some difficulty=1; Cannot=0)
Luganda: Webale nnyo obuyambi bw'otuwadde o o w r e a d i
Swahili: Asante sana kwa wusaidizi wako o o w r e a d 2
English: thank you for your help OOWREAD3
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8. Please can you write any sentence for me here ? (No 
difficulty=2;Some difficulty=1; Cannot=0) OOWWRITE___
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APPENDIX E
OWNERSHIP QUESTIONNAIRE: MEN
INDIVIDUAL MARRIED MEN
Name of interviewer
FILL IN £££ QUESTIONS BEFORE INTERVIEW
***First two digits: 01=Luwala, 02=Kusaku, 03=Nakalasa, 04=Wagala ,05=Mulange,06=Kawolo Hosopital, 7=Mukono 
DFI, 08=Sebule Cocoa Estate, 09=Nkokonjeru, 20=Namubiru, 30=Zitwe, 40=Kirangira, 50=Ttakkajjunge 
***Second three digits: House no. OMHOUSNO
1. Name  ............
2. Name of wife .........
3. Age
4. Sex (1=female, 2=male)
OMPERSONO
(SHOULD BE MALE !)
OMAGE __
OMSEX
QUESTIONS ABOUT YOUR EDUCATION
5. Have you attended school? (Yes=1;No=0) OMEDUC __
IF NO, GO TO Q10:
6. How many years were you at school? O MEDYRS_______ (yrs)
7. What level did you reach? (1=P1-P4, 2=P5-P7/P5-J1, 3=51-S4/J2-J3, 4=S5-S6, 5=Tertiary) OMLEVEL___
IF REACHED SECONDARY LEVEL, GO TO Q10:
8. Literacy test: proves ability to read (No difficulty=2;Some difficulty=1; Cannot=0)
9. Literacy test: proves ability to write (No difficulty=2;Some difficulty=1; Cannot=0)
10. Have ever had any other type of education, training or adult education? (Yes=1;No=0) OMTRAIN __
IF NO GO Q12:
11. Type of education;
Agricultural seminars? (Yes=1;No=0) (Specify  ........................................... ) OOWTYPE1____
For how long did this education last? (Delete as appropriate) OOWUNIT1 Year/Month/Week/Day OOWTIME1 _
Particular trade skills? (Yes=1;No=0) (Specify .................................................. ) O0WTYPE2 __
For how long did this education last? (Delete as appropriate) OOWUNIT2 Year/Month/Week/Day OQWTIME2    __
Religious training? (Yes=1;No=0); (Specify    ) OOWTYPE3___
For how long did this education last? (Delete as appropriate) OOWUNIT3 Year/Month/Week/Day OOWTIME3 _____
College or professional? (Yes=1;No=0) Specify .................................................. ) OOWTYPE4___
For how long did this education last? (Delete as appropriate) 00WUNIT4 Year/Month/Week/Day OOWTIME4 ______
Other ? (Yes=1;No=0) Specify..............................   )OOMTYPE5______
For how long did this education last? (Delete as appropriate) OOWUNIT5 Year/Month/Week/Day OOWTIME5 ______
12. Did your mother go to school ? (Yes=1;No=Q) OMMEDUC __
IF NO GO TO 14:
13. What level of education did your mother reach? OMMLEVEL __
(1=P1-P4, 2=P5-P7/P5-J1, 3=S1-S4/J2-J3, 4=S5-S6, 5=Tertiary)
14. Did you father go to school? (Yes=1;No=0) OMFEDUC __
IF NO GO TO 16:
15. What level of education did your father reach? OMFLEVEL __
(1=P1-P4, 2=P5-P7/P5-J1, 3=51-S4/J2-J3, 4=S5-S6, 5=Tertiary)
16. Have you held any position of responsibility within the community? (Yes=1;No=0) 
IF NO GO TO 18:
17. Were or are you a ....
LC1 offical ? (Yes=1, No=0)
For how many years has/was this position held?
LC2 offical ? (Yes=l, No=0)
For how many years was this position held?
LC3 offical ? (Yes=1, No=0)
For how many years was this position held? 
an official at church/mosoue ? (Yes=1, No=0)
For how many years was this position held?
an official in the 'Traditional1 authority ? (Yes=1, No=0)
For how many years was this position held?
1 Traditional'healer/health worker ? (Yes=1, No=0)
For how many years was this position held?
Group or Project leader ? (Yes=1, No=0) (Specify .........................
OMRESPON
OWWPOSIT1 __
OOWYRS1 _____
OWWPOSIT2 __
OOWYRS2 _____
OWWPOSIT3 __
OOWYRS3 _____
OWWPOSIT4 __
OOWYRS4 _  _
OWWPOSIT5 __
00WYRS5 _____
OWWPOSIT6 __
OOWYRS6 _____
. . .) OWWPOSIT7
For how many years was this position held? OOWYRS7
QUESTIONS ABOUT PROPERTY AND LAND
I wish to ask you questions about your property and land. One of the purposes of this study is to compare 
the property owned by the husband with the property owned by the wife. Many people have claimed that there 
is much inequality, and we wish to discover whether this is true. What you tell me will be COMPLETELY 
CONFIDENTIAL. The information will NOT be passed on to your wife, any RC official, any government official, 
or anybody in your community.
1 8 . Did you inherit any land ? (Yes=1, No=0) INHLA __
IF NO, GO TO 20
19. How many separate plots did you inherit ? INHPLOTS____
20. Do you own any land now ? (Yes=1 , No=0) OWNLA_ _
IF NO, GO TO 35
21 . How many separate plots do you own ? OWNPLOT_ _
22. How many of these plots benefit this household ? PL0THH1_ _
IF NONE, GO TO 33
I wish to talk about each plot that benefit this household:
PLOT 1
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23. Is it youself or somebodyelse that uses this land ? (Yourself=1 , Somebodyelse=2) WHO!___
24. How is that land used ? Farming=1 , Building=2, Other=3, specify ......................  USE1
IF SOMEBODYELSE IS USING THE LAND/BUILDING:
25. Do the people using that land/building pay you something for using it? (Yes=1, No=0) PAY1___
How much do they pay per week /month /year 00WRENT1__________,_________
PLOT 2
26. Is it youself or somebodyelse that uses this land ? (Yourself=1, Somebodyelse=2) WH02___
27. How is that land used ? Farming=1, Building=2, Other=3, specify.............   USE2 __
IF SOMEBODYELSE IS USING THE LAND/BUILDING:
28. Do the people using that land/building pay you something for using it? (Yes=1, No=0) PAY2 __
29. How much do they pay per week/month/year OOWRENT2   __  ,__________
PLOT 3
30. Is it youself or somebodyelse that uses this land ? (Yourself=1, Somebodyelse=2) WH03___
31. How is that land used ? Farming=1 , Building=2, Other=3, specify..............................  USE3 __
IF SOMEBODYELSE IS USING THE LAND/BUILDING:
32. Do the people using that land/building pay you something for using it?(Yes=1, No=0) PAY3___
How much do they pay per week/month/year OOWRENT3_________ ,_________
IF THE ANSWERS TO Q22 AND Q21 ARE THE SAME, GO TO 35
33. Do you have any plots do not benefit this household, that perhaps benefit another household of yours,
or are lying idle ? How many plots ? PLOTHH2_
IF IDLE, GO TO 35
34. How is that land used ? Farming=1, Building=2, 0ther=3, specify ............................
PLOT 1 USE4___
PLOT 2 USE5___
PLOT 3 USE6___
IF USED FOR FARMING,
Which crops do you grow there ? (Yes=1, No=0)
coffee OOWCOFF_ _
matooke for eating OOWMATOOI___________________
matooke for beer OOWMAT0O2___________________
beans OOWBEAN_ _
g ’nuts OOWGNUTS_________ __________
cassava OOWCASS_ _
maize OOWMAIZE ___
sweet potato OOWPOTAT_________ __________
tomatoes OOWTOMAT_________ __________
greens OOWGREEN_________ __________
cabbage OOWCABB_ _
vanilla OOWVANIL __
sorghum OOWSORG_ _
finger millet OOWMILL_ _
sugar cane OOWSUGAR_________ __________
other Specify     OOWCROP __
35. I need to ask whether you inherited any of the following:
Cattle ? (0=No; or quantity) OMINHCA_ _
Goats ? (0=No; or quantity) OMINHG_ _
Coffee trees ? (0=No; or quantity) OMINHCO    (Arces)
Banana trees ? (0=No; or quantity) OMINHBA    (Arces)
Buildings ? (0=No; or quantity) OMINHBU_ _
36. How many of the following do you own, that do not benefit this housheold, that maybe benefit another 
household ?
cattle OMCATTLE _____
goats OMGOATS_ ____
sheep OMSHEEP ___ __
hens OMHEN_ ____
hoes OMHOE_ ____
pangas OMPANGA_ ____
buildings OMBUILD _
31. Who owns the house where you live: you (=1), your wife (=2) , or somebodyelse ( = 3) OOWHOUSE___
32. Have you made any improvements to your house in the last 2 years ? (Yes=1, No=0) OOMHOUSE___
33. What was the alteration ? OMALTER1___
1=new house, 2=kitchen/extension, 3=roof/walls/floor, 4=painting OMALTER2___
OMALTER3
QUESTIONS ABOUT YOUR WORK
I wish to ask you questions about your work and income. As I mentioned above one of the purposes of this 
study is to compare the income earned by the husband with the income earned by the wife. What you tell me 
will be COMPLETELY CONFIDENTIAL. The information will NOT be passed on to your wife, any RC official, any 
government official, or anybody in your community.
***34. Do you earn any money by selling your labour ? (SEE CENSUS FORMS) (Yes=1;No=0) OMWAGE __
IF NO, GO TO Q46
35. Employer 1 ...............................................................................  OOWEMPL1______ __________ _________
(Type of business/organisation)
36. Type of work .............................................................................  OOWWORK1_________________ _________
(See over for codes.)
37. How much are you paid per month/week/day (Delete as appropriate )? OOWWAGE1 ________ , __________
38. How many hours do you work per day ? 00WH0URS1______
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39. How many days do you work a week ? OOWDAYS1
40. Are you currently doing any other work for wages ?; (Yes=1?No=0)
IF NO, GO TO 46:
41 . Employer 2 .....................................................
(Type of business/organisation)
42. Type of work .....................................................................
43. How much are you paid per month/week/day (Delete as appropriate ) ?
44. How many hours do you work per day?
45. How many days do you work per week?
***46. Do you earn any cash by doing business or selling things ? (Yes=l, No=0)
47. What type of work do you do ?
(Use work codes, or specify type of activity not on code list)
WORK 1 Specify ...................................................................
WORK 2 Specify ..................... .................. ..........................
WORK 3 Specify ...................................................................
WORK 1 .............................................. ......................
48. How many days do you work per week?
49. How many hours do you do per day ?
50. What are the costs you have to pay daily/weekly/monthly for your business ?
What is the revenue you get daily/weekly/monthly from your business ?
OOWOTHERW
OOWEMPL2 __
OOWWORK2 __
OOWHOURS2
OOWWDAYS2
OOWTYPE1 
OOWTYPE 2 
OOWTYPE 3
OMDAYS1 
OMHOURS1
Ush Item and Frequency Ush per week/day/month TOTALS
Cost 1 Total cost
Cost 2
Cost 3 Total revenue
Revenue 1
Revenue 2 Net profit
Revenue 3
WORK 2 ........................................................
51 . How many days do you work per week? OMDAYS2
52. How many hours do you do per day ? OMHOURS2
53. What are the costs you have to pay daily/weekly/monthly for your business ?
What is the revenue you get daily/weekly/monthly from your business ?
Ush Item and Frequency Ush per week/day/month TOTALS
Cost 1 Total cost
Cost 2
Cost 3 Total revenue
Revenue 1
Revenue 2 Net profit
Revenue 3
WORK 3 .........................................................
54. How many days do you work per week? OMDAYS3
55. How many hours do you do per day ? OMHOURS3
56. What are the costs you have to pay daily/weekly/monthly for your business ?
What is the revenue you get daily/weekly/monthly from your business ?
Ush Item and Frequency Ush per week/day/month TOTALS
Cost 1 Total cost
Cost 2
Cost 3 Total revenue
Revenue 1
Revenue 2 Net profit
Revenue 3
57, Do you own a watch? (Yes=1;No=0, or quantity)
58. Do you own a:
suit/kanzu for special occasions? (Quantity)
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pair of shoes for special occasions ? (Quantity) OMSHOES______
59. Which is your home district ? OMDIST
60. Does this person have difficulty in speaking luganda/swahili ? OMLANG ~
No difficulty=1, some difficulty=2, considerable difficulty=3, cannot speak it=4
If Yes:
Which language would you rather use ? ......................... ...................................
61 . Can I please measure your weight ? OMWEIGHT_______.__ kg
62. Can I please measure you height ? OMHEIGHT . cm
ARE YOU CONFIDENT THAT THE QUESTIONS HAVE BEEN FULLY UNDERSTOOD ? (Yes=1, No=0) OOWCOMPR
COMMENTS.............................................................................................................
Literacy Test:
For those who only have primary education.
8. Please can you read to me this sentence ? (No difficulty=2;Some difficulty=1; Cannot=0)
Luganda: Webale nnyo obuyambi bw'otuwadde OOMREAD1
Swahili: Asante sana kwa wusaidisi wako o o m r e a d 2
English: thank you for your help o o m r e a d s
9. Please can you write any sentence for me here ? (No difficulty=2;Some difficulty=1; Cannot=0) OMWRITE
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APPENDIX F
CHILD DATA (Women only) Date / /
1. Wife's Name ........................................................ ASST
First two digits: Namubiru=20, Kirangira=40, Ttakkajjunge=50, Lwanyonyi=70, 2itwe=30, Ggunda=60 
Second three digits: House number House Number
HOUSEHOLD ROSTER
I wish to ask you questions about the adults and children that live with you.
2. Can you please tell me the names of all the children and adults that live in this house, and their 
relationship with you.
NAME What is your relationship to this person 7
If son or daughter; Are you the biological mother?
HUSBAND
mother(or mother's sister)=7, aunt=8, father (or father's brother)=9, 
mother-in-law=13, father-in-law=l4. If other please specify in table. 
Note: Everybody should be listed including babies
uncle=10, sister=11, brother=12,
3. Do you have any other biological children that are not on this list, 
children at boarding school ?
IF NO, GO TO Q5. IF YES, CONTINUE:
4. Can you please tell me their names 7
that live elsewhere, including
NAME IF RESPONDANT IS MARRIED: Is the father of the 
child your current husband 7 (Yes=1,No=1)
5 . Name ...................................................................................................
6. Sex (1=female, 2=male ) CSEX_ _
7. Age (Only specify months if under 5 years) CAGE __ Years _____  Months
IF SINGLE WOMAN GO TO Q9. IF RESPONDANT IS MARRIED, CONTINUE:
8. Does her/his biological father live in this house ? (Yes=1, No=0) CFATHER_ _
IF YES GO TO Q10. IF NO, CONTINUE:
9. Has or does the biological father or any other person provide any financial support ?
(Yes=1,No=0) CFINANCE__
10. How many years has she/he spent at school ? CYEARS______
11. What level has he/she reached 7 (1=Nursery,2=P1-P4, 3=P5-P7, 4=S1-S4, 5=S5-S6, 6=tertiary) CLEVEL __
12. Is she/he still at school ? (Yes=1, No=0) CSCHOOL___
IF UNDER 5 YEARS GO TO Q14. IF OVER 5 YEARS CONTINUE:
13. Has she/he ever worked for wages or been involved in any income generating activity 7 (Yes=l, No=0)
eg houseboy/girl. Specify     CWORK __
IF CHILD IS "OVER 5 YEARS", GO TO NEXT CHILD.
14. Has the child ever been immunised ? (Yes=1, No=0) CIMMUNE___
IF NO, GO TO Q16. IF YES, CONTINUE:
15. Do you have the card from the health clinic 7 Can you show me 7 (Yes=l, No=0) CCARD __
16. Has the child had diahorrea in the last: week=1, month=2, two months=3, no=Q CDIAHOR___
220
17. Has the child had a fever in the last: week=1, month=2, two months=3, no=0 CFEVER_ _
18. Has the child had a cough in the last: week=1, month=2, -two months=3, no=0 CCOUGH_ _
19. Name ....................................................................................................
20. Sex (1=female, 2=male ) CSEX
21 . Age (Only specify months if under 5 years) CAGE Years Months
IF SINGLE WOMAN GO TO Q23. IF RESPONDANT IS MARRIED, CONTINUE:-------------------------------------------
22. Does her/his biological father live in this house ? (Yes=1, No=0) CFATHER
IF YES GO TO Q24. IF NO, CONTINUE: —
23. Has or does the biological father or any other person provide any financial support ?
(Yes=1,No=0) CFINANCE__
24. How many years has she/he spent at school ? CYEARS _____
25. What level has he/she reached ? (1=Nursery, 2=P1-P4, 3=P5-P7, 4=S1-S4, 5=S5-S6, 6=tertiary) C L E V E L_
26. Is she/he still at school ? (Yes=1, No=0) CSCHOOL
IF UNDER 5 YEARS GO TO Q28. IF OVER 5 YEARS CONTINUE:
27. Has she/he ever worked for wages or been involved in any income generating activity ? (Yes=1, No=0)
eg houseboy/girl. Specify .......................................................................  CWORK
IF CHILD IS "OVER 5 YEARS", GO TO NEXT CHILD.
28. Has the child ever been immunised ? (Yes=l, No=0) CIMMUNE 
IF NO, GO TO Q30. IF YES, CONTINUE:
29. Do you have the card from the health clinic ? Can you show me ? (Yes=1, No=0) CCARD_ _
30. Has the child had diahorrea in the last: week=1, month=2, two months=3, no=0 CDIAHOR_________ __________
31. Has the child had a fever in the last: week=1, month=2, two months=3, no=0 CFEVER_
32. Has the child had a cough in the last: week=1, month=2, two months=3, no=Q CCOUGH_
33. Name ..................................... .......................................................... .
34. Sex (1=female, 2=male ) CSEX___
35. Age (Only specify months if under 5 years) CAGE ___ Years __ Months
IF SINGLE WOMAN GO TO Q37. IF RESPONDANT IS MARRIED, CONTINUE:
36. Does her/his biological father live in this house ? (Yes=1, No=0) CFATHER
IF YES GO TO Q38. IF NO, CONTINUE:
37. Has or does the biological father or any other person provide any financial support ?
(Yes=1,No=0) CFINANCE___
38. How many years has she/he spent at school ? CYEARS______
39. What level has he/she reached ? (1=Nursery, 2=P1-P4, 3=P5-P7, 4=S1-S4, 5=S5-S6, 6=tertiary) CLEVEL _
40. Is she/he still at school ? (Yes=1 , No=0) CSCHOOL_________ __________
IF UNDER 5 YEARS GO TO Q42. IF OVER 5 YEARS CONTINUE:
41. Has she/he ever worked for wages or been involved in any income generating activity ? (Yes=1, No=0)
eg houseboy/girl. Specify ...............................................................)  CWORK __
IF CHILD IS "OVER 5 YEARS", GO TO NEXT CHILD.
42. Has the child ever been immunised ? (Yes=1, No=0) CIMMUNE___
IF NO, GO TO Q44. IF YES, CONTINUE:
43. Do you have the card from the health clinic ? Can you show me ? (Yes=1, No=0) CCARD_ _
44. Has the child had diahorrea in the last: week=1, month=2, two months=3, no=0 CDIAHOR __
45. Has the child had a fever in the last: week=1, month=2, two months=3, no=0 CFEVER_
46. Has the child had a cough in the last: week=l, month=2, two months=3, no=0 CCOUGH_
47. Name ................................................................. ..................................
48. Sex (1=female, 2=male ) CSEX __
49. Age (Only specify months if under 5 years) CAGE __  __ Years _____  Months
IF SINGLE WOMAN GO TO Q51. IF RESPONDANT IS MARRIED, CONTINUE:
50. Does her/his biological father live in this house ? (Yes=1, No=0) CFATHER __
IF YES GO TO Q52. IF NO, CONTINUE:
51. Has or does the biological father or any other person provide any financial support ?
(Yes=1,No=Q) CFINANCE___
52. How many years has she/he spent at school ? CYEARS______
53. What level has he/she reached ? (1=Nursery,2=P1-F4, 3=P5-P7, 4=S1-S4, 5=S5-S6, 6=tertiary) CLEVEL _
54. Is she/he still at school ? (Yes=1, No=0) CSCHOOL_________ __________
IF UNDER 5 YEARS GO TO Q56. IF OVER 5 YEARS CONTINUE:
55. Has she/he ever worked for wages or been involved in any income generating activity ? (Yes=1, No=0)
eg houseboy/girl. Specify     CWORK __
IF CHILD IS "OVER 5 YEARS", GO TO NEXT CHILD.
56. Has the child ever been immunised ? (Yes=1 , No=0) CIMMUNE_________ __________
IF NO, GO TO Q58. IF YES, CONTINUE:
59. Do you have the card from the health clinic ? Can you show me ? (Yes=l, No=0) CCARD _____
60. Has the child had diahorrea in the last: week=1, month=2, two months=3, no=0 CDIAHOR_________ __________
61. Has the child had a fever in the last: week=1, month=2, two months=3, no=Q CFEVER_
62. Has the child had a cough in the last: week=1, month=2, two months=3, no=0 CCOUGH_
63. Name .............................. .....................................................................
64. Sex (1=female, 2=male ) CSEX___
65. Age (Only specify months if under 5 years) CAGE ______  Years _____  Months
IF SINGLE WOMAN GO TO Q67. IF RESPONDANT IS MARRIED, CONTINUE:
68. Does her/his biological father live in this house ? (Yes=1, No=0) CFATHER_________ __________
IF YES GO TO Q70. IF NO, CONTINUE:
71. Has or does the biological father or any other person provide any financial support ?
(Yes=1,No=0) CFINANCE__
72. How many years has she/he spent at school ? CYEARS______
73. What level has he/she reached ? (1=Nursery, 2=P1-P4, 3=P5-P7, 4=S1-S4, 5=S5-S6, 6=tertiary) CLEVEL __
74. Is she/he still at school ? (Yes=1, No=0) CSCHOOL
IF UNDER 5 YEARS GO TO Q76. IF OVER 5 YEARS CONTINUE:
75. Has she/he ever worked for wages or been involved in any income generating activity ? (Yes=1, No=0)
eg houseboy/girl. Specify........................................................................  CWORK __
IF CHILD IS "OVER 5 YEARS", GO TO NEXT CHILD.
76. Has the child ever been immunised ? (Yes=1, No=0) CIMMUNE___
IF NO, GO TO Q78. IF YES, CONTINUE:
77. Do you have the card from the health clinic ? Can you show me ? (Yes=l, No=0) CCARD___
78. Has the child had diahorrea in the last: week=1, month=2, two months=3, no=0 CDIAHOR___
79. Has the child had a fever in the last: week=l, month=2, two months=3, no=0 CFEVER___
80. Has the child had a cough in the last: week=1, month=2, two months=3, no=0 CCOUGH___
81 . Name ..................................... ................................................ .............
82. Sex (1=female, 2=male ) CSEX __
83. Age (Only specify months if under 5 years) CAGE   Years   Months
IF SINGLE WOMAN GO TO Q85. IF RESPONDANT IS MARRIED, CONTINUE:
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84. Does her/his biological father live in this house ? (Yes=1, No=0) CFATHER
IF YES GO TO Q86. IF NO, CONTINUE: ~~
85. Has or does the biological father or any other person provide any financial support ?
(Yes=1,No=0) CFINANCE___
86. How many years has she/he spent at school ? CYEARS______
87. What level has he/she reached ? (1=Nursery,2=P1-P4, 3=P5-P7, 4=S1-S4, 5=S5-S6, 6=tertiary) CLEVEL __
88. Is she/he still at school ? (Yes=1, No=0) CSCHOOL
IF UNDER 5 YEARS GO TO Q90. IF OVER 5 YEARS CONTINUE:
89. Has she/he ever worked for wages or been involved in any income generating activity ? (Yes=1, No=0)
eg houseboy/girl. Specify .......................................      CWORK
IF CHILD IS "OVER 5 YEARS", GO TO NEXT CHILD.
90. Has the child ever been immunised ? (Yes=1, No=0) CIMMUNE
IF NO, GO TO Q92. IF YES, CONTINUE:
91. Do you have the card from the health clinic ? Can you show me ? (Yes=1, No=0) CCARD___
92. Has the child had diahorrea in the last: week=1, month=2, two months=3, no=0 CDIAHOR
93. Has the child had a fever in the last: week=1, month=2, two months=3, no=0 CFEVER _
94. Has the child had a cough in the last: week=1, month=2, two months=3, no=0 CCOUGH
95. Name  .................................................................................................
96. Sex (1=female, 2=male ) CSEX
97. Age (Only specify months if under 5 years) CAGE _____  Years _____  Months
IF SINGLE WOMAN GO TO Q99. IF RESPONDANT IS MARRIED, CONTINUE:
98. Does her/his biological father live in this house ? (Yes=1 , No=0) CFATHER___
IF YES GO TO Q100. IF NO, CONTINUE:
99. Has or does the biological father or any other person provide any financial support ?
(Yes=1,No=0) CFINANCE___
100. How many years has she/he spent at school ? CYEARS______
101. What level has he/she reached ? (1=Nursery, 2=P1-P4, 3=P5-P7, 4=S1-S4, 5=S5-S6, 6=tertiary) CLEVEL_____
102. Is she/he still at school ? (Yes=1 , No=0) CSCHOOL __
IF UNDER 5 YEARS GO TO Q104. IF OVER 5 YEARS CONTINUE:
103. Has she/he ever worked for wages or been involved in any income generating activity ? (Yes=1, No=0)
eg houseboy/girl. Specify     CWORK __
IF CHILD IS "OVER 5 YEARS", GO TO NEXT CHILD.
104. Has the child ever been immunised ? (Yes=1, No=0) CIMMUNE___
IF NO, GO TO Q106. IF YES, CONTINUE:
105. Do you have the card from the health clinic ? Can you show me ? (Yes=1, No=0) CCARD ___
106. Has the child had diahorrea in the last: week=1, month=2, two months=3, no=0 CDIAHOR___
107. Has the child had a fever in the last: week=1, month=2, two months=3, no=0 CFEVER___
108. Has the child had a cough in the last: week=1, month=2, two months=3, no=0 CCOUGH___
109. Name .....................................................................................................
110. Sex (1=female, 2=male ) CSEX___
111 . Age (Only specify months if under 5 years) CAGE __ Years ___ ___ Months
IF SINGLE WOMAN GO TO Q113. IF RESPONDANT IS MARRIED, CONTINUE:
112. Does her/his biological father live in this house ? (Yes=1, No=0) CFATHER __
IF YES GO TO Q114. IF NO, CONTINUE:
113. Has or does the biological father or any other person provide any financial support ?
(Yes=1,No=0) CFINANCE___
114. How many years has she/he spent at school ? CYEARS___ __
115. What level has he/she reached ? (1=Nursery, 2=P1-P4, 3=P5-P7, 4=S1-S4, 5=S5-S6, 6=tertiary) CLEVEL_____
116. Is she/he still at school ? (Yes=1, No=0) CSCHOOL__
IF UNDER 5 YEARS GO TO Q118. IF OVER 5 YEARS CONTINUE:
117. Has she/he ever worked for wages or been involved in any income generating activity ? (Yes=l, No=0)
eg houseboy/girl. Specify   CWORK _
IF CHILD IS "OVER 5 YEARS", GO TO NEXT CHILD.
118. Has the child ever been immunised ? (Yes=1, No=0) CIMMUNE__
IF NO, GO TO Q120. IF YES, CONTINUE:
119. Do you have the card from the health clinic ? Can you show me ? (Yes=1, No=0) CCARD __
120. Has the child had diahorrea in the last: week=1, month=2, two months=3, no=0 CDIAHOR __
121. Has the child had a fever in the last: week=1, month=2, two months=3, no=0 CFEVER __
122. Has the child had a cough in the last: week=1, month=2, two months=3, no=0 CCOUGH __
123. Name ....................................................................... ............................
124. Sex (1=female, 2=male ) CSEX __
125. Age (Only specify months if under 5 years) CAGE ______ Years _____  Months
IF SINGLE WOMAN GO TO Q127. IF RESPONDANT IS MARRIED, CONTINUE:
126. Does her/his biological father live in this house ? (Yes=1, No=0) CFATHER __
IF YES GO TO Q128. IF NO, CONTINUE:
127. Has or does the biological father or any other person provide any financial support ?
(Yes=1,No=0) CFINANCE __
128. How many years has she/he spent at school ? CYEARS______
129. What level has he/she reached ? (1=Nursery,2=P1-P4, 3=P5-P7, 4=S1-S4, 5=S5-S6, 6=tertiary) CLEVEL __
130. Is she/he still at school ? (Yes=1, No=0) CSCHOOL __
IF UNDER 5 YEARS GO TO Q132. IF OVER 5 YEARS CONTINUE:
131. Has she/he ever worked for wages or been involved in any income generating activity ? (Yes=1, No=0)
eg houseboy/girl. Specify     CWORK __
IF CHILD IS "OVER 5 YEARS", GO TO NEXT CHILD.
132. Has the child ever been immunised ? (Yes=1, No=0) CIMMUNE_ _
IF NO, GO TO Q134. IF YES, CONTINUE:
133. Do you have the card from the health clinic ? Can you show me ? (Yes=1, No=0) CCARD_ _
134. Has the child had diahorrea in the last: week=1, month=2, two months=3, no=0 CDIAHOR_ _
135. Has the child had a fever in the last: week=1, month=2, two months=3, no=0 CFEVER_ _
136. Has the child had a cough in the last: week=1, month=2, two months=3, no=0 CCOUGH___
137. Name ....................................................................................................
138. Sex (1=female, 2=male ) CSEX___
139. Age (Only specify months if under 5 years) CAGE ______ Years __   Months
IF SINGLE WOMAN GO TO Q141. IF RESPONDANT IS MARRIED, CONTINUE:
140. Does her/his biological father live in this house ? (Yes=1, No=0) CFATHER___
IF YES GO TO Q142. IF NO, CONTINUE:
141. Has or does the biological father or any other person provide any financial support ?
(Yes=1,No=0) CFINANCE __
142. How many years has she/he spent at school ? CYEARS___ __
143. What level has he/she reached ? (1=Nursery, 2=P1-P4, 3=P5-P7, 4=S1-S4, 5=S5-S6, 6=tertiary) CLEVEL __
144. Is she/he still at school ? (Yes=1, No=0) CSCHOOL___
IF UNDER 5 YEARS GO TO Q146. IF OVER 5 YEARS CONTINUE:
145. Has she/he ever worked for wages or been involved in any income generating activity ? (Yes=1, No=Q)
eg houseboy/girl. Specify   CWORK __
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IF CHILD IS "OVER 5 YEARS", GO TO NEXT CHILD.
146. Has the child ever been immunised ? (Yes=1, No=0)
IF NO, GO TO Q148. IF YES, CONTINUE:
147. Do you have the card from the health clinic ? Can you show me ? (Yes=1, No=0)
148. Has the child had diahorrea in the last: week=1, month=2, two months=3, no=0
149. Has the child had a fever in the last: week=1, month=2, two months=3, no=0
150. Has the child had a cough in the last: week=1, month=2, two months=3, no=0
CIMMUNE
CCARD
CDIAHOR
CFEVER
CCOUGH
FOR ALL NON-RESIDENT CHILDREN (All ages)
151. Name
1 52. 
1 53. 
154. 
1 55. 
1 56. 
1 57.
Sex
Age
(1=female, 2=male ) CSEX __
C A G E  Years
How many years has she/he spent at school ? CYEARS
What level has he/she reached ? (1=nursery, 2=P1-P4, 3=P5-P7, 4=S1-S4, 5=S5-S6, 6=tertiary) CLEVEL __
Is she/he still at school ? (Yes=1, No=Q) CSCHOOL
Does she/he provide this household with any "financial support" ? (Yes=1, No=0) CSUPPORT
158. Name  ....................................
159. Sex (1=female, 2=male )
160. Age
161. How many years has she/he spent at school ?
162. What level has he/she reached ? (1=nursery,
163. Is she/he still at school ? (Yes=1, No=0)
164. Does she/he provide this household with any "financial support" ? (Yes=1, No=0)
2=P1-P4, 3=P5-P7, 4=S1-S4, 5=S5-S6,
CSEX __
C A G E ______ Years
CYEARS _____
6=tertiary) CLEVEL
CSCHOOL __
CSUPPORT
165 . Name ......................................... .
166. Sex (1=female, 2=male )
1 67. Age
168. How many years has she/he spent at school ?
169. What level has he/she reached ? (1=nursery,
170. Is she/he still at school ? (Yes=1, No=0)
171. Does she/he provide this household with any
CSEX __
C A G E  Years
CYEARS _____
2=P1-P4, 3=P5-P7, 4=S1-S4, 5=S5-S6, 6=tertiary) CLEV E L__
CSCHOOL __
"financial support" ? (Yes=1, No=0) CSUPPORT
172. Name .........................................................................................
173. Sex (1=female, 2=male ) CSEX __
17 4. Age C A G E ________Years
175. How many years has she/he spent at school ? CYEARS _____
176. What level has he/she reached ? (1=nursery, 2=P1-P4, 3=P5-P7, 4=S1-S4, 5=S5-S6, 6=tertiary) CLEVEL ________
177. Is she/he still at school ? (Yes=1, No=0) CSCHOOL __
178. Does she/he provide this household with any "financial support" ? (Yes=1, No=0) CSUPPORT __
179.
180. 
181 . 
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190. 
191 . 
192.
Name
Sex (1=female, 2=male )
Age
How many years has she/he spent at school ? 
What level has he/she reached ? (1=nursery, 
Is she/he still at school ? (Yes=1, No=0) 
Does she/he provide this household with any
CSEX __
C A G E  Years
CYEARS _____
2=P1-P4, 3=P5-P7, 4=S1-S4, S=S5-S6, 6=tertiary) C L E V E L__
CSCHOOL __
"financial support" ? (Yes=1, No=0) CSUPPORT __
Name ................................... ......................................................
Sex (1=female, 2=male ) CSEX __
Age C A G E ________Years
How many years has she/he spent at school ? CYEARS _____
What level has he/she reached ? (1=nursery, 2=P1-P4, 3=P5-P7, 4=S1-S4, 5=S5-S6, 6=tertiary) CLEVEL ______
Is she/he still at school ? (Yes=1, No=0) CSCHOOL __
Does she/he provide this household with any "financial support" ? (Yes=1, No=0) CSUPPORT __
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
Name ...........................................
Sex (1=female, 2=male )
Age
How many years has she/he spent at school ? 
What level has he/she reached ? (1=nursery, 
Is she/he still at school ? (Yes=1, No=0)
CSEX __
C A G E ______ Years
CYEARS _____
2=P1-P4, 3=PS-P7, 4=S1“S4, 5=S5-S6, 6=tertiary) C L E V E L__
CSCHOOL
Does she/he provide this household with any "financial support" ? (Yes=1, No=0) CSUPPORT
200. Name .........................................................................................
200. Sex (1=female, 2=male ) CSEX __
201 . Age C A G E ________Years
202. How many years has she/he spent at school ? CYEARS _____
203. What level has he/she reached ? (1=nursery, 2=P1-P4, 3=P5-P7, 4=S1-S4, 5=S5-S6, 6=tertiary) CLEVEL __
Is she/he still at school ? (Yes=l, No=0) CSCHOOL204,
205. Does she/he provide this household with any "financial support" ? (Yes=1, No=0) CSUPPORT
206. Name ................................................................................ .........
207. Sex (1=female, 2=male ) CSEX __
208. Age CAGE   Years
209. How many years has she/he spent at school ? CYEARS _____
210. What level has he/she reached ? (1=nursery, 2=P1-P4, 3=P5-P7, 4=S1-S4, 5=S5-S6, 6=tertiary) CLEVEL _______
210. Is she/he still at school ? (Yes=1, No=0) CSCHOOL __
211. Does she/he provide this household with any "financial support" ? (Yes=1, No=0) CSUPPORT __
212. Name ..................................................................................
213. Sex (1=female, 2=male )
214. Age
215. How many years has she/he spent at school ?
216. What level has he/she reached ? (1=nursery, 2=P1-P4, 3=P5-P7, 4=S1-S4, 5=S5-S6,
217. Is she/he still at school ? (Yes=1, No=0)
218. Does she/he provide this household with any "financial support" ? (Yes=1, No=0)
CSEX __
C A G E ______ Years
CYEARS _____
6=tertiary) CLEVEL __
CSCHOOL _  
CSUPPORT
219. Name
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220. Sex (1=female, 2=male )
221-Age
222. How many years has she/he spent at school ?
223. What level has he/she reached ? (1=nursery,
224. Is she/he still at school ? (Yes=1, No=0)
226.
227.
228.
229.
230. 
231 . 
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
2=P1-P4, 3=P5-P7, 4=S1-S4,
225. Does she/he provide this household with any "financial support" ? (Yes=1, No=0)
CSEX
C A G E ______ Years
CYEARS _____
5=S5-S6, 6=tertiary) CLEVEL __
CSCHOOL
CSUPPORT
Name ..........................................................................
Sex (1=female, 2=male )
Age
How many years has she/he spent at school ?
What level has he/she reached ? (l=nursery, 2=P1-P4, 3=P5-P7, 4=51-54, 
Is she/he still at school ? (Yes=1, No=0)
Does she/he provide this household with any "financial support" ? (Yes=
CSEX __
C A G E ______ Years
CYEARS _____
5=S5-S6, 6=tertiary) CLEVEL __
CSCHOOL __
1 , No=0) CSUPPORT
Name .........................................................................
Sex (1=female, 2=male )
Age
How many years has she/he spent at school ?
What level has he/she reached ? (1=nursery, 2=P1-P4, 3=P5-P7, 4=51-54, 
Is she/he still at school ? (Yes=1, No=0)
Does she/he provide this household with any "financial support" ? (Yes=
CSEX __
C A G E ______ Years
CYEARS _____
5=S5-S6, 6=tertiary) CLEVEL __
CSCHOOL __
1 , No=0) CSUPPORT
240. Name ............................................................ .............
241. Sex (1=female, 2=male )
242. Age
243. How many years has she/he spent at school ?
244. What level has he/she reached ? (1=nursery, 2=P1-P4, 3=P5-P7, 4=S1-S4,
245. Is she/he still at school ? (Yes=1, No=0)
246. Does she/he provide this household with any "financial support" ? (Yes=
CSEX __
C A G E  Years
CYEARS
5=S5-S6, 6=tertiary) CLEVEL
CSCHOOL __
1 , No=0) CSUPPORT
247 . So, you have....... (number) biological children ? Is that right ? (Quantity)
(COUNT CHILDREN FROM 1ST AND 2ND TABLES)
248. Can you tell me the total number children that you have given birth to alive, including those who have 
died?
249. So, ....... (number) children have died ? Is that right ? (Quantity)
IF NONE HAVE DIED, GO TO NUTRITIONAL STATUS TABLE. IF SOME HAVE DIED CONTINUE:
250. Can you tell me the ages of the children when they died ?
Age of 1st child
Age of 2nd child 
Age of 3rd child 
Age of 4th child 
Age of 5th child
CBIRTH __
CDIED
CAGE
CAGE
CAGE
CAGE
CAGE
YEARS
YEARS
YEARS
YEARS
YEARS
MEASURING NUTRITIONAL STATUS 
I would now like to weigh and measure the children under 5 years
(COPY NAMES OF RESIDENT CHILDREN UNDER 5 YEARS INTO THE FOLLOWING TABLE.
PLEASE DON'T CARRY OR HOLD THE CHILD YOURSELF. MEASURE THE HEIGHT RATHER THAN LENGTH IF AT ALL POSSIBLE.)
NAME JOINT WEIGHT OF 
MOTHER AND 
CHILD
WEIGHT OF 
INDIVIDUAL
HEIGHT (Children over 1.5 years) 
LENGTH (Children under 1.5 
years)
MOTHER XXXXXXXXXXXXXX _____ .__  KG _________.__  CM
_________.__ KG _____ .__  KG _________.__  CM
__ _  _ . __ KG _  __KG _______ _ . __ CM
_________.__ KG _____ .__ KG _________.__  CM
_________.__  KG _____ .__ KG _________.__  CM
_________.__ KG _____ .__  KG _________ .__  CM
_________.__  KG _____ .__  KG _________ .__  CM
_________.__  KG _____ .__  KG _________ .__  CM
___ __.__  KG _____ .__  KG _________.__  CM
_________.__ KG _____ .__ KG _________.__  CM
COMMENTS
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APPENDIX G
Table 1 : Percentage of malnourished sons and daughters by gender and age
using all three indicies (Sample size).
Nutritional status Percentage of malnourished 
children 0-5 years
Sons (118) Daughters (133)
Wasting (a) 2.6 6.0
Stunting (b) 40.7 26.3
Underweight (c) 19.5 15.0
(a) Weight for height / Wasting / Acute, recent mainourishment
(b) Height for age / Stunting / Chronic, long-term malnourishment 
Co) Low weight for age.
Source: Kauga/Ngogwe survey.
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